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A bstract
A b s t r a c t
This thesis aims to investigate the development of social cognition during adolescence. 
Neuroimaging research has provided new evidence for significant developments of the 
brain during adolescence, contesting old notions that the human brain reaches maturity 
by childhood. The prefrontal, parietal and superior temporal cortices have been 
highlighted as the regions that undergo the most prolonged and profound structural 
change. Given the association of these brain areas with social cognitive tasks, including 
perspective taking, intention understanding and motor imagery, this series of studies 
have sought to investigate the social cognitive consequences of these brain 
developments.
The first study in this thesis investigated the development of perspective taking between 
late childhood and adulthood and found that perspective taking develops in terms of 
efficiency and possibly strategy during adolescence. The second study investigated 
perspective taking in adult patients with positive symptoms of schizophrenia, including 
delusions of persecution, and suggested differences in processing one’s own and other 
people’s perspectives in patients compared to normal controls. The third study used 
fMRI to investigate the development of the neural circuitry for intentional causality 
during adolescence and found a shift from relatively higher activity in superior temporal 
cortex during adolescence to relatively higher activity in medial prefrontal cortex in 
adulthood. In light of motor theories of social cognition, the fourth study comprised 
three motor imagery experiments that investigated the development of action 
representation during adolescence. Results suggested that the action representation 
system is refined during adolescence. The final study compared action representation in 
typically developing adolescents and those with autism spectrum disorders and found no 
differences in performance between groups.
Together, these studies have shown that certain social cognitive abilities develop during 
adolescence. The relation between social and motor cognition is discussed from a 
developmental perspective, as well as the link to brain maturation during adolescence. 
Finally speculations are made about how these processes may become dysfunctional in 
psychopathology.
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MPFC: medial prefrontal cortex
OFC: orbitofrontal cortex
PC: parietal cortex
PFC: prefrontal cortex
STS: superior temporal sulcus
TPJ: temporo-parietal junction
VPMC: ventral premotor cortex
Neural matter 
GM: grey matter 
WM: white matter 
MN: mirror neuron
Functions and systems 
TOM: theory of mind 
MNS: mirror neuron system
Groups
TD: typically developing 
ASD: autism spectrum disorder 
DCD: developmental coordination disorder 
NC: normal control adults
P-: patients with affective disorders but no/minimal positive symptoms 
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C hapter 1 Introduction
C h a p t e r  1 
1. In t r o d u c t io n
1.1. Adolescence: psychological, social and physical transitions
Adolescence is a transitional time between childhood and adulthood, characterized by 
major hormonal and physical changes and developments in identity, self-consciousness 
and cognitive flexibility (Coleman & Hendry, 1990; Feldman & Elliott, 1990; Rutter, 
1993). Social relationships seem to be of particular importance during adolescence. 
There seems to be a qualitative shift in the nature of thinking such that adolescents are 
more self-reflective and conscious of others than prepubescent children (Steinberg, 
2005). Adolescents also develop a capacity to hold in mind more multidimensional 
concepts and are thus able to think in a more strategic manner (Petersen, 1988). New 
research in social cognitive neuroscience has begun to suggest that the adolescent brain 
may be adaptive to the behaviourally demanding social environment during this period. 
Empirical research on cognitive and neural development during puberty and 
adolescence is in its initial stages. In the past few years, several pioneering experiments 
have investigated the development of brain and cognitive processes during this period 
of life. Even though brain adaptation can occur throughout the lifespan, the maturational 
phases during early life, that is, during fetal development, childhood and adolescence 
are thought to be the most dramatic (Toga et al., 2006). The first section of this 
introduction begins by outlining the cellular studies that first demonstrated anatomical 
brain developments during adolescence. It then goes on to describe how recent brain 
imaging techniques have supported these findings and have shed some light on the 
trajectories of maturational processes in the brain during adolescence. The sections that 
follow discuss investigations of cognitive development, in particular, studies of 
executive functions using behavioural and functional imaging techniques. The second 
section of this introduction discusses theories of intersubjectivity from a social cognitive 
neuroscience perspective.
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1.2. Evidence fo r  the development o f  the adolescent brain
1.2.1. The firs t experiments on adolescent brains
Until recently, very little was known about brain development during adolescence. The 
notion that the brain continues to develop after childhood is relatively new. Experiments 
on animals, starting in the 1950s, showed that sensory regions of the brain go through 
‘critical periods’ or ‘sensitive periods’ soon after birth, during which time 
environmental stimulation appears to be crucial for normal brain development and for 
normal perceptual development to occur (e.g. Hubei & Wiesel, 1962) These 
experiments on the development of the animal visual cortex suggested that there is a 
‘critical period’ in which an alteration in the normal pattern of activity during a time 
window in early life dramatically alters cortical inputs and responses, whereas a similar 
alteration later in life has no obvious effect. These experiments suggested the human 
brain might be susceptible to the same sensitive periods in early development, that is, a 
period of susceptibility to the effects of a certain type of stimulus.
It was not until the late 1970s that research on post-mortem human brains revealed that 
some brain areas continue to develop well beyond early childhood, which in turn 
suggested that sensitive periods for the human brain may be more protracted than 
previously thought. It was shown that cellular events take different trajectories in 
different areas of the human brain (Huttenlocher, 1979). Synaptic density in the visual 
cortex reaches a peak during the fourth postnatal month, and is followed by the 
elimination of synapses and the stabilisation of synaptic density to adult levels before 
the age of four. On the other hand, the structure of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
undergoes significant changes during puberty and adolescence (Huttenlocher, 1979; 
Huttenlocher et al., 1983; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967). Two main changes were 
revealed in the brain before and after puberty. As neurons develop, a layer of myelin is 
formed around their extension, or axon, from supporting ‘glial’ cells. Myelin acts as an 
insulator and massively increases the speed of transmission (up to 100 fold) of electrical 
impulses from neuron to neuron. Whereas sensory and motor brain regions become 
fully myelinated in the first few years of life, although the volume of brain tissue 
remains stable, axons in the frontal cortex (FC) continue to be myelinated well into 
adolescence (Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967). The implication of this research is that the
13
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transmission speed of neural information in the FC should increase throughout 
childhood and adolescence.
The second difference in the brains of pre-pubescent children and adolescents pertains 
to changes in synaptic density in the PFC. An adult brain has about 100 billion neurons; 
at birth the brain has only slightly fewer neurons (Pakkenberg & Gundersen, 1997). 
Flowever, during development many changes take place in the brain. Neurons grow, 
which accounts for some of the change, but the wiring, the intricate network of 
connections — or synapses — between neurons, sees the most significant change. Early 
in postnatal development, the brain begins to form new synapses, so that the synaptic 
density (the number of synapses per unit volume of brain tissue) greatly exceeds adult 
levels. This process of synaptic proliferation, called synaptogenesis, lasts up to several 
months, depending on the species of animal and brain region. At this point, synaptic 
densities in most brain regions are at their maximum. These early peaks in synaptic 
density are followed by a period of synaptic elimination (or pruning) in which 
frequently used connections are strengthened and infrequently used connections are 
eliminated. This experience-dependent process, which occurs over a period of years, 
reduces the overall synaptic density to adult levels.
These data came mainly from studies of sensory regions of animal brains. The first 
demonstration of synaptogenesis was in 1975, when it was found that in the cat visual 
system the number of synapses per neuron first increases rapidly and then gradually 
decreases to mature levels (Cragg, 1975). Further research carried out in rhesus 
monkeys (Rakic, 1995) demonstrated that synaptic densities reach maximal levels two 
to four months after birth, after which time pruning begins. Synaptic densities gradually 
decline to adult levels at around three years, around the time monkeys reach sexual 
maturity.
However, synaptogenesis and synaptic pruning in the prefrontal cortex has a rather 
different time course. Histological studies of monkey and human PFC have shown that 
there is a proliferation of synapses in the subgranular layers of the PFC during 
childhood and again at puberty, followed by a plateau phase and a subsequent 
elimination and reorganisation of prefrontal synaptic connections after puberty 
(Bourgeois et al., 1994; Huttenlocher, 1979; Woo et al., 1997; Zecevic & Rakic, 2001).
14
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According to these data, in the human brain, synaptic pruning occurs throughout 
adolescence and results in a net decrease in synaptic density in the medial PFC (MPFC) 
during this time. The focus of this chapter will be on cognitive implications of this 
second wave of synaptogenesis in PFC at the onset of puberty and the process of 
synaptic pruning that follows it after puberty.
Synaptic pruning is believed to be involved in the fine-tuning of functional networks of 
brain tissue, rendering the remaining synaptic circuits more efficient. Synaptic pruning 
is thought to underlie sound categorisation, for example. Language learning typically 
occurs immediately after birth, and requires picking out the meaningful sound 
distinctions from the continuous speech stream infants are exposed to. Babies are born 
with the ability to distinguish between many more speech contrasts than occur in their 
own language. However, by the end of their first year of life, they appear to lose the 
ability to distinguish between sounds which do not signal meaningful linguistic 
differences (see Kuhl, 2004 for review). For example, before about 12 months of age 
babies brought up in the USA can detect the difference between certain sounds common 
in the Hindi language, which after 12 months they can no longer distinguish (Werker et 
al., 1981). In contrast, babies brought up hearing the Hindi language at the same age 
remain sensitive to these distinctions. Based on these experiments, the idea that the 
human brain may continue to undergo substantial change after early sensitive periods 
seemed unlikely.
However, more recent research has questioned this view of brain plasticity. Kuhl has 
recently proposed a model of Native Language Neural Commitment (NLNC) in which 
experience-driven language learning produces dedicated neural networks that code the 
patterns of spoken language (statistical and prosodic patterns). If one is only exposed to 
one native language, the system will ‘settle’, or become committed to this, and 
subsequent violations (e.g. hearing a foreign language) will not be processed optimally. 
There is evidence that the systems of infants brought up bilingually ‘settle’ later (Kuhl, 
2004) and experience in later life can still influence and change these networks (e.g. 
second language learning; Teaching the /r/-/l/ discrimination to Japanese adults 
(McClelland et al., 2002)). Thus the idea of a ‘sensitive period’ has become less rigid 
and typified by the significant neural changes that take place when experience-driven 
learning is occurring. Many skills like language have to be learnt early, but it is thought
15
C hapter 1 Introduction
that other significant skills can only be learnt later, for example, complex social 
cognition, perhaps because there are certain aspects about adult social relationships that 
an infant can not learn in a socially ‘dependent’ role (J. Thomson, personal comm.). 
Although there is no direct evidence linking the cellular brain changes with sound 
processing, this fine-tuning of sound categorisation is thought to rely on the pruning of 
synapses in sensory areas involved in processing sound. The studies on post-mortem 
brain development suggest that development of cognitive processes associated with the 
frontal lobes may well continue throughout adolescence.
7.2.2. Viewing the adolescent brain with M RI
Until recently, the structure of the human brain could be studied only after death. The 
scarcity of post-mortem child and adolescent brains meant that knowledge of the 
adolescent brain was extremely scanty. Nowadays, non-invasive brain imaging 
techniques, particularly Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), can produce detailed 
three-dimensional images of the living human brain (see Figure. 1.1). Since the advent 
of MRI, a number of brain imaging studies have provided further evidence of the 
ongoing maturation of the cortex into adolescence and even into adulthood.
1.2.2.1. Linear increases in white matter during adolescence
Since the first in vivo studies reflecting that in spite of somewhat larger total brain 
volumes, adults have less grey matter (GM) than children (Jernigan & Tallal, 1990), in 
the past few years, several MRI studies have been performed to investigate the 
development of the structure of the brain during childhood and adolescence in humans 
(cf. Casey et al., 2005; Paus, 2005). One of the most consistent findings from these MRI 
studies is that there is a steady increase in white matter (WM) in certain brain regions 
during childhood and adolescence. In one MRI study, a group of children whose 
average age was nine years, and a group of adolescents whose average age was 14, were 
scanned (Sowell et al., 1999). This study revealed differences in the density of white 
and GM between the brains at the two age groups. The results showed a higher volume 
of WM in the FC and parietal cortex (PC) in the older children than in the younger 
group. The younger group, by contrast, had a higher volume of GM in the same regions. 
Myelin appears white in MRI scans, and therefore the increase in WM and decrease in 
GM with age was interpreted as reflecting increased axonal myelination in the frontal
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Figure 1.1. Magnetic Resonance Imaging  
(M RI) uses a very large magnetic fie ld  to 
produce high-quality three-dimensional images 
o f brain structures without injecting radioactive 
tracers. A large cylindrical magnet creates a 
magnetic fie ld  around the participant’s head, 
and a magnetic pulse is sent through the 
magnetic field. The MRI signal is based on the 
magnetic properties o f the protons within the 
nucleus o f atoms. The signal depends on a 
property o f the atoms called spin. When placed 
in a magnetic field, a spin has a magnetic 
moment. The net magnetic moment o f all the 
spins in the magnetic fie ld  is the magnetisation 
vector and the majority o f the spins in the 
magnetisation vector are aligned with the 
magnetic field. In order to observe a MRI signal 
the total magnetisation vector must be tipped 
away from  the main field  direction, to create a component o f  magnetisation precessing 
(rotating) about this axis, in the transverse plane. This is accomplished by exciting the 
spins by applying a radiofrequency magnetic fie ld  (the r f pulse) perpendicular to the 
main magnetic field. This changes the alignment o f  the proton magnetic moments so the 
spins are tipped away from  their equilibrium position. As a result o f this excitation the 
spins produce a i f  signal - this is the MRI signal. Although tissue and fa t contribute to 
the MR signal, the largest contributions come from  the protons in tissue water. The 
image intensity is dependent on the density o f these protons, and can also be affected by 
the local environment o f  the water molecules.
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and parietal cortices during this time period.
The increased WM and decreased GM density in FC and PC throughout adolescence 
has now been demonstrated by several studies carried out by a number of different 
research groups with increasingly large groups of participants (Giedd et al., 1996; 
1999a; Pfefferbaum et al., 1994; Reiss et al., 1996; Sowell et al., 1999). Different 
studies point to developmental changes in WM density in different brain regions. Paus 
et al., (1999a) analysed the brain images of 111 children and adolescents aged between 
four and 17 years, and noted an increase in WM specifically in the right internal capsule 
and left arcuate fasciculus. The left arcuate fasciculus contains WM tracts that connect 
anterior speech regions (Broca’s area) and posterior language regions (Wernicke’s 
area). Thus the increase in WM in this region was interpreted as reflecting increased 
connections between the speech regions. The corpus callosum, the dense mass of fibres 
that connects the two hemispheres of the brain, has also been found to undergo region- 
specific growth during adolescence and up until the mid-twenties (Barnea-Goraly et al., 
2005; Giedd et al., 1999b; Pujol et al., 1993).
While structural neuroimaging studies diverge in terms of the precise brain regions in 
which WM density increases have been found, they generally agree on the pattern of 
WM change. Most studies point to a steady, more-or-less linear increase in WM with 
age (Barnea-Goraly et al., 2005; Giedd et al., 1999a; Paus et al., 1999a; 1999b; 
Pfefferbaum et al., 1994; Reiss et al., 1996) and in light of histological studies 
(Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967) showing increasing levels of myelin in the human brain, 
WM increases in MRI (believed to signify  myelinated tissue) have been interpreted to 
reflect continued axonal myelination during childhood and adolescence (see Figure 
1.2A).
1.2.2.2. Non-linear decreases in grey matter during adolescence
While the increase in WM in certain brain regions seems to be linear across all brain 
areas, the changes in GM density appear to follow a region-specific, non-linear pattern. 
In other words, while WM development follows a steady, progressive course, GM 
development is at certain stages progressive and at other times regressive. As the 
following studies have shown, its pattern of development in certain brain regions 
follows an inverted-U shape (see Figure 1.2B).
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Figure 1.2. WM and GM development with ape. A: Linear 
development o f WM with increasing ape. This is thought to reflect a 
linear increase in myelination around axons. B: Non-linear 
development o f GM. This is thought to reflect synaptogenesis 
followed by synaptic pruning.
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Giedd et al. (1999a) performed a longitudinal MRI study on 145 healthy boys and girls 
ranging in age from about four to 22 years. At least one scan was obtained from each of 
145 participants (89 were male). Scans were acquired at two-year intervals for 65 of 
these participants who had at least two scans, 30 who had at least three scans, two who 
had at least four scans and one who had five scans. Individual growth patterns revealed 
heteroehronous GM development during adolescence. Changes in the frontal and 
parietal regions were similarly pronounced. The volume of GM in the frontal lobe 
increased during pre-adolescence with a peak occurring at around 12 years for males 
and 11 years for females. This was followed by a decline during post-adolescence. 
Similarly, parietal-lobe GM volume increased during the pre-adolescent stage to a peak 
at around 12 years for males and 10 years for females, and this was followed by decline 
during post-adolescence. GM development in the temporal lobes was also non-linear, 
but the peak was reached later at about 17 years. While FC and PC development is 
relatively rapid during adolescence, GM in the superior temporal cortex, including 
superior temporal sulcus (STS), steadily declines during adolescence and across the 
lifetime, following an inverted U-curve and reaching maturity relatively late (Gogtay et 
al., 2004; Toga et al., 2006; see Figure 1.3). In the occipital lobes, GM development 
had a linear course.
A further MRI study of 35 normally developing children (7-11 years), adolescents (12- 
lb years) and young adults (23-30 years) demonstrated a sharp acceleration in the loss 
of GM between childhood and adolescence in the dorsal PFC and the dorsal PC (Sowell 
et al., 2001). In the frontal lobes, the decrease in GM density was even more 
pronounced between adolescence and adulthood. In addition, an inverse relationship 
between dorsal PFC growth and GM density was found to exist between childhood and 
adolescence. The regions exhibiting the most robust decrease in GM density also 
exhibited the most robust post-pubescent increase in WM density in the dorsal PFC.
In a longitudinal study of participants aged between four and 21, Gogtay et al., (2004) 
scanned 13 children every two years for eight to 10 years. The authors suggested that 
phylogenetically older cortical areas mature earlier than the newer cortical regions. In 
the frontal lobe, maturation was shown to occur in a back-to-front direction, starting in 
the primary motor cortex (the precentral gyrus), then extending anteriorly over the 
superior and inferior frontal gyri.
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Figure 1.3. Grey matter density loss in superior fron ta l sulcus (SFS) and  
superior temporal sulcus (STS). GM loss is rapid during adolescence in 
SFS while it follows a steadier and more prolonged course o f development 
in STS (adapted from  Toga et al., 2006).
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The PFC was shown to develop last. In the posterior half of the brain, the maturation 
began in the primary sensory area, spreading laterally over the rest of the parietal lobe. 
Lateral temporal lobes were the last to mature. The authors noted that the temporal 
lobes have a distinct maturation pattern. While the temporal poles matured early, other 
areas including superior temporal gyrus and STS matured latest in the brain. It was 
suggested that the sequence of structural maturation corresponds to the regionally 
relevant milestones in cognitive development. In other words, those brain areas 
associated with more basic cognitive skills, such as motor and sensory functions 
matured first, followed by brain areas (including PC) linked to spatial orientation and 
attention and finally the regions related to executive function (PFC).
A similar pattern of development was found in a longitudinal study of children aged 
from three to 15 years (Thompson et al., 2000). In this experiment, high spatial 
resolution maps of the brain’s growth patterns were obtained using tensor mapping, 
with the same subject being scanned across time spans of up to four years. In the older 
group (11 to 15 years) a localized GM decrease in the FC was observed. This study 
provided further evidence of a sharp acceleration of GM density loss between childhood 
and adolescence in dorsal FC.
In summary, rather than a simple linear change in GM with age, studies suggest 
perturbation in GM density development that more or less coincides with the onset of 
puberty. At puberty, GM volume in the frontal lobe reaches a peak, followed by a 
plateau after puberty and then a decline throughout adolescence continuing until early 
adulthood. The MRI results demonstrating a non-linear decrease in GM in various brain 
regions throughout adolescence have been interpreted in two ways. First, it is likely that 
axonal myelination results in an increase in WM and a simultaneous decrease in GM as 
viewed by MRI. A second, additional explanation is that the GM changes reflect the 
synaptic reorganisation that occurs at the onset of and after puberty (Huttenlocher, 
1979). Thus, the increase in GM apparent at the onset of puberty (Giedd et al., 1999a) 
might reflect a wave of synapse proliferation at this time. The gradual decrease in GM 
density that occurs after puberty in certain brain regions has been attributed to post- 
pubescent synaptic pruning (Giedd et al., 1999a; Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 
2001). In other words, the increase in GM at puberty has been interpreted to reflect a 
sudden increase in the number of synapses. At some point after puberty, there is a
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process of refinement such that these excess synapses are eliminated (Huttenlocher, 
1979). It is speculated that this synaptic pruning is reflected by a steady decline in GM 
density seen in MRI.
1.2.3. Gender diff erences in development o f brain structure
Given that maturational rates and hormonal events differ between males and females, 
neuronal and cognitive differences might also be expected. Studies of rats as well as 
humans demonstrate that it is not just fluctuations of hormones but also anatomical 
differences that contribute to differences in cognition and behaviour. Aside from 
structural dimorphism of the hypothalamus, women also have larger hippocampi than 
men, when corrected for total brain size (Goldstein et al., 2001) and men have larger 
amygdalae than females (Cooke & Woolley, 2005; Goldstein et al., 2001), both of 
which are associated with differential cognitive capacities (Killgore et al., 2001; 
Kilpatrick et al., 2006; Maguire et al., 1999). The PFC is rich in sex hormones, with the 
highest concentration of oestrogen receptors in the brain (Bixo et al., 1995). Coupled 
with its structural development during adolescence, cognitive differences between the 
sexes might be expected during this period. Indeed, a cross-sectional MRI study of 46 
children and adults (mean age 11) revealed significant differences in grey and WM 
between girls and boys, particularly in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (Blanton et al., 
2004). A significant age-related increase in WM volume in the left IFG was found in 
boys but no significant volumetric changes in girls in any frontal regions. Furthermore, 
even after correcting for total cerebral volume, boys had significantly greater GM 
volume in the IFG relative to girls. The authors speculated that these structural 
differences may arise from the difference in steroid levels between girls and boys, 
during pubertal maturation. It was suggested that the effect of inhibition of synaptic 
pruning from testosterone may account for greater volume in boys that in girls. On the 
other hand, it was proposed that greater hemispheric specialisation (Shaywitz et al., 
1995) among boys may account for the gender differences in structure. So far, structural 
studies are not in full agreement with regard to gender differences. For example, in a 
longitudinal study, it was found that boys had 10% greater total cortical GM volume 
than girls, but that developmental trajectories of grey and WM volume were not 
significantly different (Giedd et al., 1999a). Larger longitudinal studies will help to 
overcome variability in FC anatomy, to discern gender differences more clearly.
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1.2.4. Brain changes continue after adolescence
Recent MRI studies indicate that the time at which the brain reaches maturity may be 
much later than the end of adolescence. One study of participants aged between seven 
and 30 revealed that the loss of GM in the dorsal FC accelerated during adulthood 
between the early 20s and up to the age of 30 (Sowell et al., 2001).
A further MRI study by the same group involved scanning 176 individuals between 
seven and 87 years (Sowell et al., 2003). The results revealed a reduction in GM density 
in the dorsal prefrontal, dorsal parietal and posterior temporal cortices, which was 
accompanied by an increase in WM. The pattern of GM changes was non-linear during 
the period of adolescence. Although the decrease in GM was most dramatic from 
childhood to young adulthood, this study revealed that WM volume continued to 
increase well beyond this stage and even up to the age of 60. The non-linear decrease in 
GM was concomitant with a linear increase in WM, consistent with earlier MRI data 
and with post-mortem studies.
To summarise, in vivo MRI studies coupled with post-mortem cellular studies of human 
brains have revealed an extended period of development, in particular in the frontal, 
parietal and superior temporal cortices. Taken together, the studies provide consistent 
evidence for the dynamic nature of the adolescent brain with respect to maturational 
changes of grey and WM. The main changes that have been observed are a non-linear 
reduction in GM density and a simultaneous linear increase in WM.
1.3. Changes in behaviour and cognition after puberty
Two of the brain regions that have consistently been shown to undergo continued 
development during adolescence are PFC and PC. Given the continued developmental 
changes in these brain regions during adolescence, it might be expected that cognitive 
abilities that rely on the functioning of these regions and their complex interconnectivity 
with other regions, should also change during this time period. Most studies to date 
have investigated cognitive abilities subserved by the frontal lobes, in particular 
executive function.
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1.3.1. The development o f  executive function
1.3.1.1. Behavioural studies o f  inhibitory control, working memory, decision-making 
and prospective memory
Most studies investigating cognitive development during adolescence have focussed on 
the frontal lobes. The term executive function  is used to describe the capacity that allows 
us to control and coordinate our thoughts and behaviour (Luria, 1966; Shallice, 1982). 
These skills include selective attention, decision-making, voluntary response inhibition 
and working memory. Each of these executive functions has a role in cognitive control, 
for example filtering out unimportant information, holding in mind a plan to carry out in 
the future and inhibiting impulses. Much work on human and monkey brain and 
behaviour has associated these strategic behaviour skills with the frontal lobes. Lesion 
studies (Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Rakic et al., 1994; Shallice, 1982) and functional 
imaging experiments (e.g. Casey et al., 1997; Rubia et al., 2001; 2003) suggest that such 
skills rely heavily on the frontal lobes. Since MRI studies have demonstrated changes in 
FC during adolescence, executive function abilities might be expected to improve 
during this time. For example, selective attention, decision-making and response 
inhibition skills along with the ability to carry out multiple tasks at once, might improve 
during adolescence. Many studies have investigated the development of executive 
function skills in early and late childhood (e.g. Brocki & Bohlin, 2004; Casey et al., 
1997; Klenberg et al., 2001; Paus, 1989; Paus et al., 1990). A few studies have 
investigated the changes in executive function skills during adolescence, the findings of 
which will be discussed in the following section.
Behavioural studies of performance of adolescents on tasks including inhibitory control 
(Leon-Carrion et al., 2004; Luna et al., 2004a), processing speed (Luna et al., 2004a), 
working memory and decision-making (Hooper et al., 2004; Luciana et al., 2005) 
continue to develop during adolescence (Luna et al., 2004a). Luna et al., for example, 
showed that performance on an oculomotor task undergoes a large improvement from 
childhood to adolescence, followed by a plateau between adolescence and early 
adulthood (Luna et al., 2004a). Another study investigating performance on a variety of 
executive function tasks between the ages of 11 and 17 demonstrated a linear 
improvement in performance on some tasks but not others (Andersen et al., 2001).
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Tasks that showed improvement during adolescence included tasks of selective 
attention, working memory and problem solving, whereas strategic behaviour, as tested 
by the Tower of London task (Shallice, 1982), seemed to have been formed earlier in 
childhood. Different aspects of executive function, therefore, may have different 
developmental trajectories. These studies speculate that the developments found are 
linked to the pruning and myelination processes occurring during adolescence in the 
PFC. Given that these cognitive functions have been associated with PFC function, and 
that histological and MRI studies have shown ongoing structural maturation during the 
adolescent period, it is thought that executive function development may be supported 
by neural maturation in PFC (cf. Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006a).
Prospective memory is the ability to hold in mind an intention to carry out an action at a 
future time (Ellis, 1996), for example, remembering to make a phone call at specific 
future time. Prospective memory is associated with frontal lobe activity (Burgess et al., 
2000) and has been shown to develop through childhood as we develop our future 
oriented thought and action (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000). Multitasking is believed to be 
a test of prospective memory as it requires participants to remember to perform a 
number of different tasks, mirroring everyday life. In a recent study of the development 
of prospective memory from childhood to adulthood, a multitask paradigm was used to 
test children aged between six and 14 and adults (Mackinlay et al., 2003). Participants 
were scored for both efficiency and the strategies used to effectively carry out the task. 
A significant improvement in both the efficiency and quality of strategies was found 
between the age of six and ten. However, between the ages of 10 and 14, there was no 
significant change in performance. The adult group (mean age 25), on the other hand, 
significantly out-performed the children. The authors therefore suggested that 
prospective memory continues to develop during adolescence, in line with the notion of 
frontal maturation in the brain. It is possible that the lack of improvement in 
performance between the 10 and 14-year olds was related to their pubertal status. In 
other words, changes in the brain at puberty might affect cognitive function.
A non-linear pattern of development was found in a recent behavioural study that used 
a match-to-sample task (McGivem et al., 2002). In this task, volunteers were shown 
pictures of faces showing particular emotional expressions (happy, sad, angry), or 
words describing those emotions (“Happy,” “Sad,” Angry”), and were asked to specify,
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as quickly as possible, the emotion presented in the face or word. In a third condition, 
volunteers were shown both a face and a word and had to decide whether the facial 
expression matched the emotional word. The rationale behind the design of the task was 
that the face/word condition places high demands on frontal lobe circuitry, since it 
requires working memory and decision-making. The task was given to a large group of 
children aged 10 to 17 years and a group of young adults aged 18 to 22 years.
The results revealed that, at the age of puberty onset, at 11-12 years, there was a decline 
in performance in the matching face and word condition compared with the younger 
group of children. A 10-20% increase in reaction time on the match-to-sample task 
occurred at the onset of puberty in the 10-11 year old group of girls and in the 11-12 
year old group in boys, compared to the previous year group of each sex (age 9-10 and 
10-11 in girls and boys, respectively). The results suggest that there is a dip in 
performance on this kind of task at the onset of puberty. After puberty, from age 13-14, 
performance improved until it returned to the pre-pubescent level by the age of about 
16-17 years.
The researchers linked this pubertal dip in performance to the proliferation of synapses 
that occurs at the onset of puberty, followed by synaptic pruning and strengthening after 
puberty. Based on these behavioural results, and in the context of structural MRI studies 
discussed above, it was suggested that until pruning occurs after puberty, synaptic 
connections in the FC generate a low signal to noise ratio due to an excess of synapses, 
which renders the cognitive performance less efficient. So, the sudden proliferation of 
synapses at puberty results in a perturbation of cognitive performance. Only later, after 
puberty, are the excess synapses pruned into specialized, efficient networks, which are 
then thought to render cognitive function more efficient.
13.1.2. Viewing the adolescent brain in action with fM RI: neuroimaging studies o f  
inhibitory control, generativity, risk assessment and learning
Functional MRI (fMRI) provides us with a safe, non-invasive tool to study interactions 
between brain and behaviour (see Figure 1.4). fMRI has been used only in a handful of 
studies investigating the neural bases of cognitive development using tasks designed to 
tap specifically into PFC function, in particular executive function tasks.
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For example, through fMRI studies, the development of response inhibition, and the 
neural structures supporting it, has been well studied. A popular paradigm for studying 
inhibition is the Go/No-Go task, which involves inhibiting a response when a certain 
stimulus is shown. In one fMRI study that employed a version of this task , a group of 
children (seven-12 years old) and young adults (21-24 years old) were presented with a 
series of alphabetic letters and were required to press a button upon seeing each one, 
except when the letter X appears (Casey et al., 1997). Volunteers were instructed to 
refrain from pressing any buttons if they saw the letter ‘X ’ -  the No-Go stimulus. This 
task requires executive action: the command to inhibit a habitual response.
The results showed that in both children and adults, several regions in the FC, including 
the anterior cingulate, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and inferior and middle frontal gyri, 
were activated during the task that required inhibiting the normal response. While the 
location of activation was essentially the same for both age groups, there was a 
significantly higher volume of prefrontal activation in children than in adults, 
specifically in the dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) and extending into the cingulate. By 
contrast, adults showed more activity in the ventral region of the PFC. Thus the 
activation in the DLPFC could be negatively correlated with behavioural performance 
(as interpreted from error rates), as distinct from the OFC whose activation increased 
with improvement in behavioural performance. In line with this pattern, those 
participants who performed best (that is, those who had lowest error rates) and had the 
greatest orbitofrontal activation, also had the least DLPFC activation. The greater and 
more diffuse activity in the dorsal region of the PFC in children suggests that there is a 
heavier dependence on this region in children compared with in adults. The researchers 
suggested that during adolescence, the network recruited for this task is modified until 
adulthood, at which stage activation of a smaller, more focal region of the PFC is used 
to perform the same task.
To substantiate speculations about brain activation during inhibition during the 
transition between childhood and adulthood, the study was replicated with a wider age 
range of participants (Tamm et al., 2002). In the second study, the same Go/NoGo task 
was used but participants included children as well as adolescents -  this time, 
participants ranged in age from eight to 20 years old. While there was no difference in 
accuracy on the task with age, reaction times successfully to inhibit responses
28
Chapter 1 Introduction
Figure. 1.4. Functional M R I (fM RI). In
the past 15 years, techniques have been 
developed that enable scientists to use 
MRI to image the brain at work. This is 
known as fMRI. When neurons become 
active they require a supply o f oxygen to 
be carried to them in the blood. It is this 
oxygen carried in the blood that the fM R I 
scanner detects because o f the magnetic 
properties o f oxygen.
Oxygen transport in the blood is mediated 
by haemoglobin, contained within red 
blood cells. The binding o f oxygen to 
haemoglobin is regulated by local oxygen 
pressure: when the pressure is high 
oxygen is bound to haemoglobin; when 
the pressure is low oxygen is released. 
When haemoglobin has no oxygen bound 
to it, it has a net magnetic moment. As soon as oxygen becomes bound this, net moment 
disappears. Haemoglobin's paramagnetic behaviour thus depends on the amount o f  
oxygen bound to it. The magnetic state o f  blood therefore reflects its level o f  
oxygenation, with deoxyhaemaglobin being more paramagnetic than oxyhaemaglobin.
Because deoxyhaemaglobin is more paramagnetic than oxyhaemaglobin, a change in 
the MRI signal extending around the blood vessels can be caused by manipulating the 
oxygenation state o f  the blood. The more paramagnetic an agent the faster its 
relaxation time is, and the less signal it will produce. Therefore, deoxyhaemaglobin 
produces less MRI signal than oxyhaemaglobin. fM R I measures the amount o f 
oxygenated blood that is sent to particular regions in the brain. This information is used 
to make film s ' o f  changes in brain activity as volunteers see or hear certain stimuli or 
perform other tasks, like answer questions tapping specific cognitive processes. 
Scanning a subject while he or she is performing a particular cognitive task should lead 
to activity changes in, and only in, the region o f interest.
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significantly decreased with age. fMRI data revealed age related increases in activation 
in the left inferior frontal gyrus extending to the OFC and, consistent with Casey et al.’s 
results, age related decreases in activation in both the left superior and middle frontal 
gyrus extending to the cingulate. These results demonstrated a dissociation between 
prefrontal areas in the development of inhibitory control and a negative correlation 
between age and brain activation.
This pattern of age-dependent activation has been corroborated by fMRI studies of 
generativity. Word generation tasks, for example, have been extensively used in 
experimental and clinical studies and are consistently linked to PFC activation and are 
therefore useful to study development of generativity in adolescence (Brown et al., 
2005, Gaillard et al., 2000). A study using a verbal fluency task required children 
(average age 11 years) and adults (average age 29 years) to generate different words 
starting with the same letter as quickly as possible in the scanner (Gaillard et al., 2000). 
The results of this study revealed that children performed worse on the task and had on 
average 60% greater activation in the left inferior FC and the DLPFC than did adults.
Thus, reaction times and imaging data together suggest that in children, an immature 
stage of the brain where excess synapses, possibly as a result of a burst of proliferation, 
accounts for the poorer performance and extensive and less efficient frontal activation. 
A pruned and more myelinated adult brain could explain the faster reaction times and 
focal activation of the PFC, the area crucial to generativity (Frith et al., 1991) and the 
inhibitory response (Konishi et al, 1999). The Go/NoGo task requires multiple 
executive functions including working memory and inhibition albeit at a relatively low 
level. One possibility is that extensive activation in children is a compensatory strategy 
used while the brain is less efficient in integrating executive functions.
Adolescents are renowned for engaging in risky behaviour. A recent neuroimaging 
study suggests that differences in brain activation in mesolimbic circuitry during 
incentive-driven behaviour between adolescents and adults might account for this 
(Bjork et al., 2004). A group of 12 adolescents and 12 young adults were scanned while 
they carried out a task that involved anticipating the opportunity for both monetary 
gains and losses and the notification of their outcomes. Compared with adults, 
adolescents showed reduced recruitment of the right ventral striatum and right amygdala
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while anticipating responses for gains. Activation patterns during monetary gain 
notification did not differ between groups. This suggested lower activation for 
motivational but not consummatory components of reward-directed behaviour. To 
explain risky behaviour commonly associated with adolescence, the authors postulated 
that adolescents are driven to seek more extreme incentives to compensate for low 
recruitment of motivational brain circuitry.
Anecdotally, adolescents are known to be poor at decision-making, especially when risk 
is involved. In an fMRI study that investigated the neural mechanisms that might 
account for differences between adolescents and adults in decision-making, participants 
were presented with one-line scenarios (e.g. “Swimming with sharks”) and were asked 
to indicate via a button press whether they thought this was a “good idea” or a “not 
good idea”(Baird et al., 2005). There was a significant group by stimulus interaction, 
such that adolescents took significantly longer than adults on the “not good idea” 
scenarios relative to the “good idea” scenarios. Furthermore, adults showed greater 
activation in the insula and right fusiform face area compared to adolescents, during the 
“not good” ideas. On the other hand, adolescents showed greater activation in the 
DLPFC during the “not good” ideas and there was a significant correlation between 
DLPFC activation and reaction time. It was proposed when confronted with a risky 
scenario, adults’ relatively efficient responses were driven by mental images of possible 
outcomes and the visceral response to those images, in line with the somatic marker 
hypothesis (Damasio, 1996). However, adolescents relied more on reasoning capacities 
and therefore activated the DLPFC, hence, the relatively effortful responses compared 
to adults.
Neural plasticity of the developing brain may underpin different propensities for 
learning new skills, such as problem solving, at different stages of the life cycle. For 
example, sensitive periods for learning phonemes of one’s mother tongue occurs in the 
first ten months of life (Kuhl et al., 1992) and the ability to learn a second language 
declines with age (Hakuta et al., 2003). Logical reasoning required to solve 
mathematical problems activates both PC and FC in both adolescents and adults. An 
fMRI study that required participants to solve algebraic equations before and after a 
practise period demonstrated differential activation patterns after four days of learning 
in adolescents and adults (Luna et al., 2004b; Qin et al., 2004). Both adolescents and
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adults showed an increase in prefrontal, parietal and motor activation while solving the 
equations. Both groups also demonstrated a reduction in prefrontal areas after practice. 
However, adolescents, as distinct from adults, additionally demonstrated a reduction in 
parietal regions after the practice period. The authors proposed that the PC represents an 
‘imaginal’ component necessary for this sort of abstract reasoning task. They proposed 
that after the learning period, the adolescents are less reliant on this area than the adults. 
However, the directions of cause and effect remain ambiguous. It is unclear whether the 
adolescents’ decrease in parietal activation with practice was a result of an immature PC 
and hence a higher relative dependence on the PFC. Alternatively, more localised 
parietal activation in adolescents might indicate an advantage among adolescents for 
this sort of task; that is, adolescents depend less heavily on more specialised parietal 
circuitry, compared to adults. Further functional imaging studies combined with 
behavioural analysis will clarify the significance of focal versus diffuse brain activation 
patterns for the propensity to learn.
Although several developmental studies emphasise the decrease in frontal activity with 
age, in others, activity in this and other regions has been found to increase with age. 
Using a visuo-spatial working memory task, Kwon et al., (2002) found that performance 
gradually improved with age between seven and 22 years. Age-related changes were 
found in several brain regions including the DLPFC and the posterior PC bilaterally. 
Activity in these regions increased with age on this task. Age predicted activity in these 
brain regions more than task performance. Similarly, Rubia et al., (2001) reported 
increased activation in various frontal and parietal regions on a task of response 
inhibition. Using the Stroop colour-word interference paradigm, which involves 
inhibition of inappropriate responses, Adleman et al., (2002) observed age-related 
increases in activity in a left frontal-parietal network of areas. They found no evidence 
of decreased activity with age.
A recent longitudinal MRI study of participants aged between three and 29 years 
revealed that the trajectory of change in cortical thickness is associated with the 
development of IQ (Shaw et al., 2006). The relationship between cortical thickness and 
IQ, as indexed by Wechsler intelligence scales, was found to vary with age. In early 
childhood, IQ and cortical thickness throughout the PFC and in the left superior/middle 
temporal gyri were positively correlated for both males and females, whereas in late
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childhood and beyond, the same correlation in these areas was negative. Stratification of 
participants into three IQ bands (superior (IQ range: 121-149), high (IQ range: 109-120) 
and average (83-108)) indicated that the maximum trajectory differences between 
groups were in superior frontal gyrus bilaterally extending into the MPFC. The 
developmental shift in trajectory was most pronounced for the most intelligent children 
and adolescents: the highest IQ children had a thinner cortex in early childhood but 
cortical thickness then increased, peaking at around age 11, and then undergoing the 
most dramatic cortical thinning thereafter. Shaw and colleagues therefore propose that 
intelligence levels relate to how the cortex changes during development. They also 
suggest further investigations including animal studies, to identify the cellular processes 
that underlie the changes in cortical thickness. This study suggests a direct link between 
IQ and dynamic properties of cortical structure and also addresses individual 
differences. Whether increased plasticity relates to better performance on executive 
function and other cognitive tasks remains to be explored.
1.3.1.3. Confounding eff ects o f task perf ormance
One remaining issue is the confounding effect of task performance differences in fMRI 
studies. If one group’s task performance is worse than that of the other group, then any 
difference in brain activity between the two groups is difficult to interpret. It might 
cause the difference in task performance, or it might be an effect of these differences. 
Future studies should attempt to match task performance between groups to avoid this 
interpretation problem. Another problem with understanding developmental fMRI data 
is the functional interpretation of increased or decreased BOLD signals in particular 
regions, given that we know the brain is developing structurally. If there is an increase 
in synaptic density at one time point in PFC, for example, and increased blood flow in 
this area for a particular task, it is difficult to know whether the increased BOLD signal 
results from higher oxygen demands from greater neural matter at this age compared to 
at another age, or from a difference in functional strategy at that age.
1.4. Summary
Cross-sectional post-mortem studies in the 1970s/80s demonstrated changes in synaptic 
density and myelination in FC during childhood and adolescence. Recent cross­
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sectional and longitudinal MRI studies show GM and WM changes during adolescence 
and into early adulthood, with the most prolonged and pronounced changes in PFC, PC 
and STS. GM decline and WM increase have been interpreted to reflect synaptic 
pruning and myelination, respectively. Behavioural and fMRI studies show 
development of executive function skills during adolescence. Executive function is 
though to rely on PFC. Morphological developments in PFC are thought to correlate 
with development of cognitive skills relying on PFC and PC, for example, impulse 
inhibition, willed action and abstract reasoning.
The next section will explore how brain development is linked to social cognitive 
development in childhood and adolescence and will describe current theories in social 
cognitive neuroscience that explain how we understand other minds.
34
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1.5. Intersubjectivity: current theories from  social cognitive neuroscience
1.5.1. What is social cognition?
Intersubjectivity refers to the communication between people that relies on shared 
meanings (Gallese, 2006). During the last decade, social cognitive neuroscience 
approaches have been developed to understand how we process sensations, actions and 
emotions such that we share the meanings of these experiences with others (Ochsner & 
Lieberman, 2001). Specifically, this branch of neuroscience focuses on the how this 
shared cognition is instantiated in the brain. Social cognition encapsulates a number of 
social skills that facilitate complex social interaction in humans. These include the 
perception of agency, knowledge of the self and the understanding of other people, the 
last of which is the focus here. Humans are endowed with the capacity to naturally infer 
intentions, desires, emotions and beliefs of other people, using minimal information. 
Not only are we typically able to decouple our beliefs from reality, but we can also 
distinguish other people’s thoughts from our own and perceive their mental states from 
the mere observation of a gesture or a gaze. This intuitive social insight that enables 
successful interpersonal communication has been labelled “Theory of Mind” (TOM) 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978), and the capacity we use to understand other minds is 
known as “mentalising” (Fletcher et al., 1995; Frith & Frith, 2003). This ability to work 
out what people might know, think or believe, based on what they say or do, is also 
referred to as “mindreading” (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Understanding another’s mental 
state enables the understanding of another’s intentions, or the ability to take the 
“intentional stance” (Dennett, 1987) since people’s desires and emotions drive their 
actions. A mentalising mechanism should therefore allow us to intuit someone else’s 
unobservable mental states and thus make predictions of their actions (Frith & Frith, 
2006).
1.5.2. The development o f social cognition during young childhood
Since the seminal paper by Premack and W oodruff ( ‘Does the chimpanzee have a 
“theory of mind?”’, 1978), much theoretical and empirical work has emerged from the 
fields of psychology and philosophy to investigate the human ability to mentalise, 
including the development of experimental paradigms to test this capacity (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1985; Dennett, 1978; Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). Autism, a developmental
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social communication disorder characterised by “mindblindness”, or the inability to 
mentalise, has provided key insights about the processes we typically use to understand 
other minds (Baron-Cohen, 1995, Frith, 1996; see Chapter 6 for a more detailed 
account).
The false belief test has also been a crucial paradigm for investigating the development 
of mentalising (Dennett, 1978; Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). Wimmer and Pemer designed 
the first false belief test in which a character called Maxi places a piece of chocolate in a 
kitchen cupboard and then leaves the room. While he is out, his mother enters the room 
and moves his chocolate into a drawer, without Maxi seeing. Maxi then returns to the 
room and the key question is where Maxi will look for the chocolate, in the cupboard or 
in the drawer (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). The task therefore taps the ability to decouple 
one’s own knowledge from another’s knowledge, as well as the other person’s belief 
from a reality. Several variants of this task have since been designed, and such 
experiments suggest that at age four, children show signs of understanding the scenario, 
performing at levels higher than chance and by age six, they are able to understand it 
without any problems. By age six, children are also competent in attributing beliefs 
about another person’s belief, so called second-order false belief tasks (Perner & 
Wimmer, 1985). TOM appears to be an aspect of social intelligence that is independent 
of general intelligence (Cosmides, 1989).
Passing a false belief test about another person’s belief seems to be closely correlated 
with passing false belief tests about the self, suggesting shared representations for the 
self and others (Gopnik & Astington, 1988). It has been shown that children who are 
able to report their own mental states can also report the mental states of others. 
Specifically, children were presented with a box for sweets and then shown that there 
were actually pencils inside it. They were asked ‘what Nicky [will] think is in the box?’ 
and then, ‘When you first saw the box, before we opened it, what did you think was 
inside it?’. The ability to answer correctly questions relating to the self was significantly 
correlated with the ability to answer questions for another person (Gopnik & Astington, 
1988). TOM tasks might therefore be measures not only of the consciousness of others’ 
mental states but also of self-consciousness.
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While several studies have reiterated findings about TOM, reflecting similar ages for 
these milestones in the development of social cognition during infancy, less research 
has been directed to the next major phase of neural plasticity and social development -  
adolescence. As discussed in the previous section, the adolescent cortex, including PFC, 
PC and STS are subject to structural change during this period. If studies have shown 
that TOM develops in infancy at around the age of four, what are the cognitive 
consequences of the continued development of its underlying neural circuitry? Before 
describing the findings from the few existing studies on social cognitive development at 
adolescence, the following section will outline recent suggestions about the association 
of these brain areas with social cognition and their differential roles in mentalising.
1.5.3. How the brain understands other minds
Social neuroscience exploits the advantages of non-invasive brain imaging techniques 
and integrates approaches from neuroscience, experimental and social psychology to 
tackle questions pertaining to this kind of implicit social information processing. The 
majority of studies investigating the role of the brain in social cognition have focused 
on functioning in the adult brain.
The ability to surmise mental states from simply watching an agent’s action or gesture 
seems to rely on a network of areas in the brain. Several different types of paradigms 
have been used to test the neural basis of mentalising, involving cartoon strips, stories, 
moving shapes, and interactive games. Consistently, a network including the temporal 
poles, the posterior STS/temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and medial PFC (MPFC) have 
been associated with tasks in which mainly adult participants are required to mentalise 
(Frith & Frith, 2003).
An important implicit mentalising task involves showing participants animations of 
moving shapes. This task established that ordinary adults feel compelled to attribute 
intentions and other psychological motives to animated abstract shapes, simply on the 
basis of their movement patterns (Heider & Simmel, 1944). Castelli and colleagues
(2000) showed such animations in a study that examined brain activation patterns using 
positron emission tomography (PET) to contrast sequences where the movements of 
two triangles were designed to evoke mental state attributions (e.g. one triangle 
surprising the other or mocking the other), and sequences where the triangles moved
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randomly and did not evoke such attributions. This comparison showed activation in the 
same system, including MPFC, STS and temporal poles, as in other studies with 
different mentalising tasks.
Interactive games that involve implicit spontaneous mentalising have also been used in 
brain imaging experiments. For example, in one study, volunteers were scanned while 
they played a prisoner's dilemma type game with another person (McCabe et al., 2001). 
In this game mutual cooperation between players increased the amount of money that 
could be won. In the comparison task the volunteers were led to believe that they were 
playing with a computer that used fixed rules. A comparison of brain activation during 
the game task and the comparison task revealed activity within the MPFC.
MPFC was also activated when participants played ‘Stone-Paper-Scissors,’ a 
competitive game in which success depends upon predicting what the other player will 
do next (Gallagher et al., 2002). Again, the comparison condition was created by telling 
the volunteers that they were playing against a computer. In fact, the sequence of the 
opponent’s moves was the same in both conditions. Participants described guessing and 
second guessing their opponent’s responses and felt that they could understand and ‘go 
along with’ what their opponent, but not the computer, was doing. The MPFC was 
activated only when the volunteers believed that they were interacting with another 
person.
There have been several fMRI studies that have investigated TOM processes. These 
have consistently highlighted the involvement of three brain regions in understanding 
other people’s mental states. The medial FC in the region of the paracingulate cortex, 
the temporal poles adjacent to the amygdala, and the STS near the TPJ, are consistently 
activated by mentalising tasks that have involved a wide variety of tasks and stimuli.
In one of the first functional neuroimaging studies that investigated TOM processes, 
participants were asked whether another person from a different era (Christopher 
Columbus) would know how to use modem objects (such as a hairdryer or food 
blender) or ancient objects (such as a pre-fifteenth century hunting tool). In order to 
surmise whether Christopher Columbus would have understood how to use a certain 
tool, the participants would presumably have to think about Columbus’s knowledge.
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MPFC and left STS were activated by this mentalising task compared with a control 
task in which participants made inferences about how to use novel objects (Goel et al., 
1995).
Similar activation patterns were found in functional neuroimaging studies in which 
participants made decisions about mental states of people in stories or cartoons (Brunet 
et al., 2000; Fletcher et al., 1995, Gallagher et al., 2000). In a PET study, participants 
were scanned while they performed story comprehension tasks that required the 
attribution of mental states (Fletcher et al., 1995). In one such story participants had to 
work out that the protagonist’s action (a robber giving himself up to the police) was 
based on his false assumption about the policeman’s beliefs (that the policeman knew 
he had robbed a shop). This task required mental state attribution because the beliefs of 
the robber and policeman were not made explicit in the story. When compared with 
comprehension tasks involving ‘physical’ stories that did not require mental state 
attribution, the TOM task produced activation in the left medial frontal gyrus (Fletcher 
et al., 1995).
Using the same stories and fMRI, Gallagher and colleagues (2000) found that the 
medial frontal gyrus, the STS and temporal poles bilaterally were activated by the TOM 
stories. In addition, these regions were also activated by non-verbal cartoons that 
involved mental state attribution in order to be understood (Gallagher et al., 2000). 
Similarly, the STS and medial frontal gyrus were activated in a PET study in which 
participants were instructed to choose the right ending for a series of cartoons only 
when this required mental state attribution and not when it required physical reasoning 
(Brunet et al., 2000).
These brain areas are also engaged when participants make semantic decisions about 
other people’s characteristics. In an fMRI study, participants were presented with 
stimuli from three different categories (people (e.g. Mary); fruits (e.g. banana); clothes 
(e.g. mittens), adjacent to adjectives (e.g. curious; pitted; woollen), and asked whether 
the adjective could be used to describe the item in the stimulus (Mitchell et al., 2002). 
While semantic judgements about objects activated inferotemporal cortex and 
ventrolateral PFC, judgements about other people were associated with activity in 
MPFC, right TPJ, STS and fusiform gyrus, suggesting distinct sets of brain areas that
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are linked to knowledge about other people compared to that required for inanimate 
objects (Mitchell et al., 2002).
A subsequent fMRI study investigated the specificity of these neural representations for 
knowledge about other people, by comparing brain activity during semantic judgements 
about other people and about dogs (Mitchell et al., 2005). For each of these two types of 
target, participants were again required to make judgements about the applicability of 
words to psychological states or to physical parts of the body of the target (person or 
dog). The words that could be used to describe people (e.g. curious) were designed to be 
equally applicable to dogs. Two important findings emerged from the imaging data: 
firstly, that higher MPFC activation was associated with judgements of psychological 
states relative to body parts, and secondly that this MPFC activity effect extended to 
dogs as well as people. This suggests that MPFC has a specific role for understanding 
mental states, rather than being generalisable to all kinds of person perception but that 
this role of MPFC can be generalised to another person or a dog, that is, another mental 
agent (Mitchell et al., 2005). Action knowledge (represented by verbs which applied to 
both people and dogs, e.g. run or bite) about people, however, activates distinct brain 
areas to action knowledge about dogs (Mason et al., 2004). Participants were scanned 
using fMRI while making semantic judgements about the relevance of the verbs to dogs 
or people, and results indicated that while action knowledge about dogs elicited activity 
in occipital and parahippocampal gyri, equivalent judgments about people was 
associated with increased activity in MPFC (Mason et al., 2004). MPFC, therefore, has 
consistently been linked to social cognitive processing.
There is emerging neuroimaging evidence for differential roles of each of these areas. 
Firstly, the STS/TPJ has been implicated in the ability to see the world from another 
person’s point of view (Aichhom et al., 2006) (i.e. What does she think from  her 
perspective?). Most likely, this is because of its role in eye-movement observation 
(Pelphrey et al., 2004) and in the representation of the body in space (Blanke et al., 
2005). The TPJ is associated with false belief tasks (Apperly et al., 2004) and the 
temporal poles are involved in the storage and use of knowledge of the world (Funnell, 
2001) (i.e. What would she tend to think, given the circumstances?). Finally, a large 
number of studies have linked social cognitive processing with medial PFC (MPFC) 
(including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Based on experimental data and an
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analysis of the anatomical connectivity of the MFC, Amodio and Frith (2006) have 
recently suggested that self-reflection, mentalising and person perception are all 
associated with MFC. Different subdivisions are dedicated to different processes such 
that caudal regions are associated with monitoring actions, orbital regions with 
outcomes, while the more anterior regions are related to meta-cognitive processes, or 
“thinking about thinking” (i.e. “What would she think, given how she feels, in the 
context o f  how I  fe e l? ”) (Amodio & Frith, 2006).
1.53.1. Theories o f  theory o f  mind
Thus, for normal social behaviour, it is necessary that social cognitive processes 
coordinate the implicit understanding of other people’s mental states. In other words, 
TOM needs to occur automatically in order for each ‘player’ in a social interaction to 
successfully explain, predict and manipulate other people’s behaviour in everyday life 
(Humphrey, 1976). Several psychologists have highlighted the evolutionary importance 
of social cognition. For example, Baron-Cohen underlines the importance of a fast and 
effective mindreading system for ‘making inferences about whether [another’s] motives 
are purely altruistic’ and for detecting social threats (Baron-Cohen, 1995). In fact, 
Barresi and Moore (1996, pp. 107) suggest that,
‘the evolution of intelligence in primates that ultimately led to human beings 
was driven in part by the demands of social information processing’.
In the last 15 years, several theories of TOM, and their variants, have been put forward 
to account for the mechanisms that underlie the ability to read other minds. These have 
tended to fall into two categories: theory theory and simulation theory. Theory theorists 
believe that our understanding of other minds rests on our knowledge of a theory, 
analogous to a scientific theory. In other words, theory theory states that we process a 
folk psychological theory comprising laws and rules that can be applied to everyday life 
in order to explain behaviour (e.g. Carruthers, 1996; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). In 
contrast, simulation theory denies the deployment of a set of laws and rules to 
understand others. Put simply, simulation theorists claim that we use our own mental 
processes to simulate others and thus understand their actions and mental states (e.g. 
Gallese & Goldman 1998; Heal, 1995). Simulation theory has gained increasing 
credence recently, since the discovery that a set of neurons in the primate brain simulate
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electrical activity of other conspecifics (see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). This will be 
described in more detail later in this chapter.
1.5.4. The consequences o f  atypical mentalising
The finding that autistic children have specific difficulties with TOM tasks (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1985) has been instructive for the understanding of the function and 
development of TOM in typical and atypical populations. Impairment in TOM, or an 
inability to mentalise, has been proposed to account for the social communication 
problems seen as one of the hallmark features of autism (Frith et al., 1991; see Chapter 
6 for a detailed discussion of autism and social cognition). In fact, Bleuler originally 
used the term “autism” to refer to an aspect of schizophrenia. This aspect was also 
described as “autistic aloneness” or the withdrawal from other people into the self 
(Bleuler, 1911). It is thought that this also manifests itself as an inability to correctly 
infer other people’s perspectives or intentions (Frith, 2003). Autistic people have 
difficulty in recognising that other people may have a different understanding of the 
world to themselves. Thus, they appear to lack a TOM. The behavioural phenotypes of 
autism and schizophrenia are very different. Firstly, autism can be diagnosed in early 
childhood whereas schizophrenic symptoms tend to first manifest themselves in late 
adolescence or early adulthood. Furthermore, while a “deficit” in TOM might lead to 
the social behavioural symptoms of autism, the qualitative impairment in schizophrenia 
is quite different. Schizophrenic patients with positive symptoms such as delusions of 
persecution have no difficulty in understanding that other people have intentionality and 
emotions, as distinct from their own. However, they tend to over-interpret other 
people’s intentions, and to read them as directed towards themselves (Frith, 1992). 
These two very different qualitative impairments in TOM in autism and schizophrenia 
might be conceptualised as different forms of egocentrism or appreciation of “other­
ness” that are on two different ends of a continuum (Frith, 2004). The social 
communication feature of autism, “mindblindness”, might be characterised by poverty 
in the appreciation of another person’s mind, or a bias towards the self. Delusions in 
schizophrenia might thus be characterised by an over-appreciation of “other-ness” at the 
extreme other end of this spectrum, leading to a tendency to over-attribute agency and 
intentionality to others, that might not even be animate (Frith, 2004). Mentalising in 
schizophrenia and autism will be discussed further in later chapters (see Chapters 3 and 
6).
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1.6. Development o f  emotion processing during adolescence
The environmental and biological changes at adolescence lead to new social encounters 
and heightened awareness and interest in other people. The importance of evaluating 
other people may be associated with increased attention to socially salient stimuli, 
particularly faces, and the processing of emotional information. Recognition of facial 
expressions of emotion is one area of social cognition that has been investigated during 
adolescence (see Herba & Phillips, 2004). fMRI studies support the notion that 
development of brain regions are linked to the development of emotion processing. The 
amygdala, which has consistently been associated with emotion processing (Adolphs, 
1999; Dolan, 2002; Phillips et al., 2003), was found to be significantly activated in 
response to the perception of fearful facial expressions in an fMRI study of 12 
adolescents aged between 12 and 17 (Baird et al., 1999). Similarly, the perception of 
happy faces compared with neutral was associated with significant bilateral amygdalar 
activation in a group of 12 adolescents aged 13 to 17 (Yang et al., 2003). Sex- 
differences in amygdala-mediated cognitive development have also been reported to 
occur during adolescence (Killgore et al., 2001). In this fMRI study, while the left 
amygdala responded to fearful facial expressions in all children, left amygdala activity 
decreased over the adolescent period in females but not in males. Females also 
demonstrated greater activation of the DLPFC over this period, whereas males 
demonstrated the opposite pattern. These findings were taken as evidence for an 
association between cerebral maturation and increased regulation of emotional 
behaviour; the latter mediated by prefrontal cortical systems. It is possible that 
functional maturation associated with face emotion processing may be modulated by 
gender-specific hormonal profiles.
The effect of age was addressed by Thomas and colleagues (2001) in their investigation 
of amygdalar response to fearful facial expressions in two groups: a group of children 
(mean age 11 years) and adults (mean age 24). Adults relative to children demonstrated 
greater amygdala activation to fearful facial expressions, whereas children relative to 
adults showed greater amygdala activation to neutral faces. It was argued that the 
children perceived the neutral faces as more ambiguous than the fearful facial 
expressions, with resulting increases in amygdala activation to the neutral faces. Age- 
related differences in neural strategies for emotion processing have been shown in an
44
Chapter 1 Introduction
fMRI study of a group of adolescents (aged seven to 17) and a group of adults (aged 25- 
36) who viewed faces showing emotional expressions. While viewing faces with 
fearful emotional expressions, adolescents exhibited greater activation than adults of the 
amygdala, OFC and ACC (Monk et al., 2003). When participants were asked to switch 
their attention between a salient emotional property of the face, like thinking about how 
afraid it makes them feel, and a non-emotional property, such as how wide the nose is, 
adults, but not adolescents, selectively engaged and disengaged OFC. In other words, 
adults better modulate OFC activity based on attention demands, while adolescents 
better modulate activity based on emotional demands. On the other hand, when there 
were no attentional demands, emotional content of the stimuli induced higher activity in 
ACC, OFC and amygdala among adolescents compared to adults. These fMRI results 
suggest that both the brain’s emotion processing and cognitive appraisal systems 
develop during adolescence. This development has previously been interpreted in the 
context of the Social Information Processing Network model (cf. Nelson et al., 2005).
1.6.1. The Social Information Processing Network (SIPN) model
This model posits that social information processing occurs by way of three interacting 
neural “nodes”, which afford the detection of social stimuli that are then integrated to a 
larger emotional and cognitive framework. Nelson and colleagues (2005) propose that 
the ‘detection node’ comprising the intraparietal sulcus, the STS, the fusiform face area 
as well as temporal and occipital regions, deciphers social properties of the stimulus 
such as biological motion. The ‘affective node’, including limbic areas of the brain 
including the amygdala, ventral striatum, hypothalamus and OFC, is then thought to 
process the emotional significance of the social stimulus. Finally, the ‘cognitive- 
regulatory node’, consisting of much of the PFC, is responsible for TOM, impulse 
inhibition and goal-directed behaviour (Nelson et al., 2005). The development of the 
nodes, that is the connections between them, the innervation by gonadal steroid 
receptors and the maturation of the neural substrates themselves, during adolescence are 
proposed to explain development of social cognitive behaviours.
A similar triadic model has been proposed to govern motivated behaviour. This model 
includes the ventral striatum, for supporting reward processes and approach behaviour, 
the amygdala for its role as a “behavioural brake” that mediates avoidant behaviour and 
the PFC as a supervisory area that orchestrates the other processes (Ernst et al., 2005).
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Ernst and colleagues suggest that the balance between reward-driven and harm-avoidant 
behaviour is tilted towards the reward-driven end in adolescents. This is hypothesised to 
be due to either differential strength in the reward and avoidance systems in adults and 
adolescents (in terms of neural systems) and/or poorer regulatory control in adolescents.
Thus, only a handful of studies have recently investigated social information processing 
during adolescence. However, these studies, reviewed above, have employed tasks that 
tap the perception of emotional stimuli. So far, however, none has investigated social 
cognitive communicative processes per se, that involve engaging with other people’s 
minds and tuning into their thoughts. Furthermore, few have considered the 
development of the mechanisms by which we understand others. The next section 
describes a recent idea that actions have a special role in social understanding.
1.7. The role o f  the motor system in social interaction
1.7.1. Shared representations fo r  perception and action
During the last decade, evidence has accumulated from experiments in non-human 
primates, as well as in humans, in support of the idea that the perception and execution 
of one’s own actions, as well as the understanding1 of another agent’s actions, are 
functionally connected, relying on a common coding system and shared neural systems 
in the brain. In fact, in his ideomotor theory of action, William James in the 19th century 
claimed that “every mental representation of a movement awakens to some degree the 
actual movement which is its object” (James, 1890). The implication is that perceiving 
an action, that is, observing, imagining or in any way representing an action activates 
the motor programs used to execute that same action (Jeannerod, 1994; Prinz, 1997). As 
such, it has long been thought that cognition is embodied in action (see Merleau-Ponty, 
1962).
1.7.2. Mirror neurons: a mechanism fo r  matching observation and execution o f actions 
The discovery of “mirror neurons” (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex (VPMC) of the 
macaque monkey lends neurophysiological support to the common coding theory 
between perception and action, and furthermore, suggesting that these shared
1 By “understanding”, I refer to the knowledge of another person’s actions, which includes the conscious 
or unconscious interpretation of or engagement in another’s movements.
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representations are fundamental to the social interaction between self and other. MNs in 
area F5 of monkey premotor cortex, were found to discharge both when the monkey 
performed a goal-oriented action and when it observed another agent performing the 
same object-directed action (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et 
al., 1996a). MNs respond selectively to goal-directed biological motion, discharging 
only during the observation of hand-object interactions and not in response to the same 
‘action’ performed by a mechanical tool, such as a pair of pliers (Rizzolatti et al., 2001). 
In the F5 region of the monkey brain, MNs appear to represent mainly hand and mouth 
actions, and show congruence between the visual actions they respond to and the motor 
responses they code (Gallese et al., 1996). Neurons that respond to the observation of 
others’ action have also been located in the monkey STS (Jellema et al., 2000; Perrett et 
al., 1989; 1990). These neurons respond to the observation but not the execution of 
other agents walking, moving their arms or turning their head as well as goal-directed 
hand movements (Perrett et al., 1990). Neurons, which are excited both by observation 
and execution of actions, are also found in the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule 
(IPL) (Fogassi et al., 1998; Gallese et al., 2002) in the macaque. MNs in the IPL not 
only fire during the observation of an act (e.g. grasping), but also before the beginning 
of the following act that specifies the action (e.g. eating). It was therefore suggested that 
MNs in the IPL code the observed motor act as well as the observed agent’s intentions 
(Fogassi et al., 2005).
1.7.3. The transformation o f visual information into knowledge: mirror neurons and 
action understanding
A further set of experiments suggested that MNs mediate action understanding, such 
that the monkey can interpret the meaning of an action in the absence of the visual cues 
that trigger MNs. Umilta and colleagues (2001) demonstrated that neurons respond not 
only during the observation of a full object-directed grasping action but even when the 
final part of the grasping action was hidden from the monkey’s vision. Half of these 
MNs responded with equal intensity to both the observation of the full action and the 
hidden action. This finding indicated that it is the meaning, rather than the visual 
features, of the action that the neurons respond to. In addition, it was found that 15% of 
neurons in the monkey F5 region respond both to the sight of a noisy action such as a 
paper being ripped as well as the sound of the action alone (Kohler et al., 2002). 
Similarly, these results suggest that when the monkey is presented with sufficient clues
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to create a mental representation of the action, MNs are activated. In other words, MNs 
“know” what the actions of others mean.
1.7.4. The human mirror neuron system
There is now strong neurophysiological evidence for the existence of analogous motor 
resonance phenomena in humans. For example, studies using electroencephalography 
(EEG), which measures electrical activity in the brain and magnetoencephalography 
(MEG), which makes sensitive measurements of the magnetic fields produced by 
neuronal activity, demonstrate that desynchronisation of the mu rhythm occurs both 
during the subject’s own movements as well as the observation of other people’s actions 
(Altschuler et al., 1997; 2000; Cochin et al., 1998; 1999; Hari et al., 1998). Similarly, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) has shown that simply observing a movement 
has measurable effects on the peripheral motor system (Fadiga et al., 1995). The left 
primary motor cortex of participants was stimulated using TMS while participants 
watched the experimenter either grasping objects (transitive movements) or performing 
meaningless arm movements (intransitive movements). This led to an increase in the 
amplitude of the motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in specific hand muscles, relative to 
the control conditions when participants watched an object moving. The facilitation of 
MEPs during action observation occurred in those muscles that would be used for the 
execution of the observed movements. For example, listening to speech sounds which 
strongly involve tongue movements when spoken, elicits an increase in MEPs in the 
listener’s tongue muscles (Fadiga et al., 2002).
Numerous fMRI studies have shown that several brain areas are activated by the 
observation of actions performed by others, including, crucially, the rostral part of the 
inferior parietal lobule, the lower precentral gyrus and the posterior part of the inferior 
frontal gyrus (e.g. Buccino et al., 2001; Decety et al., 1997; Grafton et al., 1996; Grezes 
et al., 2001; 2003; Rizzolatti et al., 1996b; Stephan et al., 1995). Buccino and colleagues
(2001) demonstrated that the frontal and parietal mirror regions are somatotopically 
organised, such that watching mouth, hand, and foot movements alone (without objects) 
activates the same functionally specific regions of premotor cortex as making those 
respective movements. Furthermore, when actions were directed to objects, the PC 
became activated. Again, functionally specific regions of the PC were activated 
according to the object-directed action being performed. Interestingly, unlike in
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monkeys, the human mirror neuron system (MNS) is activated by the observation of 
both transitive and intransitive movements, although the former type is associated with 
both parietal and frontal activation while the latter by just frontal activation (Iacoboni et 
al., 1999; 2001). In addition, EEG has been used to show that motor activity in the brain 
is also elicited prior to observing someone else’s action (Kilner et al., 2004). The 
readiness potential, an electrophysiological marker of motor preparation, is not only 
present during action observation but also prior to the onset of the observed action. The 
authors suggested that this signifies action prediction and the notion that the knowledge 
of an upcoming action is enough to excite the motor system of the observer. It was 
speculated that this might occur because it is an advantage for the brain to anticipate, 
rather than simply react to, another person’s action (Kilner et al., 2004).
7.7.5. Observation-execution mapping in the human brain
Human motor resonance in the brain is modulated by the type of observed action, and 
whether it belongs to the observer’s own motor repertoire (Buccino et al., 2004). When 
human participants were scanned using fMRI during the observation of video clips of 
biting and oral communicative actions performed by a man, a monkey or a dog, actions 
that did not belong to the motor repertoire of the observing subject did not trigger the 
motor system. For example, the observation of biting performed by a man, a monkey or 
a dog elicited activity in the inferior parietal lobule and the pars opercularis of the IFG 
as well as the precentral gyrus. The observation of communicative gestures elicited 
progressively lower frontal activation as the observed action became increasingly non­
human. Speech reading therefore activated IFG, while observation of the monkey 
specific communicative gesture of lip-smacking produced less frontal activity and 
barking did not elicit any frontal activity. These results suggest that humans map 
observed actions onto their own motor system, so long as the observed actions belong to 
their personal motor repertoire. When the observed action is foreign to the observer’s 
motor repertoire, the observation of the action does not engage the motor system. The 
action is therefore seen, but not “known”. Semantic knowledge about actions appears to 
be represented in a category-specific way such that regions in the motor cortex are 
recruited both during execution of movements of body parts (e.g. foot), and when action 
words that correspond to the body part (e.g. kick) are simply read (Hauk et al., 2004).
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It is proposed that the MNS activity during action observation corresponds to an action 
representation2 in the observer’s brain, of the actor’s action (Gallese et al., 2004; 
Rizzolatti et al., 2001). The action representation matches that which is generated 
during the action execution of the observer. The motor outcome of that action 
representation is known to the actor. As such, the representation held by the MNS 
during action observation can predict the outcome of another’s actions. Knowledge of 
another’s actions is thus translated to knowledge of another’s intentions.
1.7.6. The mirror neuron system as a bridge between minds
The brain, therefore, tunes into others during the observation of their actions. It is 
argued that this level of motor attunement forms the basis of a much more profound 
form of interpersonal engagement: social cognition. The human brain is subconsciously 
“interested” in other people at the level of action. How might this relate to our social 
interest in other people? First of all, behavioural studies have shown that the human 
motor system is geared up for making the actions it observes. The common coding 
between perception and action gives rise to a motor priming process whereby human 
participants preferentially respond to the observation of a human arm compared with a 
robotic arm, in terms of lower reaction times or higher brain activity (Castiello et al., 
2001; Perani et al., 2001). In line with this notion that like-actions in like-others activate 
one’s own motor system, psychophysical studies also show an interference effect such 
that if a subject who is performing an arm movement watches a robot or a human 
perform congruent and incongruent actions, the observation of the human, but not the 
robot, making incongruent actions interfere with the observer’s action execution (Kilner 
et al., 2003). Such findings indicate that the observation of kinematically and visually 
similar actions in others elicits a similar response in the observer. It has been proposed 
that this motor facilitation might underpin social facilitation, that is, the notion that the 
presence of others appears to impact on our own actions (Jackson & Decety, 2004; 
Sebanz et al., 2003).
2 An action representation refers to a schema or internal model, which is composed of information from 
one’s own cognitive mechanisms as well as from the external world, a simulation or copy of an actual 
action (Jeannerod, 1997; Neisser, 1976); see Chapter 5 on Action Representation for a fuller description.
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1.7.7. The mirror neuron system as a mechanism fo r  simulation and imitation 
Evidence has accumulated, therefore, that we directly map visual representations of 
actions we see onto our own motor representation for those actions, and the higher the 
degree of similarity between the features of the observed action and those of our own 
motor repertoire, the more strongly we are primed for the action. As a consequence, we 
sometimes imitate others’ actions, without even being aware of it (Tessari et al., 2002). 
This suggests that the MNS might facilitate our natural tendency to imitate. Indeed, not 
long after birth, babies will spontaneously imitate actions of adults they observe 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). It is proposed that by 14 months, infants’ imitation is not 
simply emulation. In a replication of an earlier study (Meltzoff, 1988), infants of the 
same age showed an ability to evaluate the rationality of the strategy of an action (the 
means to a goal) (Gergely et al., 2002). The paradigm required infants to watch a 
demonstrator using her forehead to illuminate a light-box, and tested the imitation of the 
means to the goal. Gergely and colleagues modulated the constraints of the action. In 
one condition, the demonstrator’s hands were occupied and in the other they were free. 
After observing the demonstrator performing the head action when her hands were free, 
69% of the infants re-enacted the head action. However, after seeing the adult perform 
the same task with her hands occupied, only 21% of the infants replicated the head 
action. It was concluded that infants could rationalise the action. In other words, it 
appeared to make sense to the infants to perform the action using the head when the 
hands were occupied, but given that their own hands were free, it was more sensible to 
achieve the same goal using their hands (Gergely et al., 2002). Infants as young as 14 
months are therefore thought to be able to imitate “rationally”, that is, they represent the 
goals of the actions they see and can imitate both the means and the goal of actions 
(Gergely et al., 2002).
A handful of neuroimaging studies have shown that imitation is associated with much of 
the same neural circuitry as that which is active for action observation (Grezes et al., 
2003; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Koski et al., 2002; Nishitani & Hari, 2002). For example, in 
an fMRI study, Iacoboni and colleagues compared brain activity in the observation only 
and imitation condition while participants watched video stimuli of a moving finger in 
the scanner. In both these conditions, there was activity in the left pars opercularis of 
the IFG, the right anterior parietal area, the right STS and the right parietal operculum 
and activity was greater in the imitation, compared with observation condition (Iacoboni
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et al., 1999; 2001). Similar brain areas are also activated by the imitation and 
observation of emotional facial expressions (Carr et al., 2003).
If similar brain networks are triggered when we ourselves act, when we see others act, 
and when we copy other people’s actions, there must be a motor equivalence between 
what we do and what others do. As such, there is a shared representational space for 
actions of our own and those of others. Thus, the mirror phenomenon in the brain 
provides a possible neurophysiological explanation for the long-standing theory of 
action simulation.
1.7.8. Embodiment, simulation theory and self-other interactions
Conceived most broadly, simulation theory posits that we generate similar mental 
processes in our own minds in order to understand the actions, beliefs, desires and 
emotions of another (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). The basis for attributing propositional 
attitudes such as intentions or beliefs is thought to be the understanding of another 
person’s actions. Thus, simulating another person’s action would trigger an action 
representation from which the underlying goals and intentions could be inferred on the 
basis of what our own goals and intentions would be for the same action.
The notion that humans have a direct experiential grasp of another person’s mind via 
their actions can be traced in the early twentieth century European movement of 
Phenomenology. Phenomenological accounts of knowledge privilege experiential 
accounts, and describe consciousness as embodied and experience as lived (Erlebnis, 
Husserl, 1970). In other words, there is immediacy between the body and the world, 
such that our understanding of the world is grounded in our corporeal nature (Husserl, 
1970). The philosophy of French phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908- 
1961) describes well this proposed intimate relation between the self and world (or, self 
and other), in which perception is the key to this immediate link. This view would argue 
that a visual scene, for example, is not understood through the visual system integrating 
several components of the scene into a neural input (e.g. Fodor, 1982). Instead, the 
meaning of that which is seen is:
“constituted in the hold which [the] body takes on it; it is not first of all a 
meaning for the understanding, but a structure accessible to introspection by the 
body.”
52
Chapter 1 Introduction
(Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology o f Perception, 1962, 
pp. 369)
Merleau-Ponty’s anti-Cartesian approach therefore saw human consciousness as 
immersed in the external world. He extended this dialectical thinking to 
intersubjectivity: the same notion of interrelatedness of self and other is used to explain 
such behaviours as a baby that will open its mouth on seeing an adult opening his/her 
mouth. According to Merleau-Ponty, this action reflects Mitsein, the idea that we are in 
a world of others, where consciousness can not be divorced from the external world but 
exists in a constant dialectic with others.
This description of embodied consciousness is central to simulation theory3. Action, 
which is mapped onto perception, is therefore implicated in higher order cognitive 
processing that leads us to understand other minds. Several variations of simulation 
theory exist within the realm of philosophy of mind. It has been suggested that 
simulation is explicit, involving the positioning of oneself into the “mental shoes” of 
another and the use of pretend mental states to attribute thoughts and beliefs to that 
person (Goldman, 2005). There is also debate about whether simulation is the default, 
or a necessary, mechanism through which we understand others (see Goldman, 2002). 
Furthermore, some simulation theorists argue that simulating others is implicit and sub­
personal, such that is not available to conscious reflection and rooted at the neuronal 
level (e.g. Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Grezes and Decety, 2001; Rizzolatti et al., 1996a; 
2000). As proposed in Gallese’s “shared manifold hypothesis” we understand others by 
modelling their action, and this can be distinguished at the phenomenological 
(experiential), functional and neuronal levels (Gallese, 2001, pp. 45 (italics inserted)):
“The phenomenological level is the one responsible for the sense of 
similarity...that we experience anytime we confront ourselves with other human 
beings. It could be defined also as the empathic level... The functional level can 
be characterized in terms of simulation routines, as if processes enabling models 
of others to be created. The subpersonal level is instantiated as the result of the 
activity of a series of mirror matching neural circuits.”
3 Fundamentally, phenomenologists reject the role of representation in their accounts of knowledge.
Given the notion of immediacy between the self and other via perception, there is no place for 
representation (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). However, I have described evidence and theory from cognitive 
neuroscience studies which argues that representation o f action, or the internal modelling of an action, is 
indeed what provides a shared space between self and other.
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It is this latter view of implicit simulation that is endorsed in this thesis. While the 
accounts and hypotheses here remain agnostic about alternative terminologies (e.g. 
“enactive perception” (Noe, 2005) or “passive elicitation” (Gallagher, 2006), and about 
whether simulation is the default mechanism or the only mechanism of interpersonal 
understanding (see Jacob, 2002, for a discussion of hybrid models), in line with above 
evidence from MNS theories, a premise of the experiments which follow is that motor 
resonance or action simulation is involved in interpersonal understanding. According to 
this theory, the activation of the MNS in the observer’s brain is believed to correspond 
to an action simulation -  a copy or representation of the actual action that is being 
observed.
1.7.9. The link between action understanding and social understanding
1.7.9.1. Actions as a means to intention understanding
It appears that the mirror system is involved in understanding the “global” intentions of 
other people’s actions, beyond the immediate goal of a movement (Iacoboni et al., 
2005), such as the symbolic meanings of simple hand actions (Nakamura et al., 2004). 
In an fMRI study of 23 adults, Iacoboni and colleagues (2005) investigated the 
influence of the context of an action on activity in the mirror system. Participants in the 
scanner were presented with video clips that were organised into three main conditions 
around the theme of drinking tea: Context (consisting of scenes in which actions 
occurred, without the action, but with the objects, e.g. a tea cup surrounded by a teapot, 
biscuits, a plate); Action (consisting of a goal-oriented action without any context, e.g. a 
hand grasping the tea cup) and Intention (consisting of the goal-oriented action 
embedded in the context, e.g. a hand grasping a tea cup in the context of the teapot, 
biscuits, plates, etc.).
Both the Action and Intention conditions, compared to the resting condition, yielded a 
significant signal increase in the parieto-frontal and STS regions typically associated 
with the execution, observation and imitation of hand actions. The Context condition 
elicited activity in similar areas, although not in STS or the inferior parietal lobule, most 
likely because there was no biological action in this condition. Compared to the Action 
only and the Context only conditions, the Intention condition, in which participants 
viewed the hand grasping the teacup in the “tea drinking” context, elicited significantly
54
Chapter 1 Introduction
higher activity in the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus and in the part of the 
VPMC in which hand actions are represented. Differential signal increase in inferior FC 
in the two different contexts suggested that the higher activity in the Intention condition 
was not simply due to the presence of objects. The authors proposed that “logically 
related” neurons in this area, which are additional to the classically described MNS, are 
triggered by the observation of an initial part of the action, which codes the intention 
(e.g. bringing to the mouth cues understanding of the intention that “he wants to drink”), 
when embedded in a specific context. When we seen an action, therefore, in a particular 
context, our motor system recognises the chain of motor acts that is typically carried out 
in that context to accomplish a goal. The mirror system is therefore able to recognise the 
intentions driving the action. In the same way that Merleau-Ponty describes gestural 
communication, “it is as if the other person’s intention inhabited my body and mine his” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962), the MNS therefore code both the “what” and the “why” of other 
people’s actions.
1.7.9.2. Actions as a basis o f empathy
Given the brain’s similar involvement in both first- and third-person experiences of 
actions, intentions and emotions, the mirror-matching mechanism is also thought to 
underlie the human propensity to empathise with other people’s sensations or emotions. 
The notion of empathy as Einfiihlung, literally translated from German as, “feeling into” 
(Titchener, 1909) has been the subject of much discussion in the social sciences, for 
example, in aesthetics, where Einf iihlung first described the idea that a work of art could 
bring about physical and emotional changes in the viewer that correspond to that which 
is expressed in the art (Vischer, 1873). The German psychologist, Theodore Lipps’ use 
of Einfiihlung describes how the perception of an emotional gesture in another person 
directly activates the same emotion in the perceiver. This view, espoused by simulation 
theorists, would correspond to the finding that perception-action mapping facilitates a 
direct arousal of emotions in the observer, matched to the person who is observed.
Disgust has been relatively well studied using fMRI. The feeling of disgust in response 
to the taste or smell of disgusting stimuli has been associated with elevated activity in 
the insula (Royet et al., 2003; Zald & Pardo, 2000). The anterior insula is also activated 
by the observation of facial expressions of disgust in other people (Phillips et al., 1997; 
Wicker et al., 2003). Futhermore, the amplitude of the insular response is modulated by
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how intensely disgusted the facial expressions appear (Phillips et al., 1997). This 
phenomenon is known as emotional contagion. It is lost when there is damage to the 
associated brain areas. A lesion to the left insula has been shown to selectively impair 
both the visual and auditory recognition of disgust in other people (Adolphs et al., 2003; 
Calder et al., 2000). In addition, the patient in these lesion studies reported a blunted 
sensation in his own first person experience of disgust. One’s own brain thus becomes 
active by the recognition of another’s disgust, as (/ we ourselves were experiencing the 
sensation.
Neuroimaging studies demonstrate common brain activity for the self and the other 
during the empathic experience of another in pain (Jackson et al., 2005; Singer et al., 
2004). Singer et al. investigated pain-related empathy in 16 couples, by measuring brain 
activity in the woman using fMRI, while painful stimulation was applied to her or to her 
partner’s hand. Both her and her partner’s hands were made visible to the female 
partner. A factorial design with four conditions of Painful, Non-Painful, Self and Other 
was employed and the comparison between pain-related brain activity in the Self and 
Other condition indicated that part of the “pain matrix” was automatically triggered in 
the brain of the female during the knowledge that her partner was being subjected to 
pain.
Specifically, when participants received pain and during the knowledge of their 
partner’s pain, bilateral anterior insula (Al), rostral ACC, brainstem and cerebellum 
were activated. In addition, empathy scales indicated that there was a correlation 
between empathy-related brain activity in the AI and ACC and subjective experiences 
of pain. Activity in Al and ACC was therefore common to both the Self and Other 
condition. However, empathy for the partner’s pain involved only the affective, but not 
the sensory component of the brain’s pain matrix. It was argued that the involvement of 
context-dependent affective aspects, but not the sensory-discriminative aspects, of pain 
reflect the automatic triggering of emotional representations of one’s own subjective 
feelings to engage with the feelings of others. Preston and de Waal (2002) have 
integrated evidence and theory across various disciplines spanning developmental 
psychology, social psychology, evolutionary theory and neuroscience, to the 
Perception-Action Model (PAM), can explain empathy in various species, age groups 
and in human empathy disorders. In line with the motor theory of social cognition that
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has emerged since the discovery of the MNS, the PAM places special importance on 
action as a mode through which self and other can identify with one another, mediated 
by neural circuitry and physiological processes that are involved in the execution of 
one’s own actions, the observation of another’s action, the experience of emotions and 
the affective engagement in other people’s emotions (Preston & de Waal, 2002).
1.7.10. The problem o f action identity: agency and authorship
If my brain ‘mirrors’ observed actions, how do I know that it is someone else, and not 
me, who is moving when I observe an action? In other words, ‘what gives me the right 
to speak of an 'I,' and indeed of an 'I' as a cause...’ (Nietzsche, 1886)? The human 
subjective experience of freely willed action requires that the actor feels a sense of 
agency. In other words, the action is one that the agent can own, ‘bearing [one’s] 
signature’ (Pettit, 2001). In the following section, I outline how a sense of self might 
emerge from representations of action. How do we feel in control of our actions? The 
ability to attribute one’s own actions to the self is crucial to feeling that the experience 
is ‘mine’. Important hypotheses have been built from studies that have investigated how 
we recognise the consequences of our actions and how this ‘self-monitoring’ system 
distinguishes between self and other. In addition, studies of patients with disorders of 
volition provide evidence that a breakdown in the self-monitoring system may account 
for a disturbance to the normal experiential link between intention and the awareness of 
volitional control.
1.7.10.1. Distinguishing between self and other through prediction
Being aware of one’s own actions and distinguishing them from the actions of others is 
critical for feeling a sense of self and for communication with other agents. Usually, 
when we carry out an action, wt f e e l  a sense of agency - that is, we feel that we are both 
the author and owner of our own action. How is this feeling of ownership possible? 
This is particularly problematic given the well established mirror in the brain. Evidence 
from motor control studies suggests that the brain solves the problem of agency through 
prediction.
1.7.10.2. Forward models
It has been proposed that internal motor representations, also known as forward models, 
serve as predictors in the brain (Miall & Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001).
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Prediction is a necessary step in motor planning and can be used in many ways, for 
example, for fine motor adjustments, action planning and motor learning. Several 
studies have suggested that, through the anticipation of future outcomes of actions, the 
brain links the consequences of a movement to the prior intention, to confer a sense of 
agency.
For every intended action, the brain must issue a motor command to the muscles in 
order to execute the action. It is proposed that a duplicate of the motor command - or 
‘efference copy’ - is generated in parallel and used to make predictions about the 
sensory consequences of one’s own action. The forward dynamic model predicts the 
sensory consequences of the movement and compares them with the desired effects, for 
example, the intended position of a hand. Discrepancies between predicted states and 
desired states result in error signals that can be used to fine-tune actions. A controller, 
also called an inverse model, gauges this relationship to provide the motor instructions 
required by the muscles to achieve the desired effect, such as a particular grip force for 
a given object. The forward output model predicts the sensory consequences of the 
motor act and compares them with the actual effect of the movement. Discrepancies 
between predicted states and actual states can be used for self-monitoring, that is, to 
distinguish between self-produced or externally produced actions, and in doing so 
maintain a distinct sense of self (Figure 1.5).
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(e.g. delay)
Figure 1.5. Forward model. An internal predictor uses information about 
movements to distinguish between self-produced and externally-produced 
sensations (adapted from  Blakemore et a l 2000).
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1.7.10.3. Recognising the consequences o f action
This predictive control model may account for why we experience self-produced touch 
differently to a touch stimulus produced by an external agent or object. For instance, it 
is well known that you cannot tickle yourself. Why do we react differently (or not at all) 
to a self-produced tickle compared to an externally-produced tickle? A series of studies 
provide evidence that self-produced stimuli are perceptually attenuated whereas 
externally produced stimuli are not. In one experiment, a device was used to deliver a 
touch stimulus to the palm of the subject’s right palm. In the first condition, participants 
produced the stimulus themselves, using the left hand, while in the second condition, 
the experimenter delivered the stimulus. Participants consistently rated the self­
produced touch as less tickly and intense than the externally produced touch 
(Blakemore et al., 1999). This may be explained in terms of the framework of motor 
control outlined above. The forward output model can be used to make accurate 
predictions of the sensory outcome (in this case, the tickly sensation of the stimulus) of 
a self-produced action, using the motor command and efference copy. This results in an 
attenuation or cancellation of the sensory outcome. In contrast, for an externally 
generated sensation, there is no efference copy available upon which to base a 
prediction, and hence, no attenuation. As a result, externally produced sensations are 
effectively perceptually enhanced. Importantly, in such studies, participants tend to 
report that they were not aware of the perturbations between the movement and the 
consequences, suggesting that the signals for sensory discrepancies are not available to 
our conscious awareness.
This predictive process is also likely to be at the root of why physical fights always 
seem to escalate. Notice how tit-for-tat tussles between children tend to intensify, with 
each person claiming that the other hit him or her harder. In a recent study (Shergill et 
al., 2003) a motor was used to apply a brief force to the tip of each participant’s left 
index finger. Participants were then asked to match the force they felt using their right 
index finger by pushing down on a force transducer attached to the motor. Results 
showed that participants consistently applied a stronger force than that which had been 
applied to them. The authors suggest that, just like when we try to tickle ourselves, the 
brain predicts the sensory consequences of the self-generated force and then reduces the 
sensory feedback. Since the forward model can only predict the outcome of our own 
actions and not of those of someone else, sensations that are externally caused are
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enhanced relative to self-produced sensations. As a result, if you were to deliver a 
vengeful punch to match the force of your opponent’s blow, it is likely that you would 
overestimate the strength of the opponent’s punch and strike back harder.
1.7.10.4. Brain areas involved in maintaining awareness and making predictions 
There is accumulating evidence that a cerebellar-parietal network is involved in 
predicting and attenuating self-produced, relative to externally produced sensations 
(Blakemore et al., 1998a; 1998b; 2001). In an fMRI experiment that employed the 
tickling paradigm described above, during externally produced touch, activity in the 
bilateral parietal operculum (the secondary somatosensory cortex) and ACC was higher 
than during the self-touch condition (Blakemore et al., 1998a). In addition, there was 
less activity in the right cerebellar cortex during a self-generated movement with a 
tactile consequence compared to an identical movement with no tactile consequence. A 
PET study revealed that activity in the right lateral cerebellar cortex increased as time 
delays between the onset of a self-generated movement and its sensory effect were 
increased. This suggests that this region is involved in signalling sensory discrepancies 
between predicted and actual sensory outcomes of motor acts (Blakemore et al., 1998b).
These data support other studies that implicate the cerebellum and PC in sensorimotor 
prediction. Electrophysiological studies show that neurons in the cerebellum are 
involved in reaching and grasping movements, firing before the onset of the action 
(Smith et al., 1993). They may therefore be involved in the rapid detection of errors 
during motor preparation and producing error signals at a sub-conscious level 
(Blakemore & Sirigu, 2003). Electrophysiological studies have also demonstrated that 
neurons in the PC are activated during planning of eye movements (Duhamel et al., 
1992) as well as during reaching and grasping movements (Buneo et al., 2002).
Neuroimaging studies have revealed differential activation of the inferior PC for tasks 
involving action of the self versus action of another. For instance, this region is 
activated more when an external agent controls a movement compared with when the 
subject controls a movement themselves (Farrer & Frith, 2002). The inferior PC is 
activated when participants mentally simulate actions from someone else’s perspective 
compared with they imagine performing the action themselves (Ruby & Decety, 2001), 
answer conceptual questions from a third person perspective compared with from their
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own perspective (Ruby & Decety, 2003), and think about how another person would 
feel in certain situations relative to how they would feel (Ruby & Decety, 2004) (see 
Chapter 2). It has been argued that the cerebellum is involved in the rapid detection of 
discrepancies between actual and predicted sensory effects of movements, signalling 
errors below the level of awareness, while the PC is concerned with higher level 
prediction, such as the maintenance of goals, monitoring of intentions and the 
distinction between the self and others. This information may be available to conscious 
awareness (Blakemore & Sirigu, 2003).
1.8. Summary
Social cognition in humans is associated with a system that includes frontal, parietal and 
superior temporal cortex. A handful of studies have begun to investigate how 
development of these brain regions leads to development of social cognition. So far, 
these have focused on face emotion processing.
Action understanding is proposed to be a mechanism that enables social understanding. 
The MNS, sensitive to the observation of actions, sensations and emotions of others as 
well as the self, are found in some overlapping areas, particularly in FC and PC. MNS 
activity reflects the activation of action representations in the brain, which are crucial 
for both sharing the experience of others’ actions and emotions, as well as for the 
distinction between the self and other, and the sense of authorship of action.
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1.9. Objectives o f  the experimental studies in this thesis
In this review of social cognition and the MNS, I have attempted to describe the 
building blocks of social cognition in terms of TOM and its precursors and then to 
outline how motor cognition can be related to social information processing and 
therefore used as a way to study intersubjectivity. Throughout, I have mentioned the 
brain systems thought to be implicated in these cognitive processes, including, most 
importantly, FC, PC and STS. The first section in this chapter reviewed structural and 
functional brain imaging studies, to demonstrate that the brain areas undergoing the 
most profound development during adolescence overlap with those typically involved in 
self-other interactions. I have also described the results of behavioural studies during 
adolescent development, and have shown that most of the efforts have so far focused on 
the study of executive function development, while there is a dearth of data on social 
cognition during this period.
Given the correspondence between those areas that are developing in the adolescent 
brain with those areas involved in perspective taking and intention understanding, 
which, in turn, have some overlap with brain regions for action representation, the 
following studies aim to:
(i) measure social cognitive development, namely, perspective taking and intention 
understanding, during adolescence
(ii) measure development in action representation during adolescence using a 
variety of motor imagery tasks
(iii) use insights from psychopathology, in particular, autism and schizophrenia, in 
which self-other interaction is atypical, to delineate how the cognitive 
mechanisms of intersubjectivity might be subject to disruption.
The next chapter presents the first empirical study in this thesis, which investigates how 
the social cognitive skill o f perspective taking develops during adolescence.
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C h a pt e r  2
2. T h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  p e r sp e c t iv e  t a k in g  d u r in g  a d o l e sc e n c e
2.1. Perspective taking in adolescence
Adolescence involves sexual maturity in terms of hormones and physical development 
of the body, and is also characterised by an increase in the complexity of group 
interactions and thus social behaviour (Lemer & Steinberg, 2004). Adolescence is a 
period of consolidation of the social self, that is, the development of identity and 
understanding of the self in relation to the social world (Coleman & Hendry, 1990). 
Anecdotal evidence and self-report data indicate that children seem to become 
progressively self-conscious and concerned with other people’s opinions as they go 
through puberty and the period of adolescence (Berzonsky & Adams, 2003). The 
psychosocial context for adolescents is markedly different to that for children and 
adults. For example, relationships with peers, family and society go through distinct 
developments during this time. Adolescents begin to assert more autonomous control on 
their decisions, emotions and actions, disengaging from parental control for example 
(Coleman & Hendry, 1990). At the same time, the school context involves an intense 
socialisation process during which adolescents become increasingly aware of the 
perspectives of classmates, teachers and other societal influences (Berzonsky & Adams,
2003). This transitional period seems to involve both the establishment of a sense of self 
as well as a process of orienting towards others.
2.1.1. Increased awareness o f others during adolescence
The emergence of the social self seems to be marked by a period of heightened self- 
consciousness, during which adolescents are thought to become preoccupied with other 
people’s concerns about their own actions, thoughts and appearance. This development 
has been described in terms of phases of egocentrism during childhood and adolescence 
(Elkind, 1967). This account is based on Piaget’s stages of cognitive growth (Inhelder & 
Piaget, 1958). It is proposed that after children develop internal representations of 
objects and referential thinking during early childhood, they reach the stage of the 
“emergence of concrete operations”, and between the ages of seven and 11, they have 
acquired the mental tools to deal with classes and hierarchies. However, at this stage of
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childhood, these abilities are restricted to concrete, physical entities and not abstract 
thought. Children of this age group therefore manifest “concrete operational 
egocentrism”, or the inability to distinguish between a mental construction and 
perceptual phenomena. According to the Piagetian developmental account, by age 11, 
the emergence of “formal operational thought” enables children to differentiate between 
the perception of an object and their own mental construction of it, allowing them to 
objectify their own thoughts and reason about them. It is this form of thinking that 
allows children in early adolescence to conceptualise other people’s thoughts and take 
their perspectives (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958).
Affective development during adolescence is thought to occur in synchrony with 
epistemological development (Benack, 1984). It is proposed that a change in 
knowledge of the world, and of the self and others in relation to the world enables a 
change in the knowledge of other people’s mental states. Benack called this a shift from 
being a “dualist” to a being a “relativist” . In this context, we might hypothesise that pre­
adolescent children are dualists, such that they are able to distinguish between a 
person’s experience and reality, but that any differences between experience and reality 
are considered deviations from an objective “truth”. On the other hand, older 
adolescents and adults might be described as relativists who are able to view the nature 
of other people’s experience through multiple frames of reference, taking into account 
subjective factors. For relativists, there is not necessarily a general truth; rather, validity 
is given to many different truths based on subjective factors. It is suggested that a shift 
in epistemological sequences might be linked to an improvement in empathy (Benack 
1984). A shift towards relativistic thinking during adolescence might therefore increase 
the flexibility required to understand other people’s perspectives and enhance the ability 
to maintain the distinction between the two perspectives and emotional states of the self 
and the other.
2.1.1.1. The imaginary audience
The development of adolescent egocentrism is thought to be a dialectic process: it is the 
ability to represent other people’s thoughts as distinct from their own and therefore 
decentre themselves that also drives the new form of egocentrism. In other words, as 
soon as they are able to understand that other people have distinct thoughts and 
perspectives, they become preoccupied with the notion that other people’s thoughts are
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focused on their own behaviour or appearance (Elkind, 1967). Elkind’s original 
theoretical model of adolescent egocentrism delineates two ideation patterns thought to 
arise as a consequence, and to characterise common adolescent social behaviours: the 
imaginary audience and the personal fable. The notion of the imaginary audience refers 
to adolescents’ beliefs that others are watching and evaluating them, and that they are 
the object of other people’s scrutiny. According to Elkind’s theory, this belief results in 
an increased self-consciousness, a tendency to anticipate reactions of other people in 
relation to the self, and a feeling of being the focus of attention, regardless of whether a 
real audience exists or not in the situation. The personal fable, a related construct, 
denotes adolescents’ convictions of their own personal uniqueness, giving rise to the 
sense of being ‘special’ (Elkind, 1967).
Since this original account of adolescent egocentrism, social psychological studies have 
investigated the imaginary audience with questionnaires and qualitative approaches. 
The exact age, validity and explanation (e.g. Bell & Bromnick, 2003; Frankenberger, 
2000; Lapsely & Murphey, 1985; Vartanian & Powlishta, 2001) of Elkind’s account of 
adolescent egocentrism have been challenged, and the theory has since evolved. 
Nevertheless, the number of reformulations and critiques of the original theory and the 
subsequent social psychological studies attest to the notion that social thinking during 
adolescence is marked by a focus on “what other people think”.
2.2. Shifting from  one's own viewpoint to another ys viewpoint
2.2.1. What is perspective taking ?
The ability to take another’s perspective is crucial for successful social communication. 
In order to reason about others, and understand what they think, feel or believe, it is 
necessary to step into their ‘mental shoes’ and take their perspective (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998). Perspective taking includes awareness of one’s own subjective space 
or mental states (“first-person perspective”, or 1PP) and requires the ability to ascribe 
viewpoints, mental states or emotions to another person (“third-person perspective” or 
3PP). It is thus related to first-order TOM in that it involves surmising what another 
person is thinking or feeling (Harris, 1989). It requires the ability to distinguish the self 
from someone else and appreciate another’s intentions or beliefs. The ability to adopt 
another’s viewpoint may underpin the ability to read other minds and understand
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another’s feelings (Humphrey, 1976).
However, a distinction between cognitive perspective taking and empathy is required 
here. A recent definition proposes that there is empathy if “(i) one is in an affective 
state; (ii) this state is isomorphic to another person’s affective state; (iii) this state is 
elicited by the observation of imagination of another person’s affective state; (iv) one 
knows that the other person is the source of one’s own affective state” (de Vignemont & 
Singer, 2006, pp. 435). Thus empathy, like perspective taking, requires the ability to 
understand another person’s emotions but the ability to distinguish between the self and 
other. Perspective taking, however, does not meet the first condition outlined above. In 
other words, to understand how one might feel, or how another person might feel, in 
given scenarios, it is necessary to represent mental states of other people but it is not 
necessary to be emotionally involved, oneself (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006). For 
example, it is possible to attribute fear to another person, based on one’s knowledge of 
that person or the understanding of their behaviour in a threatening scenario, but it is not 
necessary to feel the fear.
2.2.2. Frames o f reference and role taking
Current literature on perspective taking subsumes different forms of processing. It is 
therefore worth noting the distinction between the phenomenal and representational 
levels of self-other relationships. As detailed by Frith and de Vignemont (2005) and 
Vogeley and colleagues (2004), one can take different perspectives in terms of spatial 
representations, such that the locations of other entities in space are represented by the 
beholder in different reference frames. In an egocentric frame of reference, the location 
of an object is represented in relation to the subject, i.e., in relation to the personal agent 
(e.g. is the line on your right or left?), whereas in the allocentric frame of reference, the 
location of one object in relation to another object is represented by the agent (e.g. is the 
line on the right or left of the square?). Thus, while the egocentric perspective relates 
that which is seen to the agent who sees it, the allocentric perspective is independent of 
the agent’s position.
At the phenomenal level, however, the first-person perspective (1PP) (e.g. is the line on 
your right or left?) and the third-person perspective (3PP) (e.g. is the line on his right or
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left?) are both centred on an agent. Crucially, perspective taking at this phenomenal 
level requires “the translocation of the egocentric viewpoint” from the 1PP to the 3PP 
(Vogeley & Fink, 2003). Thus, emotional perspective taking, analogous to role taking, 
for example, considering how “1” would feel versus how “she” would feel, necessitates 
a shift in the egocentric perspective.
2.3. Mechanisms o f  perspective taking
There is currently much debate surrounding the mechanism of perspective taking. How 
do we automatically switch roles from the self to the other in everyday social 
interactions? One prevalent view is that we understand others by mentally simulating 
their actions (Goldman, 1989; Harris, 1995). In support of this “simulation theory”, a 
growing body of evidence from neurophysiological studies has demonstrated that 
common brain areas are activated both when we execute an action and when we observe 
another person perform the same action (Buccino et al., 2001; Decety et al., 1997; 
Grafton et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996a; Rizzolatti et al., 1996b). Simulation 
theorists draw on the existence of a MNS to suggest that simulating other people’s 
actions is an ontogenic precursor to understanding their thoughts and emotions (Gallese 
& Goldman 1998). On the other side of the debate is “theory theory”, or the idea that we 
use a common sense psychological theory, or “folk psychology” to understand other 
minds, rather than internally simulating them (e.g. Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).
2.4. Perspective taking and the brain
The brain regions that undergo the most significant development during adolescence 
overlap with those that have been linked to the ability to take other people’s 
perspectives. Functional neuroimaging studies have revealed that frontal, parietal and 
superior temporal cortex are associated with making the distinction between 3PP and 
1PP at the motor (Ruby & Decety, 2001), visuo-spatial (Vogeley et al., 2004), 
conceptual (Ruby & Decety, 2003; Vogeley et al., 2001) and emotional (Ruby & 
Decety, 2004) level. While these have shown common activations in prefrontal and 
parietal areas (Vogeley et al., 2004) as well as SMA, precentral gyrus, precuneus, 
MT/V5 (Ruby & Decety, 2001) and common deactivations in areas such as lateral
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superior temporal cortex (Vogeley et al., 2004), differential activity between the two 
perspective conditions has also been reported.
The series of studies by Ruby and Decety of emotional (2004) and conceptual (2003) 
perspective taking show that thinking about how another person, such as your mother 
versus you, would feel, or what a medical student versus you would think, are 
associated with increased activity in medial superior frontal gyrus, left STS, left 
temporal pole and right IPL, while for shifting perspectives in their motor imagery task 
(2001), the same contrast of 3PP versus 1PP elicited increased activity in similar areas 
including right IPL and frontopolar gyrus, suggesting continuity of cognitive and neural 
processes between motor, conceptual and social emotional processes in perspective 
taking tasks. In addition, neuroimaging and TMS studies have implicated the inferior 
PFC in the distinction between self and others at the sensorimotor level (Farrer & Frith, 
2002). In line with simulation theory, therefore, some common neural networks are 
recruited for taking the 1PP and 3PP. However, as Vogeley and colleagues (2001) 
indicate, the differential brain activity suggests that simulation cannot be the only 
mechanism since distinct brain regions are also activated, presumably to monitor who 
the agent is in the interaction.
Furthermore, MPFC plays a role in differentiating between the self and a familiar but 
unknown other such as George W. Bush (Kelley et al., 2002) and between the self and a 
personally known other such as a close friend (Heatherton et al., 2006). Neuroimaging 
studies continue to associate MPFC with mentalising tasks (cf. Amodio & Frith, 2006). 
For example, the attribution of mental states to abstract moving triangles in animations 
activates MPFC, as does playing interactive games that require mutual cooperation 
between players (McCabe et al., 2001). In another neuroimaging study investigating 
TOM processes, MPFC and STS were activated when participants were required to 
surmise what another person from another era (Christopher Columbus) would know 
about the use of certain tools (Goel et al., 1995). Thus thinking about other people has 
consistently been associated with MPFC, through functional neuroimaging paradigms 
(see Introduction, Chapter 1 for more details of paradigms).
Recently, using fMRI, Aichhom and colleagues (2006) investigated whether, like social 
perspective taking and TOM tasks, visual perspective taking is associated with MPFC
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activity in adults. They developed a paradigm that strictly necessitated a shift of 
perspective in a computerised visuo-spatial task. The results demonstrated that MPFC 
was not involved in visual perspective taking, but that posterior regions of the STS and 
the TPJ were involved in judging what another can see. These results echo findings 
from TOM studies, which also require a shift in perspective (see Frith & Frith, 2006, 
and Introduction, Chapter 1). Drawing on results of differential neural networks shown 
to be involved in visual compared with social perspective taking in various studies, 
Aichhom and colleagues suggested that different aspects of TOM are required in 
different types o f perspective taking. They suggest that the dorsal posterior STS/TPJ 
region is involved in realising that minds represent the world differently and 
representing “cold” facts about the mind, that include perspective distinctions and 
behavioural predictions. On the other hand, they propose that MPFC is involved in 
representing “hot” information such as predicting the emotional consequences of 
behaviour (Aichhorn et al., 2006).
The studies on mentalising and perspective taking described above have involved adult 
participants. None, so far, has investigated the development of these skills during 
adolescence. Given the demands of the social environment in adolescence, and the 
development of the brain areas associated with mentalising, components of mentalising 
might be expected to develop during this period.
2.5. Experiment 1: Development o f perspective taking during adolescence
2.5.1. Introduction
Studies have focussed mainly on the development of executive functions during 
adolescence and have shown that a variety of executive functions improve with age 
during adolescence (e.g. Anderson et al., 2001). Aside from a handful of studies on 
recognition of facial expressions (Killgore et al. 2001; Monk et al., 2003; Nelson et al.,
2005), there has been a lack of attention on the development of social cognition during 
this time period. In the field of social cognitive development, so far, much attention has 
been devoted to the development of TOM during childhood (e.g. Wimmer & Perner, 
1983), as well as to the consequences of its delay or impairment (e.g. Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1985). Since Piaget’s studies using the “three mountain problem” (Piaget &
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Inhelder, 1948/1956), only a handful of social psychology studies have investigated 
perspective taking in early to mid childhood (e.g. Bosacki & Astington, 1999) and to 
our knowledge, none has considered its development during adolescence. As well as 
changes in behavioural development, the transition from childhood to adolescence is 
marked by dramatic structural changes in the brain (Paus, 2005). MRI studies have 
shown a reduction in GM volume, which is most prolonged in FC, PC and STS. There 
is a simultaneous increase in WM volume, according to these MRI data. These changes 
correlate with the decreases in synaptic density and increases in myelinated axons found 
in earlier post-mortem investigations (Huttenlocher et al., 1983; Huttenlocher & 
Dhabolkar, 1997; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967). Taken together, these structural changes 
have been taken to reflect the processes of synaptic pruning and myelination during 
adolescence (Giedd et al., 1999a; Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 2003; Toga et al.,
2006).
The brain regions that undergo the most significant development during adolescence are 
also those that have been linked to the ability to take other people’s perspectives. 
Studies have shown that TOM develops in infancy by the age of five (Barresi & Moore, 
1996; Leslie, 1994). So, what are the cognitive consequences of the continued 
development of its underlying neural circuitry? Clearly, development of associated 
abilities is going to be subtle. Given that the social environment dramatically changes 
during adolescence, and that the brain undergoes a restructuring process, it might be 
expected that social cognitive abilities such as perspective taking develop during 
adolescence.
Taking a cognitive neuroscience approach, the development of perspective taking 
before, during and after adolescence was investigated4. Perspective taking was in the 
emotional domain, such that participants were required to consider their own response 
to certain emotional situations or those of another person. The processing of first-person 
and third-person emotional perspectives were contrasted. Given the reorganisation of 
PFC and PC that takes place around puberty, it was predicted that perspective taking 
becomes increasingly efficient during adolescence. This hypothesis would predict that
4 See Choudhury, S., Blakemore, S.-J & Charman, T. Social cognitive development during adolescence. 
Social Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience, in press
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the difference in RT between 3PP and 1PP (A RT) would progressively decrease with 
age.
2.5.2. Method
2.5.2.1. Participants
112 participants were recruited: 33 pre-adolescent children (12 males, 19 females; mean 
age 8.6 years, SD=0.46), 41 adolescents (20 males, 21 females; mean age 12.9 years, 
SD=1.20) and 38 adults (20 males, 18 females; mean age 24.0 years, SD=4.05). Child 
participants were from a state comprehensive primary and secondary schools in the 
London area and adults were students at University College London. Participants were 
screened to ensure that they were right handed and that none had a history of 
psychiatric, neurological, developmental or learning disorder. Written informed consent 
was obtained from the participants and, for children, from their parents prior to the 
study, which was approved by the local ethics committee.
2.5.2.2. Experimental design
Participants were presented with a series of written scenarios. First, a one-line sentence 
describing an everyday scenario was presented on a laptop computer screen together 
with a question concerning how the participant himself or herself (for 1PP scenarios), or 
how the protagonist (for 3PP scenarios), would feel in such circumstances (Figure 2.1). 
There were 120 trials altogether, of which half conveyed the question in the first person 
(“How do you feel?”) and the other half asked the same question but about a 
hypothetical character in the third person (“How does he/she feel?”). The participant 
was instructed to press the space bar after reading the question at his or her own pace. 
This elicited the presentation of two possible response choices in the form of simple 
cartoon faces, each representing one of five possible emotions: very happy, happy, 
neutral, sad, afraid and angry. The participant was asked to choose one of the two 
possible faces in answer to each question, as quickly as possible. As soon as the 
participant responded, the next scenario appeared. Reaction times (RT), taken as the 
time in milliseconds (ms) between the presentation of the answer screen and the key 
press for the chosen answer, were recorded by the computer.
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Perspective. Scenarios either concerned 1PP or 3PP:
First-person perspective (1PP): Questions focussed on what emotion the participant 
would feel given a particular social situation. For example: ‘You have had an argument 
with your best friend. How do you feel?’ These questions were designed to require the 
participant to think about his or her own emotional response in certain contexts.
Third-person perspective (3PP): The same questions involving exactly the same 
scenarios were asked, only the situation described involved a hypothetical other person 
and the question was conveyed in the third person. For example: ‘A girl has had an 
argument with her best friend. How does she feel?’ These questions were designed to 
require participants to think about another person’s likely emotional response in 
equivalent contexts to the 1PP condition. See Figure 2.1 and Appendix 2.
Choice type. The trials were designed to be of two types: Open and Closed. This created 
two levels of difficulty, the rationale being that any RT difference between the 1PP and 
3PP conditions might be more apparent in the open condition, since the answer choices 
for these questions were designed to be more ambiguous and require more thought.
Open (O): In the open answer trials, both faces on the answer screen were designed to 
be equally appropriate responses to the emotional situation outlined in the preceding 
question screen, e.g. sad and angry. See Figure 2.1.
Closed (C): In the closed trials, one of the two choices of faces was designed to be 
clearly a more appropriate response to the emotional situation outlined in the preceding 
question screen, e.g. happy and sad. See Figure 2.1.
The number of characters and clauses in each scenario were matched between 
conditions.
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You have just had an 
argument with your 
best friend. 
How do you feel?
A girl has just had an 
argument with her best 
friend. 
How does she feel?
1 pp 3PP
CLOSED OPEN
Figure 2.1. Design o f task: two levels o f Perspective (1PP and 
3PP) and two levels o f difficulty (Open and Closed). See Method 
fo r  details.
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2.5.23. Experimental procedure
Stimulus presentation. The questions were delivered in four blocks of 30 question and 
answer stimuli, in a pseudorandom order that was counterbalanced between the 
participants. It was ensured that each of the Perspective and Choice Type conditions 
were equally represented in each block. Stimuli within each block were presented in a 
random order and each question occurred only once in each block. There was a rest 
period between the blocks and participants were told that they could continue with the 
task when ready, by pressing the space bar. To indicate their response, participants were 
instructed to use the right hand and to press either the F or the FI key (chosen for their 
central position on the keyboard) to indicate their answer. These keys were colour- 
coded and participants were instructed to press the key that corresponded to the side of 
the screen of their selected answer face. As soon as the participant had pressed an 
answer key, the next question was automatically presented. Each block of questions 
lasted approximately two minutes and testing was conducted individually in a quiet 
room. The duration of the experiment was approximately 10 minutes per participant. 
Cogent (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) running in Matlab 6.5 (Mathworks Inc, Sherborne) was 
used to present the stimuli and to record participant responses and reaction times.
Instructions. Each participant was shown a Powerpoint presentation which explained 
how to perform the task, emphasising that the participant should pay careful attention to 
the person whose perspective they were required to take, and that they should choose an 
answer as quickly as they could. The presentation was also used to check that 
participants understood the emotions represented by each of the faces. Participants were 
then given a practise condition consisting of six example questions (which were not 
included in the main experiment).
2.5.2.4. Data analysis 
Reaction time
For each participant, median RTs were calculated for each of the four conditions of 
1PPO, 1PPC, 3PPO and 3PPC, and for 1PP and 3PP overall, irrespective of Choice 
Type. The difference between the median RT for 1PP and 3PP was then calculated for 
each participant (A RT). Data were analysed using a univariate ANOVA to test the 
effects of age and gender on A RT.
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Error analysis
Since the response choices in the Open condition were entirely subjective and purposely 
ambiguous, there was no correct answer, only the timing of responses was used in the 
analyses. In the Closed condition, there was a more obvious correct answer and an 
obvious incorrect answer. An error analysis was therefore performed for all subjects in 
the Closed condition. The correct answer was determined beforehand, and each 
subject’s answers to Closed condition questions were “marked” for errors. A percentage 
error was given to each subject, for each of the 1PP Closed and 3PP Closed condition. 
A 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA (2 levels of perspective: 1PP % error, 3PP % error; 
3 levels of age: pre-adolescent, adolescent, adult) was used to test the hypothesis that 
difference in percentage (%) error between 1PP and 3PP becomes less pronounced with 
increasing age. In other words, an interaction was predicted between errors in each 
Perspective condition and age.
2.5.3. Results
All participants were able to follow the instructions and perform the tasks. Two outliers 
were excluded because their median RT for one of the perspective conditions fell below 
3SD of their group mean.
2.5.3.1. Reaction time analysis
A univariate ANOVA was performed to investigate the effect of Age (three levels: 
preadolescence; adolescence; adult) and Gender (two levels: male; female) on the non- 
directional differences in RT between 1PP and 3PP (collapsed across Open and Closed 
conditions). There was a main effect of age group showing that A RT decreased 
significantly with age (F(2,104) = 10.82; p<.0001; see Table 2-1). Post-hoc Bonferroni 
tests indicated that the mean A RT was significantly larger in pre-adolescents compared 
with adults (p<0.0001) and in adolescents compared with adults (p<0.005). Mean A RT 
was not significantly different in pre-adolescents compared with adolescents (see Table 
2-1 for RTs in ms for the three groups of subjects in each condition (3PP and 1PP), and 
the difference in RT between conditions). This relationship between age and A RT can 
also be seen in Figure 2.2, showing a correlation between A RT and age in years. This 
graph shows that there is a significant negative correlation between age and A RT (R2 = 
0.145 (p<0.01)).
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Figure 2.2. Relationship between A RT and age. This graph shows that 
there is a significant negative correlation between age and A RT (R2 = 
0.145 (p<0.0l)
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Mean±SE RT (ms) in 
3PP
Mean±SE (ms) RT in 
1PP
Mean±SE (ms) 
ART
Preadolescent
(N=31) (mean age 8.6) 1739.7 ±74.1 1712.7 ±69 .1 143.6 ± 1 9 .5
Adolescent
(N=41) (mean age 12.9) 1248.5 ± 4 5 .9 1199.1 ± 4 3 .7 112.1 ± 13.9
Adult
(N=38) (mean age 24.0) 903.5 ±35.1 894.0 ± 35.4 48.6 ± 6.2
Table 2-1 Mean reaction times and non-directional A RT (3PP-1PP) fo r  each 
perspective condition fo r  every age group.
The effect of age on A RT was consistent within the Open (A RT-O) and Closed (A 
RT-C) conditions, as well (Figure 2.3). A univariate ANOVA showed that there was a 
significant effect of age on A R T-0 (F(2,104)=5.2; p<0.05). Post-hoc t-tests indicated 
that in this condition, there was a significant difference between pre-adolescents and 
adults (p<0.05). Similarly, A RT-C significantly decreased with age (F(2,104)=6.9; 
p<0.005), and again, post-hoc t-tests showed that A RT-C was significantly higher for 
pre-adolescents than adults (p<0.001).
A RT (collapsed across Open and Closed conditions) was plotted to investigate 
directionality (see Figure 2.4). As shown in the graph, ART among both groups of 
younger participants was larger and spread almost equally in both directions (i.e. 
3PP>1PP and 1PP>3PP) whereas among adults there was little difference with A RT 
values clustering around the zero mark of the difference scale (i.e. 3PP = 1PP). The 
difference was most pronounced for the pre-adolescent group, less so for the 
adolescents and negligible for the adults.
There was no significant effect of Gender on A RT (F( 1,104)= 1.69; p=0.17), nor was 
there a significant effect interaction between Age and Gender (F(2,104)=0.717; p=0.49).
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Figure 2.3. A R T fo r  each Choice Type condition for each age group, showing 
that A RT decreases with age in both the Open and Closed conditions, with pre­
adolescents having a significantly higher A RT in both Choice Type conditions 
than adults. *p=<0.05; **p=<0.00l.
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Figure 2.4. Difference between 3PP and 1PP (A RT) against age 
showing direction o f  A RT. Differences are larger and more scattered in 
both directions fo r  the younger participants, particularly the pre­
adolescents. With increasing age, differences get closer to zero.
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2.53.2. Error analysis
There was a main effect of age group (F(2,105)=5.9, p<0.005) indicating that the % 
errors overall decreased with increasing age (% error ± S.E.(pre-adolescents)=7.5±0.87; 
(adolescents)=4.3±0.69; (adults)=4.0±0.46) (Figure 2.5). Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected 
t-tests indicated that pre-adolescents made significantly more error across both 
perspective conditions, compared with both adolescents (p<0.05) and adults (p<0.005). 
There was no significant difference in the overall percentage error between adolescents 
and adults (Figure 2.5). However, there was no effect of Perspective condition on the 
number of errors (F=(l,105)=0.20, p=0.66) nor an interaction between Perspective 
condition and age (F=(2,105)=1.2, p=0.30).
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Figure 2.5. Error analysis. Pre-adolescents made significantly more 
errors than adolescents and adults, from both perspectives in the 
Closed condition *p—<0.05; **p<0.005
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2.5.4. Discussion
In this study, the development of perspective taking during adolescence was 
investigated. A novel perspective taking task was designed, suitable for a large age 
range spanning middle childhood, adolescence and adulthood. The difference in RT 
between 3PP and 1PP conditions (A RT) significantly decreased with increasing age 
between late childhood and adulthood. Whilst A RT was relatively large among pre­
adolescents, it became progressively smaller with age. The spread of A RT was both in 
the positive (3PP>1PP) and negative (1PP>3PP) directions among the pre-adolescent 
children whereas the RT for 1PP and 3PP conditions was more or less equal for adults. 
In line with our prediction, this finding suggests that the efficiency and possibly the 
strategy of perspective taking develops during adolescence, in parallel with the 
maturation of neural networks subserving social cognitive processes during 
adolescence. The relatively higher proportion of errors in the Closed condition among 
the pre-adolescents may indicate that the less systematic response style of the pre­
adolescents, compared with the two older groups is also associated with greater 
difficulty (less accuracy) in perspective taking.
2.5.4.1. Inefficient perspective taking among pre-adolescents
According to Piaget’s stages of cognitive growth (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958), the pre­
adolescent group, aged around nine years, is able to carry out formal operational 
thought, which includes being able to conceptualise other people’s thoughts as distinct 
from one’s own. Indeed, studies of the development of TOM have shown that children 
aged four are able to predict other people’s intentions and emotional reactions (Harris, 
1989; Wellman, 1990). By age nine, children should therefore be capable of taking into 
account the third person perspective. However, our results suggest that prior to 
adolescence, children have a less systematic processing strategy. The pre-adolescent 
group showed no systematic direction of difference between 1PP and 3PP, such that 
around half of the pre-adolescents took longer to take the 1PP (1PP>3PP), while the rest 
took longer to take the 3PP (3PP>1PP). It might be speculated, therefore, that prior to 
adolescence, the unsystematic direction of A RT reflects an immature cognitive 
mechanism for perspective taking. Whether this response pattern among pre­
adolescents is a result of a relative difficulty in differentiating between the first- and 
third-person, or that children of this age group are less inclined, or find it more difficult, 
to enter into another person’s “mental shoes”, requires further investigation. The error
84
Chapter 2 Perspective taking in adolescence
analysis (which was only applicable to the Closed conditions) demonstrated 
significantly more errors among pre-adolescents compared to adults. This suggests that 
pre-adolescents were not only less efficient but also more error prone than the older 
participants.
2.5.4.2. Neural and cognitive mechanisms o f perspective taking
It has been suggested that we understand others by mentally simulating their actions and 
thoughts (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Harris, 1995). In support of this “simulation 
theory”, evidence has accumulated to show that common brain areas are activated when 
participants perceive a visual scene or answer a conceptual question from their own, 
first-person, perspective and from another person’s perspective (e.g. Vogeley et al.,
2004). In addition to simulating another person, it is also necessary to distinguish 
between the first- (self) and third- person (other), which is thought to activate PC 
(Farrer & Frith, 2002; Ruby & Decety, 2001). The synaptic reorganisation in FC and PC 
during adolescence is likely to have implications for social cognitive processes that 
depend on these brain regions. This conjecture is supported by the current results. If we 
assume that, among the age groups tested, adults are most experienced in social 
interaction and have mature frontal and parietal neural circuitry, then a low difference in 
A RT (3PP=1PP) is likely to indicate the highest proficiency in perspective taking. In 
contrast, the most pronounced difference in RT between 1PP and 3PP, seen in the pre­
adolescent group, would therefore indicate relatively inefficient processing.
2.5.43. Cellular maturation in the frontal and parietal cortices during adolescence 
There is accumulating evidence that the brain regions consistently involved in social 
interaction with other people, including PFC and PC (Frith & Frith, 1999; Gallagher et 
al., 2000; Ruby & Decety, 2001; 2003; 2004), are subject to structural development 
during adolescence. Post-mortem cellular studies have shown that there is a 
proliferation of synapses in the subgranular layers of the PFC during childhood 
followed by a plateau phase and a subsequent elimination of synaptic connections after 
puberty and throughout adolescence (Huttenlocher, 1979). In addition to this synaptic 
development, axons in PFC are myelinated from childhood to adulthood (Yakovlev & 
Lecours, 1967).
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MRI studies have shown a peak of frontal and parietal GM just before puberty, from 
age seven to roughly 12, and a progressive net decline thereafter well into adulthood, 
along with a concomitant linear net increase in WM (Giedd et al., 1999a; Gogtay et al., 
2004; Sowell et al., 2003). The peak in GM density just before puberty, followed by the 
decrease in grey matter density in frontal and parietal regions throughout adolescence 
has been interpreted as reflecting a wave of synaptogenesis at puberty followed by 
synaptic pruning (Giedd et al., 1999a; Gogtay et al., 2004; Huttenlocher, 1979, 
Huttenlocher et al., 1983; Sowell et al., 2003; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967). There have 
been few empirical studies investigating social cognition during adolescence. Results 
from studies that have investigated development of executive function have shown 
development of selective inhibition, working memory and risk assessment. 
Improvement in performance was attributed to the ongoing myelination of the frontal 
lobes during childhood and adolescence (see Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006a for a 
review).
2.5.4.4. Synaptic pruning improves efficiency during adolescence 
It is possible that children use different strategies for perspective taking and only 
gradually during adolescence does a unified, efficient strategy become refined. This 
refinement of performance may be conferred by the cellular changes occurring in the 
FC and PC during adolescence (Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 2004; Huttenlocher, 
1979, Huttenlocher et al., 1983; Sowell et al., 2003, Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967). It is 
possible that the net increase in GM thought to represent exuberant synaptic 
connections in frontal and parietal areas may account for the increased A RT of pre­
adolescent participants. During adolescence, pruning of excess synapses, along with 
accelerated axonal conduction conferred by the myelination process, is proposed to lead 
to the consolidation of functional circuits in frontal and parietal areas (Giedd et al., 
1999a), rendering cognitive processing more efficient (McGivern et al., 2002). 
Consequently, adults may have sufficiently fine-tuned neural circuitry to take the 
perspective of another person as efficiently as taking the first person perspective.
The differences between age groups are also likely to be influenced by differences in 
social experience. Compared to children and adolescents, adults are generally more 
skilled in instinctively inferring the perspectives of other people. Perhaps as a result of 
their mature neural circuitry supporting social cognition, as well as their greater social
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experience, adults show no difference between RTs for 1PP and 3PP. Perspective taking 
in adults, in other words, is automatic.
2.5.4.5. Development o f  the strategy fo r  perspective taking
While PC is involved in differentiating self and other, it has been proposed that STS is 
associated with the prediction o f actions based on past actions, and that MPFC is 
involved in anticipating future consequences o f actions based on internal mental states 
(Frith, in press). We know from executive function studies, that the ability to suppress 
impulses develops during adolescence, perhaps in line with PFC maturation (Adleman 
et al., 2002; Casey et al., 1997; Rubia et al., 2001; Tamm et al., 2002). As the ability to 
inhibit one’s own impulses develops, and the ability to understand other people’s mental 
states is refined, a change in the strategy of perspective taking might take place. Perhaps 
children and young adolescents have relatively poor inhibition of their own egocentric 
bias, and therefore rely on predicting other people’s emotional perspectives based on the 
consequences of their own past actions. Maturation of PFC circuitry might facilitate a 
strategic shift such that older adolescents and adults can predict the feelings of other 
people based on how they anticipate the other person would feel if s/he were to make 
the action in the given scenario. Development of IPL might enable older adolescents 
and adults to keep the self/other distinction intact, while in pre-adolescents, immature 
circuitry in the area might lead to a blurring between 1PP and 3PP and the imposition of 
the self-perspective onto the other.
2.5.5. Conclusion
The significant decrease in the difference between RTs for 1PP and 3PP during 
adolescence found in the current study may reflect cognitive and behavioural features 
both experimentally (Steinberg, 2005) and anecdotally associated with adolescent 
development (see Time Magazine, June 7 2004). While several studies have investigated 
development of executive function during childhood and adolescence (Anderson et al., 
2001; Casey et al., 1997; Luna et al., 2001; McGivem et al., 2002; Tamm et al., 2002), 
no empirical study to our knowledge has explored the development of social cognitive 
abilities during this time period. Perspective taking is a cognitive mechanism that 
underlies everyday social interaction. These data suggest that prior to adolescence, 
children are less efficient and have a less systematic and more error-prone style of 
processing the emotional perspectives of other people. During adolescence, social and
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neural maturation occur so that by adulthood the cognitive processing for perspective 
taking is fast and systematic. Future fMRI studies are necessary to test our prediction 
that this reflects a developmental shift in the neural strategy required for perspective 
taking. The results from this novel perspective taking task appear to model the course 
of social behavioural development and provide an interesting basis for further research.
The next chapter investigates how the pattern o f perspective taking differs between 
healthy adults and adult patients with positive symptoms o f schizophrenia.
Chapter 3 Perspective taking, in schizophrenia
C h a pte r  3
3. P e r sp e c t iv e  t a k in g  in pa t ie n t s  w it h  p o sit iv e  sy m pt o m s  o f  sc h iz o p h r e n ia
3.1. Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is characterised by both negative and positive symptoms. Negative 
symptoms reflect a lack of typical behavioural features, and include apathy and 
emotional bluntness. Positive symptoms are features that are present in schizophrenia 
but not in healthy individuals. These include thought insertion, delusions of control, 
delusions of persecution and auditory hallucinations (see Table 3-1; DSM IV-TR, APA, 
2000). Here, the focus is on persecutory delusions, which are a type of positive 
symptom in which a person holds a bizarre and paranoid belief with extraordinary 
conviction (Johnstone, 1991; Kraeplin, 1919; Ndetei & Vadher, 1984). Specifically, this 
study investigates perspective taking in patients with positive symptoms which were 
predominantly delusions of persecution. The next section describes delusions and 
outlines theories that have been proposed to explain them.
3.2. Delusions
Delusions, once described as the ‘basic characteristics of madness’ (Jaspers, 1963), are 
a key symptom of psychosis and are commonly associated with the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. Like auditory hallucinations (which are the experiences of hearing 
speech or voices in the mind), delusions are experiences involving distortions of reality 
but that make sense to the believer. While delusions were traditionally considered to be 
resistant to change despite experiences to the contrary and counter-arguments 
(Johnstone, 1991; Kraeplin, 1919; Ndetei & Vadher, 1984;), it has recently been argued 
that delusional conviction changes over time and can be reduced by cognitive 
intervention, and is therefore better conceptualised as a dimensional rather than 
categorical phenomenon (Blackwood et al., 2001). Delusional beliefs are thus viewed as 
an extreme form of the normal belief system. The table below illustrates the diverse 
types of delusions exhibited by patients with schizophrenia (Table 3-1).
89
Chapter 3 P erspective taking in schizophrenia
Theme
Defined by DSM
Persecutory
Grandiose
Jealous (Othello syndrome)
Erotomanic (De Clerambault’s syndrome)
Somatic (e.g. delusional parasitosis/Ekbom’s syndrome) 
Bizarre
Misidentification
Capgrass syndrome
Fregoli syndrome 
Reduplicative paramnesia 
Mirrored self-misidentification
Other
Thought insertion/withdrawal
External control 
Guilt
Religious 
Cotard delusion 
Lycanthropy
Example
“My food is being poisoned by the police"
“I have the power to heal all illnesses”
“My partner is cheating on me”
“A famous pop star secretly signals her love to me over 
the radio”
“I am infected by tiny parasites”
“My mother’s thoughts are being carried on raindrops 
that fall on the air conditioner”
“My relatives have been replaced by identical looking 
impostors”
‘The same person is disguising himself as others”
“My present location exists in two places simultaneously” 
“The reflection in the mirror is another person”
“Thoughts are being inserted into/withdrawn from my 
mind”
“My mind/body is being controlled by an external agent”
“I am responsible for the AIDS epidemic”
“I am the reincarnation of Solomon"
“I am dead/do not exist” or “My body is decaying”
“I am/have transformed into an animal”
Table 3-1. Examples o f positive symptoms as defined by DSM-IV  
(adapted from  Bell et al., 2006)
Studies have indicated that delusional behaviour is associated with particular styles of 
cognition (Bell et al., 2006). For example, in the domain of probabilistic reasoning, 
delusional individuals manifest a tendency to jump to conclusions, and the degree to 
which they do this may be related to the strength of delusional thinking (e.g. Garety & 
Freeman, 1999). Studies of attributional style focussing on patients with delusions of 
persecution have shown that such patients manifest a propensity to blame other people, 
or external circumstances for particular events (e.g. Bentall et al., 2001). Attention 
studies suggest that patients with persecutory delusions preferentially attend to 
threatening stimuli (e.g. Fear et al., 1996).
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3.3. Impairments in theory o f  mind in schizophrenia
In addition to these attentional and reasoning styles, patients with delusions of 
persecution are behaviourally characterised by a preoccupation with intentions of other 
people, which may affect the psychological processes involved in forming accurate 
social beliefs about others (Blackwood et al., 2001). In fact, it has been argued that an 
impairment in TOM accounts for delusions of persecution. In other words, in these 
individuals, there is abnormal processing of other people’s intentions and mental states 
in which intentions (usually malevolent) are over-attributed to others (Frith, 1992). Frith 
proposed that TOM skills develop normally in people with delusions of persecution, but 
are “lost” during an acute psychotic episode (Frith, 1992). Consequently, persecutory 
delusions reflect false beliefs about other people’s intentions, especially when directed 
towards the self. Thus it has been suggested that the TOM impairment refers 
specifically to a problem in computing metarepresentation. This affects the normal 
decoupling mechanism involved in mentalising, such that schizophrenic patients with 
delusions of persecution do not detach the content of a representation from the real 
world. As a result, people’s beliefs are misconstrued as aspects of the real world, and 
this type of TOM impairment results in positive symptoms of schizophrenia, including 
delusions of persecution and auditory hallucinations (Frith, 1994).
The model proposed by Bentall and colleagues (e.g. Kinderman & Bentall, 1997), 
integrates attributional style with TOM impairments to explain delusions of persecution. 
They argue that the characteristic style of avoidance of internal attributions (not 
accepting responsibility for especially negative events) arises from dysfunctional 
strategies for regulating self esteem. TOM deficits consequently ensure that intentions 
and actions are attributed to other people rather than situational factors (Kinderman & 
Bentall, 1997).
Autism and schizophrenia, while phenomenologically distinct, are both proposed to 
share the feature of impairment in TOM. However, the models of a mindreading deficit 
that exist to explain autism seem unlikely to account for social cognition problems in 
schizophrenia. While autism is characterised by a deficit in attributing mental states to 
others (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Frith et al., 1991), the presence of positive symptoms 
in schizophrenia is more commonly associated with over-attribution of mental states,
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biases to certain types of mental states and the over-attribution of one's personal 
affectedness in a given social interaction. For example, it has been shown that patients 
with delusions of persecution interpret others’ non-intentional actions as being 
intentional (Corcoran, 2003) and non-causal actions as being causal (Blakemore et al., 
2003a). Thus, people with positive symptoms of schizophrenia are not “mind-blind”; 
they demonstrate an awareness that other people have intentions and beliefs, but in a 
qualitatively different way to both autistic and healthy individuals. This has been 
described as “over-mentalising” (ascribing beliefs and intentions wrongly) in 
schizophrenia, and “under-mentalising” in autism (failing to ascribe beliefs and 
intentions) (Frith, 2004)).
It has thus been argued that these positive symptoms of schizophrenia can be explained 
in terms of a “disturbed capacity in patients to relate their own intentions to executing 
behaviour, and to monitor others’ intentions” (Frith, 1992; see Briine, 2005, for a recent 
review). TOM has been extensively studied in schizophrenia but findings are 
inconsistent. In spite of the fact that delusions are the most prevalent psychotic 
symptom associated with schizophrenia (Breier & Berg, 1999), there is little consensus 
as to the relationship with social cognitive task performance, for example in mentalising 
tasks. Schizophrenia is a heterogeneous disorder; it is especially unclear as to how 
different symptom subgroups might show particular impairments. This may be because 
of the inclusion of patients with several types of symptoms in one patient group that is 
compared to a healthy control group. In general, understanding one’s own and others’ 
mental states has been found to be impaired in schizophrenic populations compared to 
healthy controls, in support of Frith’s (1992) neuropsychological account (Corcoran et 
al., 1997; Corcoran & Frith, 1996; Langdon & Coltheart, 2001; Mitchley et al., 1998; 
Sarfati et al., 1997; Sarfati et al., 1999).
Most of the studies tapping TOM in schizophrenia employ verbal or pictorial tasks that 
require participants to make inference about social meanings. For example, a ‘hinting 
task’ was used by Corcoran and colleagues (1995), which involved the interpretation of 
short stories about social interactions between two characters, and required participants 
to infer the intentions of characters from indirect speech. The phrase, “It’s very cold in 
here”, for example, was expected to be taken to mean, “Please shut the window”. 
Patients with negative symptoms performed worst, even when IQ was co-varied out.
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Paranoid patients also demonstrated difficulty compared to controls, while patients with 
passivity symptoms and those in remission were no worse than controls. This suggested 
that TOM performance is a state rather than a trait variable. Similarly, in another study 
by Frith and Corcoran (1996), patients with paranoid symptoms performed worse than 
patients with passivity symptoms and controls, on first and second order false belief 
tasks. However, the finding that TOM impairment is specific to persecutory delusions 
has not been consistent.
The appreciation of humour similarly involves the understanding of the intentions of 
characters and how events are causally related. While the appreciation of jokes was 
shown to be impaired in schizophrenia generally (Corcoran et al., 1997), when broken 
down into patient subgroups, both patients with passivity and paranoid symptoms 
performed more poorly than controls. Picture sequencing, illustrating series of vignettes, 
has also been used to test the ability to represent other agents’ intentions in 
schizophrenia (Sarfati et al., 1997; Sarfati et al., 1999) and results indicated that TOM 
impairments were specific to schizophrenic patients with formal thought disorder.
More recently, the understanding of visual jokes, including ‘physical’ or ‘mental state’ 
jokes, was found to be compromised in schizophrenic patients, compared with healthy 
controls, matched for age, sex and estimated IQ (Marjoram et al., 2005). Schizophrenic 
patients were particularly impaired in comprehension of mental state jokes, indicating a 
specific link between TOM impairment and schizophrenia, in support of previous 
findings (e.g. Corcoran et al., 1997). Marjoram and colleagues explored the notion that 
specific positive symptoms are linked to TOM impairments (Corcoran et al., 1995; Frith 
& Corcoran, 1996) but found no correlation between TOM impairment and positive 
symptom severity, even when specific symptoms of delusions and hallucinations were 
scrutinised (Marjoram et al., 2005).
The over-inference of malevolent intentions to other people is thought to be the result of 
abnormal causal attributions to external agents (Fear et al., 1996; Kinderman & Bentall, 
1997). The studies described above have used complex social stimuli involving verbal 
and pictorial vignettes. The processing of basic components of social information in 
schizophrenia was investigated in a task that required participants to rate mechanically 
or intentionally moving shapes on a computer screen according to their level of agency
93
Chapter 3 P erspective taking in schizophrenia
(Blakemore et al., 2003a). This study found that psychotic patients with delusions of 
persecution had a higher tendency than psychotic patients without delusions of 
persecution or healthy control groups to attribute contingency to the intentional stimuli. 
This was thought to reflect the behavioural tendency of these patients to over-attribute 
intention and mental states to others, which leads to the conviction that others have 
malevolent intentions related to patients. However, this study did not test whether 
abnormal attribution of intentions was more likely when intentions were directed to the 
self.
In addition, in a study by Corcoran and Frith (2003), in which tasks involved the 
comprehension of stories about social interactions and false beliefs, schizophrenic 
patients were impaired on TOM performance and this was related to an impairment in 
autobiographical memory. This was thought to reflect an alternative analogical 
reasoning strategy among schizophrenic patients when thinking about others’ intentions 
and beliefs. This finding might also suggest a relationship between impaired self- 
consciousness and consciousness of others in schizophrenia. Blackwood and colleagues 
(2001) relate the role of self-related information to TOM impairments in everyday 
social interactions, predicting that normal social inferences, which require selection of 
social data in the environment that is relevant to the self, and then accurate inferential 
processing to determine others’ intentions towards the self, are impaired in 
schizophrenia. They propose that this type of processing requires information from the 
“self schema,” that is, accurate encoding and integration of information about the self in 
relation to social contexts. How the understanding of one’s own and other people’s 
mental states relate specifically to positive symptoms in schizophrenia remains 
unexplored.
3.4. Experiment 2: Perspective taking in patients with positive symptoms o f  
schizophrenia
3.4.1. Introduction
This study on perspective taking in schizophrenic patients with positive symptoms 
probes the question of whether atypical processing of other people’s intentions and 
mental states, as demonstrated by performance on complex TOM tasks as well as basic 
causality tasks, is also reflected in the ability to take the first-person and third-person
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perspective in socio-emotional contexts. Social cognitive skills, such as having a TOM, 
that is, the ability to infer other people’s thoughts, intentions and desires (Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Frith & Frith, 2003), and empathy, the vicarious response to affective cues from 
another person in a specific situation (Hoffman, 1978) are central to successful social 
interaction, and rely on the ability to represent what others think (Frith & Frith, 2003; 
Premack & Woodruff, 1978). As described above, their absence or poverty is 
characteristic of social communicative disorders such as autism and schizophrenia 
(Frith, 2004).
In order to investigate further the nature of TOM impairments in autism and 
schizophrenia, Langdon et al. (2006) clarify the distinction between epistemic and non- 
epistemic mental states. These authors discuss autistic individuals’ problems with 
mentalising tasks involving intentions and beliefs (epistemic) but show that these 
individuals have no problems with visual perspective taking tasks or in understanding 
simple emotions (non-epistemic). On the other hand, individuals with schizophrenia do 
manifest problems in visual perspective taking tasks (Langdon et al., 2001) and show a 
different quality of impairments in TOM tasks. Langdon and colleagues hypothesise 
that the problem in autism may be a “domain-specific” problem of de-coupling 
epistemic mental states from reality, but that in schizophrenia, the problem lies in a 
“domain general” impoverishment in simulating other people’s subjective worlds.
This suggestion is supported by their data from an emotion attribution study (Langdon 
et al., 2006). This study investigated how patients diagnosed with schizophrenia, 
relative to healthy controls, performed on a TOM task, an emotion attribution task 
(similar to an emotional perspective taking task) and on an emotion identification task. 
The results demonstrated that the patient and control groups were equally able to 
identify emotional expressions, but the patients had significantly more difficulty with 
emotion attribution and false belief inference. The authors suggest that, unlike in 
autism, people with schizophrenia may have a general difficulty in empathic perspective 
taking that affects their ability to infer other people’s beliefs as well as their direct 
appreciation of others’ emotions and perceptions. However, while Langdon and 
colleagues do relate TOM impairment to schizophrenia, this study did not distinguish 
between different symptom subgroups of schizophrenia, each of which, as described 
earlier, seems to relate differently to TOM task performance.
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The ability to take another’s perspective is crucial for successful social communication. 
In order to reason about others, and understand what they think, feel or believe, it is 
necessary to step into their ‘mental shoes’ and take their perspective. As described in 
the previous chapter, perspective taking includes awareness of one’s own subjective 
mental states (“first-person perspective”, or 1PP) and the ability to ascribe mental states 
to another person (“third-person perspective” or 3PP). Emotional perspective taking is 
related to first-order TOM in that it involves surmising what another person is thinking 
or feeling. While perspective taking requires the representation of the mental states of 
others (epistemic), it does not require entering into an affective state oneself (de 
Vignemont & Singer, 2006). However, perspective taking also requires the attribution 
of emotions to oneself and to others. The appreciation of emotional states, itself, is 
therefore also required to successfully perform this task (non-epistemic).
Here, emotional perspective taking was investigated in a hospitalised group of adult 
patients with affective disorders and minimal positive symptoms of schizophrenia (P- 
group) and a second group of patients with strong positive symptoms of schizophrenia 
(predominantly, delusions of persecution) (P+), compared with healthy, normal controls 
(NC), using a computerised question-and-answer task that required participants to 
consider their own response to certain emotional situations or those of another person in 
the same situations.
As in the previous perspective taking experiment (Chapter 2) involving typically 
developing adolescents and adults, in this study, the efficiency and strategy of 
processing of 1PP and 3PP emotional perspectives were contrasted. The measure of 
interest was the difference in RT between the two perspective conditions, that is 3PP- 
1PP (A RT). Given the evidence for mindreading deficits and the reports of difficulties 
to “enter into another’s feelings” (Lee et al., 2004), it was considered possible that the 
efficiency and style of perspective taking in the P+ group would differ from the clinical 
and healthy control groups. Given that the link between TOM and positive symptoms 
has so far been equivocal, the relationship between symptom severity, as indexed by the 
positive subscale of the PANSS interview (Kay et al., 1987), and A RT was additionally 
explored.
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With respect to emotional valence of TOM impairments in schizophrenia, apart from 
the notion that negative intentions are often attributed to external agents (Frith, 1992), 
evidence from epidemiological studies, questionnaire and experimental data suggest 
that there is a link between negative beliefs, often in relation to the self, and the 
development of symptoms of psychosis (cf. Smith et al., 2006). Several explanations 
have been put forward including the theory that symptoms of psychosis such as 
delusions offer a protective element against a background of negative emotions (Bentall 
et al., 1994) or that negative emotions have a direct causal role in the development of 
delusions and hallucinations that become involved in the appraisal of negative beliefs 
and emotions (Garety et al., 2001). Furthermore, anhedonia, the decreased ability to 
experience pleasure, has been linked to schizophrenia, and is manifest behaviourally 
through flattened responsivity and emotional bluntness (Meehl, 1962; Rado, 1953). At 
the cognitive level, it is hypothesised that this association between negative emotion and 
the positive symptoms of schizophrenia is reflected by a “negative emotion-specific 
deficit” in emotion identification and discrimination tasks (Johnston et al., 2006). 
However, results have been inconsistent in this respect and emotion identification 
studies have generally focused on the valence of emotions related to the self. In the 
current study, the tendency to select negative, positive and neutral emotional responses 
relating to the self and others was analysed to investigate the hypothesised link between 
negative and flattened affect and social cognitive processing in schizophrenia. Given the 
tendency to over-attribute malevolent intentions to other people, it was predicted that 
there would be a bias in the emotional valence on the responses in the delusional group, 
compared to the other groups, such that they would have a preference for negative 
emotions over neutral or positive emotions in the answer choices, particularly when 
these related to other people.
3.4.2. Method
3.4.2.1. Participants
A group of 25 in-patients (two male) from the Department of Psychiatry at the Centre 
Hospitalier de Versailles, and 11 healthy university students (five males) in Paris, 
France gave consent to participate in this study. All patients were diagnosed by clinical 
interview using the ICD-10 (International Classification of Diseases; WHO, 1992). 
Patients included those with diagnoses of affective disorders including depression and 
bipolar disorder, and those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. At the time of testing, all
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patients were medicated. They were taking anti-depressant, anti-psychotic, hypnotic or 
anxiolytic medication. All but two patient participants had been in education at least to 
the level the Baccalaureate (French examination equivalent to A-levels). All control 
participants had taken the Baccalaureate and were in further education or employment. 
Written informed consent was obtained from the participants. The study was approved 
by the local ethics committee. Data from eight of the recruited patients were excluded 
because these patients did not complete the task.
3A.2.2. Measure o f positive symptoms
All patients were divided into two groups according to the presence or absence of 
positive symptoms which included delusions and auditory hallucinations. This was 
determined according to the PANSS interview (Kay et al. 1987), conducted by 
psychiatrists. The PANSS is a 30-item 7 point (1-7) rating instrument of psychotic 
symptoms. The interview is divided into three sections: positive subscale, negative 
subscale and general psychopathological subscale. Here, only positive subscale scores 
were used. The positive subscale comprises seven questions which rate delusional 
ideation, conceptual disorganisation, hallucinations, excitation, delusions of grandeur 
and persecution and hostility. Each question can be scored from 1 (absence) to 7 
(extreme). The maximum score for the positive subscale is 49 (see Appendix 3B). The 
PANSS interview was administered to patient groups only. Those patients whose scores 
were between 7 and 14 on the positive subscale, indicating the absence of, or minimal, 
delusions or auditory hallucinations, were classified as not experiencing positive 
symptoms (P- group). Those who scored 15 or over were classified as experiencing 
positive symptoms (P+ group). The control group consisted of healthy adults with no 
previous history of psychiatric or neurological disorders. In the P+ group, all patients 
were suffering from delusions of persecution, except one who was mainly experiencing 
auditory hallucinations.
There were thus three participant groups: NC (normal controls; N=11); P- (patients with 
minimal or no positive symptoms; N=10); P+ (patients with strong positive symptoms; 
N=7, after exclusions). Categorising the groups in this way, rather than by diagnosis, 
enabled the investigation into the contribution of positive symptoms per se to the 
processing involved in the perspective taking task. The presence of patients without 
positive symptoms (P-) ensured that other ‘global’ factors that might affect performance
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(e.g. attention, reaction speed as a result of medication or hospitalisation) were also 
controlled for. The mean score on the positive symptoms subscale for the P+ group 
(21.0±3.1) was significantly higher than that of the P- group (12.1 ±7.1) (Z=-2.7;
p<0.01).
3.4.2.3. Experimental design
Participants were presented with blocks of scenarios, written in French. The questions 
in this task were modified from those used for the task in Chapter 2, in order to make 
them suitable for adults instead of children and adolescents, and then translated. First, a 
one-line sentence describing an everyday scenario was presented on a laptop computer 
screen together with a question concerning how the participant himself or herself (for 
1PP scenarios), or how the protagonist (for 3PP scenarios), would feel in such 
circumstances (See Figure 3.1). The number of characters and clauses in each scenario 
were matched between conditions. There were 120 trials altogether, of which half 
conveyed the question in the first person (“Comment vous sentez-vous?” / “How do you 
feel?”) and the other half asked the same question but about a hypothetical character in 
the third person (“Comment se sent-il/elle” / “How does he/she feel?”). The participant 
was instructed to press the space bar after reading the question at his or her own pace. 
This elicited the presentation of two possible response choices in the form of simple 
cartoon faces, each representing one of five possible emotions: very happy, happy, 
neutral, sad, afraid and angry. The participant was asked to choose, as quickly as 
possible, one of the two faces in answer to each question. As soon as the participant 
responded, the next scenario appeared. Reaction times (RT), taken as the time in 
milliseconds (ms) between the presentation of the answer screen and the key press for 
the chosen answer, were recorded by the computer. The actual task was preceded by a 
Practice session in which participants were trained to ensure correct emotion attribution 
to each face. See Methods, Chapter 2.
Perspective. Scenarios either concerned 1PP or 3PP -  see Chapter 2 and Appendix 3A. 
Choice type. Answer choices were either Open or Closed. See Chapter 2.
The design and rationale for the factors above were exactly as described in the Methods 
section of Chapter 2, which also contains details of the Experimental Procedure and 
Instructions which were replicated from the first experiment, but in French.
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3.4.2.4. Data analysis
3.4.2.4.1. Reaction time differences between all three groups
Non-parametric tests were used for this analysis because the data were not normally 
distributed. For each participant, median RTs were calculated for each of the four 
conditions of 1PPO, 1PPC, 3PPO and 3PPC. The difference between the median RT 
for 1PP and 3PP was then calculated for each participant (A RT). Overall A RT, as well 
as A RT for each of the Open (A RT-O) and Closed (A RT-C) conditions were compared 
between the three participant groups (NC, P- and P+) using a Kruskall-Wallis test. Post- 
hoc Mann-Whitney U tests, corrected for multiple comparisons, were used to 
investigate further between-group differences.
3.4.2.4.2. Individual differences between patients
Given that the presence of positive symptoms existed on a continuum, beyond a specific 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, the results of all patients were also analysed together in one 
group to test the hypothesis that the severity of positive symptoms (range of score: 7 -  
31) predicted performances on the different conditions of the perspective taking task. A 
Spearman’s rank correlation investigated the relationship between the score on the 
positive subscale and A RT in each of the Open and Closed conditions. Here, 
Spearman’s rank correlation was used in view of the relatively low N.
3.4.2.4.3. Emotional valence o f response
Each question was followed by a choice of two cartoon faces depicting emotions. 
Altogether, six emotions were presented: very happy, happy, neutral, sad, afraid and 
angry, i.e. two positive, one neutral and three negative. An equal number of positive and 
negative expressions were used in the task. The neutral faces were only appropriate to 
the Open condition, and were therefore used less than the positive and negative faces. 
For each participant, the total number of positive, neutral and negative response choices 
in each condition (Positive-Open, Positive-Closed, Negative-Open, Negative-Closed, 
Neutral-Open) were calculated and converted to percentages.
An average percentage was calculated for each group and a Kruskall-Wallis test was 
used to compare the relative percentages of the valence of each emotion response 
between groups. Any main effects were further explored using Mann-Whitney U tests to
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analyse specific between-group differences and to investigate any differences between 
the Perspective conditions.
3.4.2.4.4. Error analysis
Response choices in the Closed condition were subject to an error analysis. The 
percentage of errors were calculated for the 1PPC and 3PPC conditions for each subject, 
and a Kruskall-Wallis test was used to compare the percentage of errors between 
groups. The Open condition, by definition, was not amenable to such an error analysis, 
given that both response choices for each question are designed to be equally valid.
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Vous trouvez un billet 
de € 50 en marchant 
dans la rue. 
Comment vous 
sentez-vous?
Un homme trouve un 
billet de € 50 en 
marchant dans la rue. 
Comment se sent-il?
1PP 3PP
CLOSED OPEN
Figure 3.1. Design o f task: two levels o f Perspective (1PP and 3PP) and 
two levels o f difficulty (Open and Closed). The question (above: “You 
find  a 50 euro note while walking down the road. How do you fee l? ”) is 
contrasted between 1PP where the protagonist is “yo u ” and 3PP where 
the protagonist is, fo r  example, “a man ”. See Methods fo r  details.
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3.4.3. Results
One further patient was excluded from the P+ group and one participant was excluded 
from the NC group on the basis of the RT data being outliers (overall RT was over 3 
S.D. away from the mean in the group). The remaining participants were able to follow 
the instructions and complete the task.
3.4.3.1. Overall reaction time comparison between groups
A Kruskall Wallis test showed that there were main effects of Group (NC/P-/P+) on 
overall RT (x2=17.1, d.f.=2, p<0.0001). This effect was the same for RT in each Choice 
Type condition (main effect in R T-0 condition: )f= \6.1, d.f.=2, p<0.0001; RT-C 
condition, x2=17.4, d.f.=2, p<0.0001).
Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected Mann-Whitney U-tests indicated that the overall RT to 
answer questions was significantly lower in the NC group than in the P- group (Nnc= 10, 
Np_=10, p<0.0005) as well as the P+ group (Nnc= 10, Np+=6, p<0.005). There was no 
significant difference in the RT between the P- and P+ groups (p=0.635). See Figure
3.2. These results were paralleled within each Choice Type condition. In the RT-0 
condition, the NC group was significantly faster than both the P- group (p<0.0001) and 
the P+ group (pcO.OOl). The NC group was also significantly faster than both the P- 
group (p<0.0001) and P+ group (p<0.0001) in the RT-C condition. However, there were 
no differences in either condition between P- and P+ groups (RT-O: p=0.562; RT-C: 
p=0.713).
3.4.3.2. Diff erences in A RT between groups
A RT was used as the measure of proficiency in perspective taking. It is the difference 
between the RT for 3PP and 1PP (A RT = 3PP-1PP). These differences in RT (A RT) 
were absolute differences, not taking into account direction of difference between 3PP 
and 1PP. There was a main effect of A RT in the Closed condition (A RT-C) (x2=7.8, 
d.f.=2, p<0.05) (see Figure 3.4). There was additionally a near-significant main effect of 
A RT in the Open condition (A RT-O) (%2=5.98, d.f.=2, p=0.052) (see Figure 3.3). There 
was no significant effect of Group on the overall A RT (^2=4.9, d.f.=2, p<0.085, n.s.).
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□ P+
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Group
Figure 3.2. Overall RT differences between groups. NC group 
(N -10) answered questions significantly faster than both the P- 
group (N=J0) and the P+ group (N=6). There was no RT difference 
between the P- and P+ groups.
[*=p<0.005; **=p<0.0005]
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Post-hoc Bonferroni corrected Mann-Whitney U-tests demonstrated that, while there 
was no difference in A RT-O between groups (for NC vs. P-, p=.070; NC vs. P+, 
p=.l 12; P- vs P+, p=.792) (see Figure 3.3), A RT-C was significantly higher in the P- 
compared with NC group (p<.005). However, there were no differences in A RT-C 
between the NC and P+ groups (p=.713) or between the P- and P+ groups (p=.44) (See 
Figure 3.4).
3.4.3.3. Investigating directionality o f A RT
In order to explore the variance and strategy or ‘style’ of responses within groups, 
individual data points were plotted showing A RT in both directions of 3PP>1PP and 
1 PP>3PP for each participant group.
The variance in A RT showed little difference between groups in the Open condition, 
although on looking at the graph there was slightly less variance in the NC group 
compared to the patient groups (see Figure 3.5). On the other hand, the graph shows that 
in the Closed condition, the variance, as well as the pattern of directionality of A RT 
was different between groups (see Figure 3.6). The A RT-C graph shows that the 
variance in the NC group was lower than that among the P- and P+ groups. 
Furthermore, while the NC participants showed a relatively low A RT with most 
participants, while clustering close to the zero-line (3PP=1PP), taking marginally longer 
in the direction of 3PP>1PP, in the P- group, 36% of participants had a A RT in this 
direction of 3PP>1PP, while 64% of P- participants had a A RT in the direction of 
1PP>3PP. However, perhaps in view of the low N, this difference in directionality 
between groups was not statistically significant (x2=0.343, d.f.=2, p=0.842).
This pattern was exaggerated in the P+ group such that all bar one had a A RT in the 
direction of 1PP>3PP. In comparison, in the A RT-O condition (Figure 3.5), the 
distribution of A RT was relatively even in either direction of 1PP>3PP and 3PP>1PP 
for all groups.
3.4.3.4. Effect o f positive symptoms on A RT
To explore individual differences between patient participants, the P- and P+ were 
collapsed and A RT in each condition was correlated with the PANSS positive subscale 
score for all patients. Spearman’s rank correlations showed no significant relationship
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between PANSS score and A RT-C (rho=-0.27, p=0.315, n.s.) or A RT-O (rho=0.33, 
p=0.22, n.s.).
In summary, there was a near-significant main effect of Group on A RT-O, but post-hoc 
tests showed no significant differences between groups. There was a significant main 
effect of Group on A RT-C that arose from the P- group having a significantly higher A 
RT-C than the NC group. Directionality of A RT-C was explored to investigate this 
further. Although between group tests were non-significant, perhaps due to a low N, in 
the A RT-C (in which there was a main effect of Group), the P+ group showed a 
particular A RT-C bias in the direction of 1PP>3PP.
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O 150
<  100
Figure 3.3. A RT-O fo r  each group. There was a near 
significant main effect o f Group on A RT-O but post-hoc tests 
between groups showed no significant differences.
[(*) = trend ofp=0.07]
300
P  150
o  100
Group
Figure 3.4. A RT-C fo r  each group. There was a significant main 
effect o f Group on A RT-C. Post-hoc tests indicated that A RT-C  
was significantly greater fo r  the P- than the NC group. There was 
no RT difference between the P- and P+ groups or between NC and 
P+ groups. [*=p<0.005]
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NC
Figure 3.5. Variance and directionality o f  A RT-O in each group. As
can be seen in the graph, there was little difference in variance between 
groups. A RTs are spread approximately evenly in both directions o f  
1PP>3PP (below x-axis) and 3PP>JPP (above x-axis) fo r  all groups.
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Figure 3.6. Variance and directionality o f  A RT-C in each group. The
graph suggests that variance was lower in the NC group compared to the 
P- and P+ groups. The direction o f  A RT shifted from  predominantly 
3PP>1PP in the NC group to relatively higher in the 1PP>3PP direction 
in the P- group to almost all in the 1PP>3PP direction in the P+ group.
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3.4.3.5. Difference in emotion choices between groups
A Kruskall-Wallis test, comparing the percentage of responses selected in each emotion 
category between groups, indicated a main effect for both the positive (POS-C; p<0.05) 
and negative (NEG-C, p<0.05) emotion categories in the Closed condition, and for the 
neutral condition (NEUT-O, p<0.005). Post-hoc Mann-Whitney U tests, Bonferroni- 
corrected for multiple comparisons, indicated that the main effect of NEUT-O arose 
from the significantly higher percentage of NEUT responses in the P+ group (mean % 
±S.E.=10.4±2.0%) compared to the NC group (4.6±1.2%) (p<0.05), and the 
significantly higher percentage of NEUT responses in the P- (9.2+1.2%) group 
compared to the NC group (p<0.05). The difference in the percentage of NEUT 
responses was not significant between the P- and P+ groups. In addition, the percentage 
of POS-C responses in the P+ group (46.7±1.5%) was significantly lower than that of 
the NC group (51.4±0.7%, p<0.05). The percentage of NEG-C responses in the P+ 
group (53.3±1.5%) was significantly higher than that of the NC group (48.6±0.7%, 
p<0.05). See Figure 3.7.
The significant effects of POS-C, NEG-C and NEUT-O were further analysed for 
effects of self (1PP) and other (3PP), using Bonferroni-corrected Mann-Whitney U 
tests. No differences between groups were found in the percentage of POS-C and NEG- 
C responses depending on whether the emotions related to the self or other. However, 
the significant difference in percentage of neutral responses chosen between groups 
arose from between-group differences in the 3PP. The percentage of neutral responses 
in the 3PP condition was significantly lower in the NC (mean % ± S.E.=2.8±0.69%) 
than in the P- group (7.8± 2.2%) (p<0.01), and similarly, significantly lower in the NC 
compared with the P+ (9.3±2.2%) group (p<0.05). There was no difference between P- 
and P+ groups in the tendency to select neutral responses in the 3PP condition 
(p=0.713). See Figure 3.8.
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Figure. 3.7. Percentage (%) o f responses in each emotion category fo r  
each group. There was a main effect o f POS-C, NEG-C and NEUT-O.
[*=p<0.05]
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Figure 3.8. Comparison o f % neutral responses in the 3PP between 
groups. P- and P+ groups selected significantly more neutral 
responses in the 3PP than the NC group. There was no difference 
in % neutral responses between the P- and P+ groups.
I l l
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In summary, the NC group chose more positive (and fewer negative) responses than did 
the P+ group in the Closed condition. In the Open condition, compared with controls 
both patient groups chose a higher proportion of neutral responses when answering 
questions about someone else (3PP).
3.4.3.6. Error analysis
There were no differences in the percentage of errors made in the Closed condition 
between groups (x2=1.3, d.f.=2, p=.518, n.s.). This analysis cannot be performed for the 
Open condition because there are no errors in this condition, by design. In the Open 
condition, either of the two answers offered is equally appropriate.
3.4.4. Discussion
To investigate the hypothesis that people with schizophrenia have an impairment in the 
ability to mentalise, this study used a modified version of the task described in Chapter 
2 tailored to adults and translated into French, tapping perspective taking in patients 
with schizophrenia and those with affective disorders. Patients were classified by the 
degree of positive symptoms experienced, which were predominantly delusions of 
persecution but included hallucinations (minimal positive symptoms: P-; high level of 
positive symptoms: P+). The difference in RT between 3PP and 1PP (A RT) was 
compared between groups, in each Choice Type (Open/Closed) condition (A RT-C and 
A RT-O). As in the previous chapter, A RT was used as a measure of proficiency at 
perspective taking. In light of the previously hypothesised reduction in the ability to 
experience pleasure in schizophrenic and depressed patients and a bias towards 
experiencing negative beliefs and emotions in schizophrenic patients, the tendency to 
respond with each of the emotional valences of the responses was compared between 
groups.
The results demonstrated a main effect of group in the A RT-C but not the A RT-O 
condition. The main effect in the A RT-C condition was due to the significantly higher 
A RT among P- patients compared to NC participants. Directionality of A RT in the 
Closed condition suggested a pattern, albeit non-significant, of A RT bias in the 
direction of 1PP>3PP in the P+ group. Analysis of emotion choices indicated that P+ 
patients selected a significantly higher percentage of negative, and lower percentage of
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positive, responses compared to NCs. In addition, the percentage of neutral responses in 
the 3PP was significantly higher in the P- and P+ groups compared to NCs.
3.4.4.1. Differences in general task efficiency between groups
There was a significant effect of Group (NC/P-/P+) on overall RT taken to perform the 
task in both the Open and Closed conditions. Both P- and P+ groups were significantly 
slower than the NC group, but there was no difference in speed between the two patient 
groups. This RT difference most likely reflects the difference in motor speed, 
concentration and motivation between control and patient participants. Indeed, 
considerable motivational differences to perform the task were also noted between 
patients and controls, at the time of testing. In addition, the lack of RT difference 
between P- and P+ groups suggests that medication may have had an impairing effect 
on reaction speed. Both patient groups were medicated at the time of testing. 
Antipsychotic and antidepressant drugs are well-known to have a slowing effect on 
psychomotor speed, as well as an impairing effect on memory. Time taken in between 
the question and response screen to recall the previous scenario, coupled with a slower 
motoric response and reduced motivation may account for this general RT effect.
3.4.4.2. A mentalising impairment in patients with affective disorders?
As described in the previous chapter, A RT was used as an index of proficiency on the 
perspective taking task. While a comparison between groups in A RT-C demonstrated a 
significant effect, there was only a trend in A RT-O. Post-hoc tests indicated that in the 
Closed condition, NC participants had a significantly lower A RT than P- participants. 
No significant differences were found between the NC and P+ groups, or between the 
P- and P+ groups. Why should the absolute (non-directional) difference in RT between 
3PP and 1PP be higher in the patients with affective disorders who were experiencing 
low levels or no positive symptoms of schizophrenia, compared to healthy controls? A 
higher A RT-C in the P- group might suggest that this group of depressive and bipolar 
patients is particularly impaired at perspective taking. The pronounced difference in RT 
between 3PP and 1PP suggests that relative to NCs, P- patients show self and other 
perspectives that are maximally separated in terms of processing time. If, as suggested 
by NC adults here and in Chapter 2, the lack of difference in RT between 3PP and 1PP 
is indicative of fast and instinctive (automatic) perspective taking, then this result for 
the P- group suggests these patients are particularly inefficient in making the
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translocations between self and other. This is in line with previous data to suggest that 
people with affective disorders are impaired in their ability to mentalise (Inoue et al., 
2004; Kerr et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2004).
3.4.4.3. Different strategies fo r  perspective taking between NC, P- and P+ groups ? 
What do these data say about perspective taking in the P+ group, however? Given the 
low N, further information about the form of processing might be gleaned from looking 
at the directionality of A RT. Absolute (non-directional) RT differences, in other words, 
might mask differences in strategy. As Frith (2004) points out, results of performance in 
schizophrenic patients with delusions on TOM tasks are equivocal, perhaps because it is 
difficult to elucidate the exact strategy, or style, of mentalising that leads to poor 
performance. Interpretations about differences in patient and control strategies may be 
extrapolated from the graph (Figure 3.6) demonstrating the distribution of A RT-C in 
both the 1PP>3PP and 3PP>1PP directions. Given the significant main effect of Group 
for A RT-C, the directionality for this condition was further investigated to understand 
qualitative differences in the strategy of response. This graph suggests a difference, 
albeit statistically non-significant, in the strategy of perspective taking between groups, 
which is masked by comparing only absolute, non-directional RT differences. With 
larger groups, these differences may have been statistically significant.
The previous data set on the development of perspective taking in Chapter 2 
demonstrated that normal adults have a minimal difference in RT between 3PP and 1PP 
and that the mean A RT is around 50ms with a range of approximately 100ms in either 
direction. The current data corroborate this previous finding, showing that NC adults 
have a relatively small A RT, clustering tightly within a similar range to the adults in the 
previous normative study of perspective taking in this thesis. In the current study, as 
Figure 3.6 demonstrates, the A RT of NC participants are clustered close to the zero- 
line, although spread marginally in either direction, with the majority showing a 
minimally higher RT for 3PP relative to 1PP. The variance between participants is 
considerably greater for the P- group, and participants in this group have significantly 
higher A RT, with most taking longer to answer 1PP questions compared with 3PP. 
Between the NC and P- group, therefore, there is a shift from approximately equal 
efficiency for self- and other-related questions, to a tendency to take longer for 
scenarios involving the self compared to those involving other people.
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In the previous chapter, it was argued that in adults, social experience and mature brain 
circuitry associated with perspective taking account for equal efficiency for taking the 
1PP and 3PP. In a forced choice situation, when choosing between two answers 
designed to be unambiguous, perhaps affective patients tend to deliberate for longer on 
how they imagine themselves emotionally responding to each scenario. This may be 
because they can generate and/or access first-person simulations elicited by the 1PP 
questions, whereas they are impaired in the ability to generate third-person simulations 
in response to the 3PP questions, and therefore answer 3PP questions using a fast rule- 
based strategy (“what people would generally feel”). This is consistent with the notion 
that people with affective disorders are impaired in their ability to decode other people’s 
mental states (Inoue et al., 2004; Kerr et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2005), as measured by, for 
example, performance on a task involving inference of mental states from photographs 
of eyes (Lee et al., 2005).
The scatterplots (Figures 3.5 and 3.6) suggest that variance between P+ patients was not 
dissimilar to that between P- patients. However, the scatterplot for A RT-C (the 
condition for which there was a main effect of Group) indicates that in the P+ group, the 
pattern of directionality found in the P- group was more exaggerated such that the 
direction of A RT among P+ patients was heavily biased in the direction of 1PP>3PP. In 
other words, there was a tendency of schizophrenic patients with strong positive 
symptoms to take longer in responding to questions relating to how they themselves, 
felt, compared to those questions relating to how other people feel. A possible 
interpretation could be that a longer RT for 1PP is indicative of participants engaging 
more in the 1PP. This effect, perhaps due to the low N of six, was not, however, 
statistically significant. The pattern may, though, suggest a particular impairment in 
taking the perspectives of other people in the P+ group. This is in line with findings 
from studies of schizophrenic patients showing poor performance relative to controls on 
TOM tasks. For example, schizophrenic patients exhibiting delusions of persecution or 
thought disorganisation score less highly than healthy controls on a variety of social 
cognition tasks, that employ picture-sequencing (Brunet et al., 2003; Sarfati et al., 1997;
1999), cartoon stories (Frith & Corcoran 1996; Pickup & Frith 2001) jokes (Corcoran et 
al. 1997) and irony (Mitchley et al. 1998). Increased variance in the patient groups 
compared with the control group may be suggestive of a less consistent and less 
systematic processing strategy for perspective taking.
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3.4.4.4. An impairment in self-consciousness in schizophrenia?
On the other hand, as suggested in the Introduction, a tendency to take a longer time to 
answer questions in the 1PP might alternatively reflect difficulty in answering these 
questions, relative to the 3PP questions. Looking at Figure 3.6, the graph would suggest, 
then, that P- and P+ patients are able to take the 3PP given the relative efficiency for 
3PP compared with 1PP in most cases, particularly in the case of P+ patients (Figure 
3.6). This is consistent with results of a previous study of meta-representation in 
delusional schizophrenics (Gambini et al., 2004). This study showed that some 
delusional patients gain insight about their mental state when the perspective is shifted 
from the first- to the third-person perspective. In other words, they were impaired in 
thinking about their own mental state from their own perspectives. Perhaps the tendency 
for patient groups to take a longer time to answer questions in the 1PP compared to the 
3PP, especially among those experiencing a higher level of positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia, reflects impairment in self-consciousness.
Conscious reflection relating to the self might therefore be anomalous in schizophrenia 
(Frith, 2004). Self-monitoring and self-consciousness in the context of motor control is 
proposed to be anomalous in schizophrenia, although this evidence is from patients with 
delusions o f control (Blakemore et al., 2000), hallucinations and formal thought 
disorder (Kircher & Leube, 2003). People diagnosed with schizophrenia who have 
delusions of control often report that their movements, thoughts and emotions feel as if 
they are under the control of some other agent rather than caused by their own volition. 
Self-produced action is assigned to an external agent, rather than to the self, such that 
the movement feels involuntary. Studies of such patients have led several groups to 
interpret the cause of this experience as a failure in the self-monitoring system (Frith, 
1987; Frith et al., 2000; Johns et al., 2001). Indeed, patients with delusions of control or 
auditory hallucinations have different experiences of self-tickling, compared with 
healthy controls or other patient controls who do not exhibit the symptoms (Blakemore 
et al., 2000). There appears to be a failure in attenuation in the self-touch condition, 
such that the self-touch feels as intense and tickly as external touch. This suggests that 
something may have gone awry in the predictive mechanism that usually serves to 
reduce the sensory consequences of self-generated actions. A breakdown in the forward 
model might, therefore, account for the feeling that active movements are passive and 
the attribution of such sensations to alien sources.
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One speculative interpretation about the underlying mechanism of perspective taking in 
the P+ group in the current study is that this fault in self-monitoring might extend to the 
higher social cognitive domain in patients with delusions of persecution (Blakemore & 
Decety, 2001). Indeed, it has been argued that patients with passivity symptoms can 
perform normally on TOM tasks because their representation of others’ mental states is 
preserved, while their representation of their own mental states is impaired (Pickup & 
Frith, 2001). If this can be extended to patients with delusions of persecution, this 
interpretation would argue that thinking about one’s own mental states, therefore, is 
harder in affective patients compared with healthy controls, and particularly impaired in 
schizophrenic patients. Both interpretations -  about an impairment in self-consciousness 
(1PP) or other-consciousness (3PP) -  are compatible with neuroimaging studies that 
indicate atypical functioning of inferior PFC in schizophrenic patients during a source- 
monitoring task (Spence et al., 1997), of inferior frontal gyrus during a mentalising task 
(Russell et al., 2000) and of PFC during an intention attribution task (Brunet et al.,
2000). This parietal brain area is related to agency and self-consiousness (e.g. Lou et al., 
2004) and the frontal areas are related to TOM (e.g. Gallagher and Frith, 2003).
No relationship was found between symptom severity, as measured by the positive 
subscale of the PANSS interview, and A RT, contrary to the prediction. However, the 
patients here included those with both delusions of persecution and auditory 
hallucinations. It is possible that different symptom types have different influences on 
social cognitive processing. One study showed that patients with auditory hallucinations 
tended to make greater misattributions of agency (Johns et al., 2001). However, in the 
study by Marjoram et al. (2005) described earlier, TOM impairments showed no 
relationship with positive symptom severity in patients with delusions of persecution. A 
larger sample of patients, broken down into symptom subgroups would be helpful to 
further investigate the proposed link between symptom severity and perspective taking.
It is possible that that the graph for A RT-O (Figure 3.5) does not suggests obvious 
differences in strategy between groups because the Open condition is more difficult, by 
design, and therefore engages more ‘thoughtful’ responses rather than what might be the 
default pattern shown in the Closed condition.
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3.4.4.5. No impairment in epistemic mental state representations in schizophrenia?
A third alternative, given the lack of statistical difference between NC and P+ groups in 
either absolute A RT or directional A RT, is that there is no difference between these 
groups in the ability to represent other people’s mental states, as gauged by this 
particular perspective taking task. It is possible that this task is not sensitive enough to 
detect it. Or, it is possible that schizophrenic patients with delusions of persecution do 
not have a specific problem in the decoupling mechanism involved in mentalising. This 
would suggests that they are in fact able to understand the relationship between the 
content of a representation and the real world and generate the correct mental state 
representations of other people and make the necessary distinctions between the self and 
other states (“epistemic” representations (Langdon et al., 2006), that is the ability to 
infer how someone would feel based on the knowledge of that person and/or their 
behaviour or context). Langdon and colleagues (2006) have suggested that there is a 
domain general problem in TOM in schizophrenia, such that these patients have an 
impairment in representing emotional states in others (that is, in “non-epistemic” 
representations, that involve direct appreciation of emotional meaning). However, the 
task also involves representing basic emotions in the first place. Thinking about how 
other people feel, in this context, thus involves both non-epistemic states as well. The 
following section discusses how the current data do suggest a difference between 
healthy controls and P+ patients in emotional understanding and attribution, which may 
reflect differences between P+ and NC individuals in non-epistemic representation.
3.4.4.6. A bias towards more negative and less positive emotion choices in 
schizophrenia
Several studies have investigated emotion recognition in schizophrenia and have 
reported atypical performance relative to normal controls (e.g. Hermann et al., 2006; 
Kee et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2006; Phillips et al., 2003). Atypical emotion processing has 
been consistently found in schizophrenia across different cultural groups, including 
North American, German, Indian and South African Xhosa patients (Habel et al., 2000; 
Leppanen et al., 2006). The nature of the differences from control groups has, however, 
been shown to be inconsistent among all patients. Mirroring the notion that 
schizophrenic patients demonstrate a negative bias and an enhanced experience of 
negative emotions compared to normal controls (Barrowclough et al., 2003; Meehl, 
1962), the current data show that there was a main effect of Group on the percentage of
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positive responses and negative responses chosen in the Closed condition such that the 
NC group chose significantly more positive and significantly less negative responses 
than the P+ group in the Closed condition.
This difference between the NC and P+ groups is consistent with some studies that have 
shown that schizophrenic patients experience positive emotions such as joy and interest 
less frequently than normal (e.g. Suslow et al., 2003), that they also have an automatic 
attentional bias towards negative threatening stimuli (e.g. Green & Phillips, 2004) and 
that they have a specific deficit in processing a subset of negative emotions such as 
anger, fear and sadness recognition (Bediou et al., 2005; Silver et al., 2002). These 
studies have focused on the experience of attributing or recognising emotions relating to 
the self. Results from other studies, show no specific emotion deficit, even relating to 
the self, in schizophrenic patients (e.g. Johnston et al., 2006; Kee et al., 2006). These 
inconsistent results may arise from the differences in patient subgroups according to 
symptoms as well as emotion stimuli. Some studies have shown atypical emotion 
processing when emotional stimuli are modulated to make them more arousing for 
example, high intensity angry faces (e.g. Leppanen et al., 2006). In the current task, 
emotions were basic and did not differ in their degree of intensity. However, this would 
be an interesting line of modification to the task in future research.
3.4.4.7. Misinterpreting neutrality in other people in affective and schizophrenic 
patients
The analysis of the emotional valence of the responses also demonstrated a main effect 
of Group on the percentage of neutral responses chosen. Neutral faces, which appeared 
only in the Open condition, were chosen significantly more frequently by the P- 
compared to the NC group, and also by the P+ compared to the NC group. There were, 
however, no significant differences in the tendency to select neutral responses between 
the two patient groups.
The significant effects of emotional valence (in the POS-C, NEG-C and NEUT-O) 
were further analysed to investigate any differences between 1PP and 3PP. No 
differences between perspective conditions (1PP vs. 3PP) were found for the positive or 
negative emotions, in support of one study which did analyse attribution of negative 
beliefs to others, but found that was no particular tendency of the group of delusional
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patients studied to attribute negative evaluations to other people (Smith et al., 2006). A 
difference in percentage response between 1PP and 3PP was found only in the neutral 
condition, such that the P+ group selected a significantly higher percentage of neutral 
responses in the 3PP compared to the NC group. Similarly, there was a significantly 
higher percentage of neutral responses selected by the P- group compared to the NC 
group. This propensity of patients to select more neutral responses may explain why the 
A RT pattern was found to be different in the Open and Closed condition. In the Open 
condition, the variance was similar in all three groups and the distribution of A RT was 
spread more evenly in both directions, compared to the Closed condition, in which there 
was a bias in patients towards the 1PP>3PP direction, which was most pronounced for 
P+ group.
Previous findings have suggested that schizophrenic patients are prone to 
misinterpreting intended meanings of subtle or ambiguous emotional cues (cf. Kee et 
al., 2006). For example, in emotion identification tasks, they tend to have higher error 
rates in neutral expression identification, misattribute other emotions to neutral faces, 
for example falsely attributing anger to neutral expressions (Kohler et al., 2003; 
Leppanen et al., 2006) or seeing ambiguity as threatening (Phillips et al., 2003). A 
recent ERP study investigating decoding of emotional expressions demonstrated higher 
error rates in the neutral condition and curiously, higher ERP amplitudes over parietal 
areas during the neutral condition in schizophrenic patients (Hermann et al., 2006). This 
was taken to reflect increased brain activation during neutral faces, possibly linked to a 
tendency of schizophrenic patients to look actively for information in neutral situations. 
This effect was pronounced in paranoid compared to non-paranoid patients, in parallel 
with behavioural reports linked to paranoid schizophrenic patients misinterpreting 
neutrality as affect in other people. The tendency of the P+ compared to the NC group 
to attribute more neutral faces to others (that is, in the 3PP) might be associated with a 
specific proneness to making errors and looking for emotional cues in the neutral 
condition, that would in turn lead to increased RT in the 3PP relative to 1PP. Similarly, 
depressed patients have been shown to bias the recognition of emotionally neutral faces 
(e.g. Leppanen et al., 2004). In this study, depressed patients took especially long and 
were less accurate relative to healthy controls in recognising neutral faces, compared to 
other basic emotional expressions.
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The error analysis in this task was limited to the Closed condition here, in which there 
was one clear correct and one clearly incorrect answer. The analysis showed no 
significant difference in errors in patients compared to controls. In the Open condition, 
either of the answers can be correct (e.g. happy vs. neutral / sad vs. afraid), and was 
therefore not amenable to error analysis. That the increased tendency to select neutral 
responses in the P+ group reflects an increase in erroneous responses is therefore 
speculative, but it was noted at the time of testing that emotion identification was 
considerably more unstable in the patients groups compared to the control group. Even 
though the task was preceded with a training session to ensure that participants were 
correctly assigning emotions to faces, several of the patients in both the P- and P+ 
groups exhibited an inability to correctly identify facial expressions, asking questions 
about the faces during the task.
3.4.5. Conclusion
Mentalising impairments have previously been reported in patients with schizophrenia, 
but findings about the nature of these problems, especially in relation to particular 
symptoms, have been inconsistent. Perspective taking, related to first order TOM, was 
investigated in patients with schizophrenia and affective disorders, with varying degrees 
of positive symptoms, particularly delusions of persecution. Comparisons in the 
difference in RT between 3PP and 1PP (A RT) between patients with higher (P+) and 
lower (P-) levels of positive symptoms and normal controls (NC) indicated that P- 
patients had a significantly higher A RT than the NC group in the Closed condition. An 
exploration of strategy suggested a bias among patients, particularly in the P+ group, 
such that they took longer to answer questions in the 1PP compared to the 3PP, perhaps 
suggesting an impairment in self-consciousness. Analysis of emotion choices indicated 
that P+ patients chose fewer positive and more negative responses compared to NCs. 
Both P- and P+ groups chose more neutral responses when they related to other people 
(3PP) than did NCs perhaps because these patients are impaired in decoding ambiguous 
expressions in other people.
The next study investigates how the understanding o f the relationship between one's 
own intentions and the consequent actions develops during adolescence.
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C h a pte r  4
4. D e v e l o p m e n t  of  in t en t io n  u n d er st a n d in g  d u r in g  a d o l e sc e n c e
4.1. What is intention understanding?
Intentional understanding refers to the ability to look at the actions of an object or agent 
and predict what it is going to do, and that its actions and/or mental states can be about 
something (Dennett, 1987). Dennett described how we can understand the actions of 
entities from different stances. One approach would be to take a physical stance, which 
would involve applying the principles of physical sciences to an object in order to link 
its actions with the consequences. On the other hand, taking an intentional stance would 
mean assuming that the entity has a mind and therefore goals, desires or beliefs, which 
are most likely to influence its behaviour (see Introduction, Chapter 1). Actions and 
their consequences would thus be linked by the mental states of the agent. The 
intentional stance is therefore suited to understanding the behaviour of agents. In the 
following study, the development of the neural circuitry underlying the ability to predict 
the actions that result from self-related intentions during adolescence was investigated.
Given the socialisation process associated with the adolescent period, in which 
interactions with others play an important role, it might be expected that components of 
mentalising, such as the ability to understand how intentions govern actions, are refined 
with age. Evidence for the development of brain areas associated with mentalising 
suggests that neural maturation may support this cognitive development.
4.2. Experiment 3: Development o f intention understanding during adolescence
4.2.1. Introduction
As explained in Chapter 1, it has recently been demonstrated that the brain undergoes 
development during the period of adolescence, particularly in areas of the brain that are 
linked to TOM. These brain areas include PFC and STS. Histological studies coupled 
with MR I data suggest that changes in grey and white matter are accounted for by the 
process of synaptic pruning and myelination, respectively (see Toga et al., 2006). It is 
thought that the functional consequences of synaptic pruning and myelination are 
increased efficiency and fine-tuning of neural networks (see Blakemore & Choudhury,
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2006a).
Based on the finding that PFC and STS undergo structural development during 
adolescence, it was hypothesised that the functioning within these regions would also 
show developmental change during this time period. Many high-level cognitive abilities 
rely on these brain regions, including mentalising (or Theory of Mind; Frith & Frith, 
2006). Mentalising refers to the inferences that we naturally make about other people’s 
intentions, beliefs and desires, which we then use to predict their behaviour. It includes 
the understanding that intentions relate to actions. A number of neuroimaging studies, 
using a wide range of tasks, have reported activation in a highly circumscribed 
“mentalising network,” comprising the MPFC, the STS and temporo-parietal junction 
(TPJ), and the temporal poles adjacent to the amygdala (Brunet et al. 2000; Castelli et 
al. 2000; Fletcher et al. 1995; Gallagher et al. 2000; Vogeley et al. 2001). Lesion studies 
have also implicated the frontal cortex in mentalising (Channon & Crawford, 2000; 
Gregory et al. 2002; Happe et al., 2001; Rowe et al., 2001; Stone et al., 1998; Stuss et 
al., 2001; though see Bird et al., 2004) and STS/TPJ (Apperly et al., 2005; Samson et 
al., 2004).
Signs of social competence develop during early infancy, such that by around 12 
months of age, infants can ascribe agency to a system or entity (Johnson, 2003; Spelke 
et al., 1995). The understanding of intention emerges at around 18 months, when infants 
acquire joint attention skills, for example, follow an adult’s gaze towards a goal 
(Carpenter et al., 1998). These early social abilities precede more explicit mentalising, 
such as false belief understanding, which usually emerges by about five years of age 
(Barresi & Moore, 1996; Leslie, 1994; Rochat et al., 2004; Schlottmann et al., 2002). 
While normally developing children begin to pass TOM tasks by about age five, the 
brain structures that underlie mentalising undergo substantial development beyond early 
childhood. It was hypothesised that the functioning of brain areas involved in 
mentalising tasks may change during adolescence. Functional imaging of the adolescent 
brain provides an opportunity to investigate this development.
To this end, a mixed factorial design was employed, with the factors i. Causality 
(intentional causality vs. physical causality) and ii. Age group (adults vs. adolescents). 
In the Intentional Causality condition, the subject’s task was to answer blocks of
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questions posing scenarios that involved their own intentions and consequential actions. 
The Physical Causality condition involved answering questions about the causal link 
between physical events and their consequences. In a previous study looking at adults 
only, the Intentional Causality task, relative to the Physical Causality task, was found to 
activate regions associated with mentalising (MPFC, STS and temporal poles) and self­
reflection (MPFC and posterior cingulate/precuneus) (den Ouden et al., 2005).
The objective of this study was to investigate whether the adult brain and the adolescent 
brain process this intentional causality task differently. While some functional 
neuroimaging studies have shown that activation of frontal cortex increases with age 
(e.g. Adleman et al., 2002; Kwon et al., 2002; Rubia et al., 2000), others have 
demonstrated the reverse pattern (e.g. Casey et al., 1997; Gaillard et al., 2000; see 
Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006b and Introduction, Chapter 1, for details).
4.2.2. Method
4.2.2.1. Participants
19 right-handed, female adolescents (mean age: 14.79; age range: 12.12 - 18.06 years) 
and 11 right-handed female adults (mean age: 28.43; age range 22.40 - 37.76 years) 
with no history of psychiatric or neurological disorder took part in the study. To ensure 
a consistent level of verbal intelligence across all participants, the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn et al., 1997) was administered individually to each 
participant. Furthermore, adult subjects were university students or graduates, and the 
adolescent subjects were from a selective private school in London at which the vast 
majority (about 95%) of pupils go on to do undergraduate degrees and higher. The 
school teachers confirmed that each adolescent subject performed above average on 
national SAT tests. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants, and 
from the parents of the participants aged 16 and under, prior to the study, which was 
approved by the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery Ethics Committee.
4.2.2.2. Experimental design
The experiment was split into two 11 minute sessions. Subjects were presented with a 
description of a scenario followed by a question relating to this scenario. Each block 
consisted of three scenario/question trials. In half the blocks, scenarios pertained to 
intentions and consequential actions (intentional causality (IC)): e.g. scenario stimulus:
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“You are at the cinema and have trouble seeing the screen” ; followed by question 
stimulus: “Do you move to another seat? Likely or Unlikely?.” In the other blocks, the 
scenarios pertained to natural occurrences and consequential events {physical causality 
(PC)): e.g. scenario stimulus: “A huge tree suddenly comes crashing down in a forest”; 
followed by question stimulus: “Does it make a loud noise? Likely or Unlikely?”. In 
each block, the scenario stimulus was presented for 4.7 seconds, and was immediately 
followed by the question stimulus. The question stimulus was presented for 4.7 seconds, 
during which time subjects were asked to respond by pressing one of two buttons on a 
keypad corresponding to “likely” and “unlikely”. The scenarios and questions were 
matched between the two conditions in terms of number of characters, words and 
clauses (see Appendix 4).
In addition to the two conditions described above (IC and PC), a baseline condition was 
included in which subjects were asked to fixate on a black cross on a white background 
for a duration of 30 seconds. There were eight repetitions of each of the three 
conditions. Block order was counterbalanced within and between subjects. Each subject 
was trained on the task for approximately 4 minutes prior to scanning. Stimulus 
presentation was programmed in Cogent (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/index.html) 
running in Matlab 6.5, which recorded subject responses.
4.2.2.3. Data acquisition
A 1.5 T Siemens Sonata MRI scanner was used to acquire both 3-D Ti-weighted fast- 
field echo structural images and multi-slice T2*-weighted echo-planar volumes with 
blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR = 3.6secs). For each subject, 
functional data were acquired in two scanning sessions of approximately 11 mins each 
in which 195 volumes were acquired. The first 5 volumes were discarded to allow for 
T1 equilibrium effects. Each functional brain volume was composed of 40 2mm axial 
slices with a 1 mm gap, and in-plane resolution of 3x3x2 mm positioned to cover the 
whole brain. The acquisition of a T1-weighted anatomical image occurred after the two 
sessions for each participant. The total duration of the experiment was approximately 35 
minutes per subject.
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4.2.2.4. Data analysis
4.2.2.4.J. Behavioural data analysis
Mean reaction times and response types were calculated for both IC and PC questions. 
The main effects of causality (IC vs. PC) and age, as well as the interaction between 
causality and age, were analysed using a mixed design ANOVA.
4.2.2.4.2. Functional neuroimaging analysis
For data analysis statistical parametric mapping was used, implemented in SPM2 
[http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm]. For each subject, a set of 380 fMRI scans was 
realigned to correct for interscan movement and stereotactic ally normalised using sine 
interpolation (Friston et al., 1995), with a resolution of 3x3x3 mm3, into the standard 
space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template. The scans were 
then smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full-width half maximum to account for 
residual inter-subject differences.
The analysis of the functional imaging data entailed the creation of statistical parametric 
maps representing a statistical assessment of hypothesised condition-specific effects 
(Friston et al., 1994). The scans corresponding to the instruction phase of each block 
were excluded from the analysis. Condition-specific effects were estimated with the 
General Linear Model with a delayed boxcar wave-form for each condition. Low- 
frequency sine and cosine waves modelled and removed subject-specific low-frequency 
drifts in signal, and global changes in activity were removed by proportional scaling. 
Each component of the model served as a regressor in a multiple regression analysis. 
The resulting parameter estimates for each regressor at each voxel were then entered 
into a second level analysis where ‘subject’ served as a random effect in a within- 
subjects ANOVA. The main effects and interactions between conditions were then 
specified by appropriately weighted linear contrasts and determined using the t-statistic 
on a voxel-by-voxel basis.
Statistical analysis at the second level was performed for each group separately to 
examine the main effect of the two experimental conditions compared with the baseline 
stimulus, and the main effect of intentional causality [(IC) - (PC)]. Since there were no 
predictions about differential activation in PC, no PC-IC contrasts were computed. To 
compare the two age groups directly, the interaction between group (adult vs.
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adolescent) and intentional causality task was investigated using the contrasts [(adultlC- 
adultPC) - (adolescentlC-adolescentPC)] and [(adolescentlC-adolescentPC) - (adultlC- 
adultPC)]. In addition, the effect of age on each contrast was investigated using a 
regression function at the second level with age in months as the covariate of interest.
Statistical contrasts were used to create an SPM{t}, which was transformed into an 
SPM{Z} and thresholded at p<0.05 (corrected on the basis of the theory of random 
Gaussian fields for multiple comparisons across the whole brain volume examined). 
Regions that survive whole brain correction are reported (or, where there was an a 
priori hypothesis for their activation, small volume correction) at p<0.05.
4.2.3. Results
4.2.3.1. Behavioural results
Every subject made a response to every causality question. A mixed design ANOVA 
revealed that subjects from both groups were significantly faster to answer IC questions 
than PC questions (F (1,28) = 89.29, p<0.0001; Figure 4.1). There was no overall 
significant difference in RT between the two groups (F (1,28) = 1.92; p>0.05), nor was 
there a significant interaction between group and task (F (1,28) = 0.52; p>0.05). There 
was no significant correlation between age and RTs for either task (p>0.05).
4.2.3.2. Functional imaging results 
Experimental conditions compared with baseline
Comparison of the two visual conditions with the fixation condition [(IC+PC) - 
baseline] in both groups resulted in significant activations in regions involved in visual, 
motor and language processing (p<0.05 whole brain corrected), as would be expected.
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Figure 4.1. Mean (±S.D.) RTs (ms) in the two conditions for adult 
and adolescent groups: IC = intentional causality, PC = physical 
causality. Participants from  both groups were significantly faster to 
answer IC questions than PC questions (F (1,28) = 89.29,
p<0.0001. **p=<0.0001
129
Chapter 4 Intention understanding in adolescence
Main effect o f Intentional Causality in both groups
Both groups showed a very similar pattern of activation when comparing questions 
related to IC scenarios versus questions related to PC scenarios (see Figure 4.2). In both 
groups, this contrast resulted in activation of the precuneus/PCC, MPFC, temporal 
poles, STS and TPJ. These activations are listed in Table 4-1 and shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2. Main effect o f  IC-PC in both groups.
Left panel: Activation from the adult group (N=l 1) showing greater 
activation in the MPFC, precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex, STS, 
TPJ and temporal pole in the intentional causality (IC) condition 
versus the physical causality (PC) condition. Anatomical labels: 1. 
Precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex; 2. STS/TPJ; 3. Temporal pole; 
4. MPFC
Right panel: Activation from  the adolescent group ( N - 19) from  the 
same contrast (IC-PC). It can be seen that the network o f  activation 
in IC-PC is similar in both groups (anatomical labels as in adults’ 
activations)
131
Chapter 4 Intention understanding in adolescence
Foci of activation
MNI coordinates 
x y z Z value Cluster size
ADULTS: Main effect o f  IC>PC
Precuneus/posterior cingulate 0 -48 33 4.56 360
L STS -57 -57 18 3.85 10
L TPJ/intraparietal sulcus -42 -72 36 4.35 214
R STS 51 -48 24 3.59 47
R TPJ/intraparietal sulcus 48 -75 36 3.54 14
Medial PFC -9 63 12 3.32 71
L temporal pole -42 18 -39 3.41 59
R temporal pole 39 21 -33 3.48 24
ADOLESCENTS: Main effect o f  IC>PC
Precuneus/posterior cingulate -6 -51 33 5.51 289
L STS -45 -60 24 4.22 57
L TPJ/intraparietal sulcus -45 -72 36 3.64 part of same cluster
R STS 48 -63 21 5.33 60
Medial PFC 0 54 21 4.1 1 14
L temporal pole -57 -12 -24 4.75 87
-45 9 -42 3.54 4
R temporal pole 48 18 -36 4.05 8
Table 4-1. Coordinates and Z-values fo r  regions o f significantly (corrected fo r  multiple 
comparisons, or SVC) higher activation in the main effect o fIC  compared with PC.
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Interaction between age and intentional causality
The right MPFC (MNI coordinates: 12 42 21) was activated significantly more in adults 
compared with adolescents during 1C compared to PC (Z=3.52; p<0.05 SVC) (Figure 
4.3 left panel). The regression analysis showed that activity in this region was positively 
correlated with age (R2=0.17; p<0.05; Figure 4.3 right panel).
Conversely, adolescents activated the STS more than did adults when thinking about IC 
compared to PC (63 -33 -9 ; Z=3.35; p<0.05 SVC) (Figure 4.4 left panel). The 
regression analysis showed that activity in this region was negatively correlated with 
age (R2=0.22; p<0.01; Figure 4.4 right panel).
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Figure 4.3. Interaction between group (adults vs. adolescents) 
and condition (IC vs. PC) Left panel: Activation from  the interaction 
between group and condition, showing greater activity in MPFC in IC-PC 
fo r  the adult group (MNI: 12 42 21; BA 10) compared with the adolescent 
group. Right panel: Significant positive regression o f BOLD signal in MPFC 
in IC-PC against age (R2=0.17; p<0.05).
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Figure 4.4. Interaction between group (adolescents vs. adults) and condition 
(IC vs. PC). Left panel: Activation from the interaction between group and 
condition, showing greater activity in the right STS in IC-PC fo r  the 
adolescent group (63 -33  -9) compared with the adult group. Right panel: 
Significant negative regression o f BOLD signal in STS in IC-PC against age 
(R =0.22; p<0.01).
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4.2.4. Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate adolescent development of the neural 
network involved in thinking about intentions. Previous studies have suggested a role 
for a network of areas (MPFC, STS, TPJ and temporal poles) in this type of mentalising 
task (Brunet et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2000; Vogeley et al., 2001). In the current 
study, subjects responded to scenarios related either to their own intentions and 
consequential actions (intentional causality; IC) or to physical events and their 
consequences (physical causality; PC). This study investigated how activity during 
these tasks in the adult brain compares with activity in the adolescent brain. The results 
suggest that activity shifts from posterior to anterior regions of the mentalising network 
during from adolescence into adulthood.
Both groups of subjects took significantly less time to respond to the IC questions than 
to the PC questions (Figure 4.1). The difference in reaction times could not have been 
due to any difference in the structural features of the stimuli since these were matched. 
Instead, this effect may be due to an inherent difference in cognitive processing 
demands for the two types of question. These results are in line with previous findings 
demonstrating a tendency for normally developing children to show better performance 
on questions about intentions than questions about the physical world (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1986). One possibility is that, perhaps because we have “direct” information about 
intentions, the understanding of intentions is more intuitive, and requires less explicit 
reasoning and ‘working out’ than does the understanding of physical causality. This in 
turn may relate to our ability to simulate intentional causality scenarios relating to 
people, but not physical causality scenarios relating to objects. There were no 
significant task performance differences between the two groups.
4.2.4.1. Brain activations associated with intentional causality in both groups 
In both adults and adolescents, responding to questions that involved thinking about 
one’s own intentions and consequential actions activated the MPFC, the STS, and the 
temporal poles (Figure 4.2). These regions are all part of the highly circumscribed 
neural network that has consistently been activated by mentalising tasks in functional 
neuroimaging studies across a wide variety of tasks, ranging from attribution of mental 
states to animated shapes (Castelli et al., 2000; 2002) to understanding beliefs and 
intentions in cartoons (Brunet et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2000; Vogeley et al., 2001)
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and in stories (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). 
These areas are proposed to play different roles in mentalising (see Frith & Frith, 2003 
for discussion of the functional division between these regions). Activations in the 
precuneus/PCC in the intentional causality condition relative to the physical causality 
condition were also found. This region is often activated in tasks that involve thinking 
about mental states in relation to the self (Happe, 2003; Johnson et al., 2002; Kampe et 
al., 2003; Kjaer et al., 2002; Lou et al., 2004; Vogeley et al., 2001). The scenarios and 
questions in the current task related to the self. Therefore, activity in the precuneus/PCC 
during the IC condition may have been associated with subjects thinking about 
themselves in the given scenarios.
4.2.4.2. Diff erences between adults and adolescents
Our results revealed that the MPFC was activated more by adults than by adolescents 
when thinking about IC relative to PC (Figure 4.3). Activity in this region during IC 
relative to PC was positively correlated with age. Conversely, the STS was activated 
more by adolescents than by adults during IC, and activity in this region in this contrast 
was negatively correlated with age (Figure 4.4). Both these regions are part of the 
mentalising network. These results suggest that the part of the network that is used to 
think about intentions shifts from posterior (STS) to anterior (PFC) regions with age 
over the period of adolescence.
While there were age-related changes in activity in the MPFC and the STS, there was 
no significant difference between adolescents and adults in activity in the temporal 
poles (the third region of the mentalising network). Perhaps this is because, unlike the 
rest of the temporal cortex, the temporal poles mature early, at around the same time as 
the occipital poles (Toga et al., 2006).
The STS has been proposed to play a role in the prediction of observed patterns of 
behaviour in order to surmise the mental states underlying this behaviour (Frith & Frith, 
2003; Frith, in press). This region is activated during the perception of biological 
motion (Allison et al., 2000; Bonda et al., 1996; Grezes et al., 2001; Grossman et al., 
2000; Puce & Perrett, 2003), of faces and body parts (Campbell et al., 2001; Chao et al., 
1999; Grezes et al., 1998; Puce et al., 1998) and of someone moving their eyes (e.g.
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Pelphrey et al., 2005). One possibility is that this region is involved in predicting the 
trajectory of movements, and higher activity occurs when there is a mismatch between 
the predicted and actual observed movement (Frith, in press).
The MPFC, in contrast to the STS, is activated whenever subjects reflect on the mental 
states of themselves or of others (Gallagher et al, 2000; Mitchell et al., 2005; McCabe et 
al., 2001; Vogeley et al., 2001). In these studies, mental states must often be decoupled 
from reality; the way we perceive the world is not the way the world is, but the way we 
believe the world to be. In order to understand another person’s mental states, we must 
be able to decouple what the other person believes about the world from reality - these 
may be in agreement, but are not necessarily so. Other tasks that activate MPFC involve 
attributing traits or feelings to people (Mitchell et al., 2002; Schmitz et al., 2004), 
animals (Mitchell et al., 2005), and oneself (Kelley et al., 2002; Ochsner et al., 2004; 
Johnson et al., 2002; Lou et al., 2004). All of these tasks involve thinking about mental 
states. Activity in MPFC is often observed during rest conditions in comparison with 
high demand tasks (including mentalising). It has been suggested that, during ‘rest’ or 
low demand tasks, participants might indulge in spontaneous mentalising (Amodio et 
al., 2006).
The MPFC has direct connections to the STS (Bachevalier et al., 1997). Frith and Frith 
propose that the MPFC receives input about the content of mental states and their 
relation to people’s actions from the STS. Consequently the MPFC may be the basis of 
the decoupling mechanism that distinguishes mental state representations from physical 
state representations (Frith & Frith, 2003).
4.2.43. Development o f a strategy fo r  intention understanding
While children start to pass explicit TOM tasks by about five years, our data suggest 
that the neural basis of TOM continues to develop well past early childhood. Our results 
indicate a shift with age in recruitment within the mentalising network in the brain, from 
relatively higher posterior (STS) activation to relatively higher frontal (MPFC) 
activation from early adolescence to adulthood. Thus, it seems that during adolescence, 
the neural strategy for thinking about intentional causality changes with age. One 
possible explanation is that cortical development, including synaptic reorganisation in 
MPFC and STS (Gogtay et al., 2004; Toga et al., 2006) and increased myelination of
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fronto-temporal pathways (Paus et al., 1999), facilitates a change from using more basic 
social information processing, involving the prediction of another person’s behaviour 
based on their past actions, to more sophisticated mental state inferences in order to 
predict what action would follow an intention, taking into account future mental states 
and emotions. Young adolescents might activate mental imagery to predict actions in 
the IC scenarios, thus eliciting higher activation of the posterior STS. Therefore, young 
adolescents might use strategies akin to precursors of mentalising to think about 
intentional causality.
Processing of intentions in adulthood might take a different form. Cortical sculpting 
during adolescence in frontal and temporal regions might enable a process whereby 
adults’ judgements of what action would follow an intention might be driven by full­
blown mentalising. Rather than thinking about the actions per se, adults perhaps base 
their judgements on a representation of the mental states elicited by each scenario, 
activating the MPFC relatively more highly. In other words, the recruitment of 
differential neural networks might indicate that adolescents use an action based 
representation (“What would I do?”, based on a prediction of an action) for thinking 
about intentional causality, whereas adults use mental state representations (“What 
would I do, given how I would feel?” based on one’s own imagined mental states). 
Adults might additionally be more inclined than adolescents to take into account the 
mental states of others when making decisions about what action they would take given 
a particular intention (“What would I do, given how they would feel?” based on the 
imagined mental states of others). This fits with the proposal that adolescents may be 
poor at counterfactuals (thinking about “what would happen if . . .”) and therefore tend to 
be risk taking (Baird & Fugelsang, 2004).
In summary, the STS seems to be concerned with predicting someone else's behaviour 
on the basis of the past actions, while MPFC is concerned with predicting someone 
else's behaviour on the basis of future mental states and emotions (e.g. anticipated 
regret). It is thus proposed that, during adolescence, brain activity shifts from a focus on 
prediction based on past actions (STS) to prediction based on future mental states 
(MPFC).
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All the questions in this paradigm elicit first-person processing, that is, thinking about 
what one would do based on one’s own intentions. It is not possible to delineate 
whether increased MPFC activation with age reflects a development in social cognition 
related to the self per se, or mentalising in general. A future extension of this study 
might include a third-person contrast in the intentional scenarios that elicit processing 
what one thinks someone else would do given their intentions. However, the 
development of intention understanding in the brain, as suggested by these data, may 
imply a combination of social cognitive processes related to both self and other. Indeed, 
as mentioned above, it is proposed that there is a ‘default state’ of cortical processing 
involving high metabolic activity at rest in dorsal MPFC, thought to reflect self- 
referential thinking, which might be expected when task demands are low and 
participant are free to think about what they like (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001). This 
suggests that brain activity during self-oriented thinking may overlap with the 
processing involved in thinking about others (Vogeley et al., 2001). In addition, fMRI 
studies have demonstrated that reflecting on one’s own thoughts or thinking about 
personality trait adjectives that involve the self elicit activity in similar brain areas to 
those associated with attribution of mental states to others (Happe, 2003; Johnson et al., 
2002, Kelley et al., 2002; Kampe et al., 2003; Kjaer et al., 2002; Lou et al., 2004; 
Macrae et al., 2004). Self and other might therefore be conceptualized as ‘two sides of 
the same coin’, and this ‘co-constitution of self and other’ (Iacoboni, 2006) suggests 
that the development found in this study reflects a combination of both self- and other- 
processing, especially in the context of simulation theory.
4.2.5. Conclusion
Here, the aim was to investigate how the neural system associated with intention 
understanding changes from early adolescence through to adulthood. The results of this 
fMRI study revealed that, when thinking about intentional causality (relative to physical 
causality), activity shifts from posterior to anterior regions of the mentalising network 
as a function of age. This suggests that the neural strategy for thinking about intentions 
continues to develop during adolescence and early adulthood. To our knowledge, this is 
the first imaging study to provide evidence that the mentalising network continues to 
develop after early childhood. While normally developing children pass TOM tasks by 
about age five, these data suggest that the mentalising network continues to become 
refined during adolescence.
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The next chapter investigates whether these developments in higher social cognitive 
skills may be linked to development in the action representation system during 
adolescence.
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C h a pte r  5
5. T he  d e v e l o pm e n t  of a c t io n  r e p r ese n ta t io n  in  a d o l e sc e n c e
5.1. What is an action representation?
During adolescence, the body is subject to height, weight, organ and musculoskeletal 
development (Coleman & Hendry, 1990). Internal models might therefore be expected 
to change with age. An internal forward model, or action representation, is a neural 
system that simulates the dynamic behaviour of the body in relation to the environment 
(Wolpert et al., 1995). An internal model can be thought of as a schema, which is 
composed of information from one’s own cognitive mechanisms as well as from the 
external world (Neisser, 1976).
It has been proposed that these internal models make predictions about actions, limb 
kinematics and parameters of the external world and enable successful planning and 
execution of movement (Wolpert, 1997). Prediction is a necessary step in motor 
planning and can be used in many ways, for example, for fine motor adjustments, action 
planning and motor learning. For every intended action, the brain must issue a motor 
command to the muscles in order to execute the action. It is proposed that a duplicate of 
the motor command - or ‘efference copy’ - is generated in parallel and used to make 
predictions about the sensory consequences of one’s own action (Miall & Wolpert, 
1996). Internal forward models are used, for example, to gauge the relationship between 
predicted states and desired states and to provide the motor instructions required by the 
muscles to achieve the desired effect, such as the grip force necessary to manipulate a 
given object (Wolpert et al., 1995). Accurate motor control requires up to date 
information about the external world. For example, it is only possible to make accurate 
reaching movements by acquiring an internal model of our limb dynamics. Recently, it 
has been shown that internal model prediction occurs even in the absence of movement 
(Voss et al., 2006). Internal models are constantly updated based on the actions and 
experiences of the person in the world (Miall & Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert et al., 1995). 
As body kinematics change during adolescence, the representation and prediction of 
actions made by internal models require updating.
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5.2. Motor imagery as a paradigm to study action representation
It has been posited that by studying conscious motor imagery, it is possible to access the 
unconscious process of action representation (Jeannerod, 1997). Motor imagery is a 
conscious, first-person simulation of an action, for example, imagining the sensation of 
generating the force of the leg to kick a football, without actually moving. The 
conscious generation of a motor image reflects an unconscious internal action 
representation, or “internal model” of volitional movements (Jeannerod, 1997).
A tight correlation between the timing of a specific action and its imagined equivalent 
has been shown to be a robust phenomenon, suggesting that actions in both modalities 
are subject to the same environmental and physiological constraints (Decety & Michel, 
1989; Jeannerod, 1994; Sirigu et al., 1995; Wilson et al., 2001). For example, there is no 
difference in the time taken to carry out or to imagine tasks that involve writing, 
drawing (Decety & Michel, 1989), walking (Decety et al., 1989; Stevens, 2005), 
performing simple hand actions, including the “fingers task” employed here (Sirigu et 
al., 1996), or reaching to targets (Cerritelli et al., 2000; Maruff et al., 1999; Wilson et 
al., 2001). Furthermore, the visually-guided pointing task (VGPT) has previously been 
used to show that, typically, the duration of target-oriented reaching movements 
increases as the size of the target decreases (Cerritelli et al., 2000; Maruff et al., 1999), 
both when the actions are executed and imagined. In other words, task difficulty, also 
referred to as the index of difficulty, affects actions in the same way, regardless of 
modality. Taken together, the temporal invariance between executed and imagined 
movements suggests that the same motor representation governs an action whether it is 
executed or imagined.
5.2.1. F itts’ Law
This phenomenon can be expressed by Fitts’ Law (Fitts, 1954). This describes the 
logarithmic relationship between the speed and accuracy of actual movements, and has 
been shown to extend to imagined movements in typical participants. In other words, 
we make the same speed-accuracy trade-offs for both executed and imagined actions 
(Decety & Jeannerod, 1995; Sirigu et al., 1995; 1996). For example, for both executed 
and imagined movements, we slow down in order to reach accurately to increasingly
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small targets, or we take longer to walk to increasingly distant targets (Decety et al., 
1989; Maruff et al., 1999; Sirigu et al., 1996; Wilson et al., 2001).
5.2.2. Motor imagery and parietal cortex
In patients with parietal lesions, however, this relationship is lost (Maruff et al., 2003; 
Sirigu et al., 1996; Wolpert et al., 1998). Impairment in internal models has thus been 
shown in patients with PC lesions (Sirigu et al., 1996; Wolpert et al., 1998) as well as in 
schizophrenic patients (Maruff et al., 2003). Together with neuroimaging (Gerardin et 
al., 2000; Lacourse et al., 2005; Stephan et al., 1995) and electrophysiological 
experiments (Kalaska & Crammond, 1995), the results suggest that motor imagery is 
associated with activity in PC. This is supported by the proposal that internal models are 
stored in PC (Blakemore & Sirigu, 2003; Wolpert et al., 1998).
5.3. Experiments 4A, 4B & 4C: Development o f  action representation during 
adolescence
5.3.1. Introduction
It has been proposed that action understanding may be linked to social understanding 
(see Chapter 1). The development of action representation has not yet been studied in a 
developmental context beyond childhood and through adolescence. Adolescent 
development provides an opportunity to study the development of the cognitive basis 
for action representation and thus to make interpretations about its possible link to 
higher social cognitive skills. As detailed above ‘action representations’ are 
synonymous with internal models of action. In order to maintain accurate motor control, 
internal models need to be updated in accordance with physical development during this 
transitional period. Internal models of action have been associated with PC, a region of 
the brain subject to considerable development during adolescence. Although motor 
imagery is a well-established phenomenon in healthy adults, the development of this 
ability during adolescence has not previously been studied. In the following three 
experiments, three different tasks -  in Experiment 4A, the “triple 8 task”, in Experiment 
4B, the “fingers task”5 and in Experiment 4C, the “visually-guided point task” (VGPT) 
-  were used to tap internal models in adolescents and adults, and mental chronometry
5 See Choudhury, S., Charman, T. & Blakemore, S.-J. Development of action representation during 
adolescence. Neuropsychologia, in press
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was used as a measure of the ability to represent actions. Three separate motor imagery 
experiments were conducted firstly, to test whether development of motor imagery 
ability extends to different types of tasks. These tasks are also amenable to different 
types of statistical analysis to one another. As an index of the development of the action 
representation system, we measured the correspondence between the time course of 
every participant’s executed (E) and imagined (I) actions in each age group, on the three 
different motor imagery tasks. To compare this correspondence between age groups, we 
compared the Execution-lmagery (E-I) correlations of each individual in the two age 
groups. To determine whether developmental change was specific to the development 
of internal models and not a result of general cognitive-motor improvement, the change 
in E-I correlation with age was compared to the change in general cognitive-motor 
efficiency with age. In addition, in Experiment 4C, each group’s compliance to Fitts’ 
Law was compared.
For Experiment 4A, it was predicted that there would be an ‘isochrony effect’ for the 
‘triple 8 task’ such that execution and imagery times would be maintained regardless of 
the size of the 8. This prediction was based on a previous study showing that 
handwriting time remains constant irrespective of size (Decety & Michel, 1989). It was 
predicted that in Experiment 4B, there would be an effect of laterality for the ‘fingers 
task’, such that the time taken to both execute and imagine actions with the dominant 
hand would be relatively faster. For Experiment 4C, it was predicted that there would be 
a main effect of Index of Difficulty (ID), with all participants taking a longer time to 
reach for the smaller targets (Cerritelli et al., 2000; Maruff et al., 1999; Sirigu et al., 
1995; 1996; Wilson et al., 2001), due to the speed-accuracy trade off typically 
represented. Furthermore, given the pronounced development of body structure and 
therefore limb dynamics during adolescence, it was hypothesised that forward 
modelling for action control would show parallel development. It was predicted that this 
would be reflected by an increase between adolescence and adulthood in the 
correspondence between Execution and Imagery times in all three experiments.
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EXPERIMENT 4A:
5.3.2. Method fo r  Triple 8 task
5.3.2.1. Participants
73 participants were recruited and divided into two age categories. 40 adolescents (24 
males; mean age 13.1 years, SD=1.4) and 33 adults (15 males; mean age 27.5 years, 
SD=7.9). Adolescent participants were from state comprehensive primary and 
secondary schools in the London area and adults were students and staff at University 
College London. Participants were all right handed and none had a history of 
psychiatric, neurological, developmental or learning disorder. Written informed consent 
was obtained from the participants and, for the adolescents, from their parents prior to 
the study, which was approved by the local research ethics committee.
5.3.2.2. Experimental procedure
For each trial, participants were presented with a plain sheet of paper. Two parallel 
horizontal lines were drawn, with one towards the top of the sheet and the other pair 
towards the bottom. An example of the figure 8 was drawn between the top pair of lines 
such that its height spanned the width between the lines.
5.3.2.2.1. Executed condition fo r  triple 8 task
Participants sat with their hand in a starting position with the tip of the pencil touching 
the centre of the X drawn between the bottom pair of lines (See Figure 5.1). When the 
experimenter said “Go”, participants were instructed to draw a further three consecutive 
figure 8s as fast and as accurately as they could within the bottom pair of lines, without 
going outside the border of the lines. The width between the lines and therefore the 
sizes of the figure 8s varied. Three different sizes were used: 70, 35 and 18 mm high. 
There were three trials of each size of 8, on separate sheets of paper, for the Executed 
condition and also for Imagined condition. A stopwatch was used to record the duration 
of participants’ movement from the time the experimenter said ‘Go’ to the time the 
participant said ‘Stop’.
5.3.22.2. Imagined condition
The Imagined condition followed the Executed action blocks. During this condition, 
participants were instructed to place their hands in the starting position for the action 
(for Exp. 4C this meant holding the pencil at the starting point of the vertical line on
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each sheet), but they were asked to keep as still as possible during the Imagined trials. 
When the experimenter said ‘Go,’ participants were required to imagine doing the 
action exactly as in the Executed condition, but without moving. As in the Action 
condition, participants were told to say ‘Stop’ out loud to indicate they had finished the 
imagined movements.
5.3.2.2.3. Instructions
Each participant was given a demonstration by the experimenter at the beginning of the 
task. To ensure that participants had fully understood the instructions, they were given a 
Practise condition consisting of three example trials which were not included in the 
main experiment.
In the Imagined condition, the experimenter always stressed that participants should 
‘really feel themselves making the movement’. In other words, they were to avoid 
objectifying themselves by imagining a visual image of their hand moving. Rather, they 
were supposed to feel as if they were actually moving their hand in a first-person 
perspective of the motor image. If the participant lost count of the number of 
movements, lost concentration during a trial, or expressed any problems, then that trial 
was subsequently excluded from the analysis. At the start of every block, for each task, 
participants were reminded to perform the actions as quickly and as accurately as 
possible.
During the piloting stage, the order of blocks was counterbalanced between participants, 
so that some started with the Imagined condition and others with the Executed 
condition. It was found that starting with the Imagined condition was challenging for 
subjects, who reported not knowing what to imagine. Therefore, it was decided that, 
during the actual study, participants would perform the tasks in blocks of Executed 
actions followed by Imagined actions.
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8
Figure SA.Triple 8 task. Executed (E). Participants drew three 
consecutive figure 8s with a pencil, within the parallel pair o f 
lines, as quickly and as accurately as they could. There were 
three siz.e conditions o f the figure 8: small, medium and large 
corresponding to varying distances between the parallel lines. 
They were timed between the time they were instructed to start 
and the time they said ‘stop ’ to indicate they had finished. 
Imagined (I). Participants were timed to imagine making this 
action without moving their hand at all.
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5.3.2.2.4. Praxis Imagery Questionnaire (PIQ)
To check that there was no difference between groups in the ability to image actions, we 
administered an imagery questionnaire to all participants. The PIQ was adapted from 
the children’s version (Wilson et al., 2001) of the Florida Praxis Imagery Questionnaire 
(Ochipa et al., 1997) (see Appendix 5). The questionnaire consisted of seven questions 
in each of four subscales, each designed to test different aspects of praxis imagery: 
kinaesthetic, body position, action and object imagery. Correct answers indicated that 
the participant was able to correctly image the action required to arrive at the answer. 
The questionnaire was used to check for outliers on a group by group basis. This was to 
ensure that all data analysed were from participants able to carry out praxis imagery. 
PIQ scores were analysed by subscale (possible range: 0-7) and by total number correct 
(0-28). High overall scores were indicators of high ability to image actions. This 
questionnaire is designed to tap both visual and motor representations in separate 
subscales.
5.3.2.3. Data analysis
5.3.2.3.1. Individual reaction time data fo r  Imagined and Executed actions
For each participant, the mean movement duration for all the trials (nine for the triple 8 
task; eight for each condition of the fingers task) under the Executed and Imagined 
conditions was calculated. To investigate how well these data correlated across 
participants, each participant’s mean Executed RT (E) was plotted against his or her 
mean Imagined RT (I), for each task. Individual correlations provide information about 
motor imagery ability, which would be masked by comparing group means. A 
Pearson’s product moment correlation was calculated between the mean E-RT and 
mean I-RT. In addition E time was compared between groups, as was I time. These 
measures were used as controls to test whether any development was specific to action 
representation (as indexed by E-I correlation) and not by general movement or general 
imagery ability.
5.3.2.3.2. Comparison o f E-I correlations between groups
Fisher's Z was used to test whether the size of the correlations between executed and 
imagined movement duration significantly differed between the age groups and between 
genders on each task. According to this test, if the Z value was above 1.96, the
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correlations were significantly different at the p<0.05 level, and if the Z value was 2.58 
or over, the correlations were significantly different at the p<0.01 level.
5.3.2.3.3. The effect o f  action size
To investigate the effect of size of the figure 8 in this task, a mixed design 3x2x2 (Size 
x Age x Gender) ANOVA was used.
5.3.3. Results
5.3.3.1. PIQ fo r  all experiments
All participants scored highly on the PIQ, and there were no differences between groups 
in the mean total scores or in any of the subscales (mean score (adolescents) = 24; mean 
score (adults) = 26 out of a total of 28; see Table 5-1). A participant’s imagery and 
action data were excluded from the analysis if his or her mean PIQ score fell three or 
more standard deviations below the mean score from his or her age group. One 
adolescent’s data fell into this category. This analysis indicated that all participants 
whose data were included in subsequent analyses were able to form all aspects of 
imagery tapped by the PIQ which included both visual and motor representations.
SUBSCALE
ADOLESCENTS ADULTS
Mean±S.D. Median Range Mean±S.D. Median Range
Kinaesthetic 5.2±0.99 5 2-7 5 .2±1 .1 5 3-7
Position 6.3±0.82 6 3-7 6.6±0.56 7 5-7
Action 6.3±0.88 6 4-7 6.7±0.64 7 4-7
Object 6.4±0.79 7 4-7 6.6±0.55 7 5-7
Total 24.2±0.54 24 25.1 ±0.74 26
Table 5-1. PIQ scores. The table indicates the mean, median and range o f scores fo r  
each subscale. There were no differences between age groups in Imagery 
questionnaire scores, indicating that both adolescents and adults were able to image 
actions correctly. The questionnaire was used to identify and exclude data from  
participants whose scores fe ll 3 S.D. below the mean score fo r  each group.
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5.3.3.2. Action imagery tasks
Participants who showed a discrepancy between imagined and executed action times 
that were three standard deviations above or below the mean in either of the two tasks 
were also considered outliers. There were two outliers for the Triple 8 task (one adult 
and one adolescent).
5.3.3.2.1. Execution-Imagery (E-I) correlations
The correlation between the timing of actual (E) and imagined (I) actions was 
significant for both age groups (R2 (adolescents)=0.58; R2 (adults)=0.87; p<0.01 for 
both). However, the correlation between E and I for individuals in the adult group was 
significantly higher than that of individuals in the adolescent group (Z=2.61; p<0.01). 
There was no effect of gender on either the executed or imagined conditions 
(Z(adolescents)=l .10; Z(adults)=0.17). Thus, performance on both tasks indicated that 
the ability to form accurate action representations, as indexed by the strength of the 
correlation between executed and imagined actions, significantly improves between 
early adolescence and adulthood (see Figure 5.2).
5.3.3.2.2. Relationship between action time and age
The second set of regression analyses (see Figure 5.3) revealed no significant 
correlation between age and movement execution time (E) for the Triple 8 task 
(R2=2.9x10'4; p=0.89). This indicates that both age groups performed the motor 
execution task equally efficiently. Similarly, there was no significant correlation 
between age and imagery time (I) for this task (R2=0.044; p=0.082) (See Figure 5.3). 
These control regression analyses show that there was no difference between age groups 
in terms of motor speed and other general factors such as understanding task 
instructions, making a hand action, and reaction time. There were no differences 
between genders in either the E or I condition.
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Figure 5.2. Triple 8 task E -I correlation. Graph shows a 
significantly greater E-I correlation fo r  adults (R2=0.867) than for  
adolescents (R2=0.58), p<0.01
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Figure 5.3. Triple 8 task: regression analyses o f  actions times.
Graph shows no change in E (R2=2.9xl0~4; p=0.89) or in I 
(R2=0.044; p=0.082) with age.
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5.33.2.3. Size o f  action (Figure 8 task)
There was a main effect of Size of Action (handwriting size) (F(2,64)=84.3; p<0.0001), 
indicating that on average across both the I and E trials participants performed the 
actions increasingly slowly as the size of the figure 8 increased (mean RT for small 
8=4.32s, SE=0.16; medium 8=5.16s, SE=0.21; large 8=6.26s, SE=0.27). There was a 
significant interaction between Size of Action and Age (F(2,130)=6.83; p<0.01) but 
post-hoc t-tests comparing RT of each size between groups were not significant.
5.3.4. Mini discussion
This experiment employed a novel task -  the triple 8 task -  to assess the development of 
motor imagery during adolescence. This task was designed to involve a fluid action, 
which did not have a metronomic quality to it. The results showed that within both age 
groups, the correlation between timing of Executed (E) and Imagined (I) actions was 
significant and positive, suggesting that the ability to accurately represent actions, as 
reflected by performance on the Triple 8 task, is in place in adolescents and adults. In 
addition, while there was no change with age in the E-time per se or the I-time per se, 
there was a significant increase in the degree of correspondence between E and I 
between adolescence and adulthood. These data indicate that although adolescents are 
able to form motor images, this ability improves between adolescence and adulthood. It 
is suggested that this is due to refinement of internal models during adolescence.
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EXPERIMENT 4B:
5.3.5. Method fo r  Fingers task
5.3.5.1. Participants
See details of Experiment 4A above. The same adolescent and adult groups participated 
in this experiment.
5.3.5.2. Experimental procedure
Each participant was seated in a quiet room with the experimenter, with his/her right 
arm raised from the elbow and palm facing his/her face. During the piloting stage, the 
order of blocks was counterbalanced between participants, so that some started with the 
Imagined condition and others with the Executed condition. We found that starting with 
the Imagined condition was challenging for subjects, who reported not knowing what to 
imagine. Therefore, it was decided that, during the actual study, participants would 
perform the tasks in blocks of Executed actions followed by Imagined actions.
5.3.5.2.1. Executed condition fo r  Fingers task
The fingers task was identical to that described by Sirigu et al. (1996). Two blocks of 
Executed actions were followed by two blocks of Imagined actions, with each block 
consisting of a sequence of five consecutive, continuous actions.
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Figure 5.4. Fingers task. Executed (E). Participants moved their 
thumb between their little finger and index finger in a continuous 
sequence o f five movements, as quickly and as accurately as they 
could. They were timed between the time they were instructed to 
start and the time they said ‘stop ’ to indicate that had finished. 
This was repeated with both the right and left hands. Imagined 
(I). Participants were timed to imagine making this action without 
moving their hand at all.
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When the experimenter said ‘Go,’ participants were required to touch the right thumb to 
the tip of the little finger and then to the tip of the index finger (See Figure 5.4). In each 
block, this action was repeated five times (one sequence was equivalent to the thumb 
touching both the little finger and the index finger; this whole motion was repeated five 
times as one repetitive continuous motion). Participants were instructed to say ‘Stop’ to 
indicate that they had completed the sequence of actions. In half of the blocks, 
participants used their right hand and in the other half of the blocks, their left hand. The 
experimenter used a stop-watch to time the duration of the action from the moment after 
she said ‘Go’ to the moment the participant said ‘Stop’.
5.3.5.2.2. Imagined condition
See Method section 5.3.2.2.2 from Experiment 4A.
5.3.5.2.3. Instructions
See Method section 5.3.2.2.3 from Experiment 4A.
5.3.5.2.4. Praxis Imagery Questionnaire (PIQ)
See Method section 5.3.2.2.4 from Experiment 4A.
5.3.5.2.5. Data analysis
See Method section 5.3.2.3.1 and 5.3.2.3.2.
5.3.5.2.6. The eff ect o f laterality
Group means of RT were analysed using a between-subjects 2x2x2 (Hand x Age x 
Gender) ANOVA to explore laterality for the fingers task. The effect of laterality for 
this task was also analysed by comparing E-I correlation for the left and right hand 
within each age group.
5.3.5.3. Results
There were two outliers for the Fingers task (two adults).
5.3.5.3.1. PIQ
There were no differences between age groups in any of the subscales of the PIQ. See 
Results section 5.3.3.1 in Experiment 4A for details.
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53.5.3.2. E-I correlations
The correlation between E and I were also significant for both age groups (R2 
(adolescents)=0.82; Rz (adults)=0.96; p<0.01 for both). Again, the correlation between 
E and I for individuals in the adult group was significantly higher than that for 
individuals in the adolescent group (Z=3.20; p<0.01). There was no effect of gender 
(Z(adults)=0.492; Z(adolescents)=1.24). In line with the results from the first task, 
performance on the Fingers task indicated that the ability to form accurate action 
representations significantly improves between early adolescence and adulthood (see 
Figure 5.5).
5.3.53.3. Relationship between action time and age
The second set of regression analyses (see Figure 5.6) revealed no significant 
correlation between age and movement execution time (E) for the Fingers task 
(R2=0.041; p=0.l).
Similarly, there was no significant correlation between age and imagery time (I) for the 
Fingers task (R2=0.042; p=0.1). Again, these control regression analyses show that there 
was no difference between age groups in terms of carrying out a motor execution task, 
and other general factors such as understanding task instructions, making a hand action, 
and reaction time. There were no differences between genders in either the E or I 
condition.
5.3.53.4. Laterality (Fingers task)
The ANOVA revealed no effect of the hand used for the Fingers action on RT 
(F(l,64)=0.34; p=0.55). There was no interaction between Hand and Age Group 
(F(l,64)=0.53, p=0.47 or between Hand and Gender (F(l,64)=0.15, p=0.70)). 
Furthermore, a comparison between E-I correlations for each hand showed no 
difference in strength of the E-I association between hands for adolescents or (R (left 
hand)=0.79; R2(right hand)=0.82; Z=0.44, n.s.) or for adults (R2(left hand)=0.94; 
R2(right hand)=0.92; Z=0.54, n.s.).
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Figure 5.5. Fingers task E -I correlation. Graph shows a 
significant increased E-I correlation fo r  adults (R2=0.958) 
compared with adolescents (R2=0.818), p<0.01
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Figure 5.6. Fingers task: regression analyses o f  action 
times. Graph shows no change in E (R2-0.041; p=0.1) or in I 
(R2=0.042; p=0.1) with age.
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5.3.6. Mini discussion
This experiment replicated a task -  the fingers task -  from a previous experiment used 
with healthy adults and adult patients with parietal lesions (Sirigu et al., 1996) to assess 
the development of motor imagery during adolescence. This task has a periodicity or 
rhythmic quality to it. The results showed that within both age groups, the correlation 
between timing of Executed (E) and Imagined (I) actions was significant and positive, 
in line with results from Experiment 4A. Again, this suggests the ability to represent 
accurately actions, as reflected by performance on the Fingers task, is in place in 
adolescents and adults. In addition, while there was no change with age in the E time 
per se or the I time per se, there was a significant increase in the degree of 
correspondence between E and I between adolescence and adulthood. These data 
indicate that although adolescents are able to form motor images, this ability improves 
between adolescence and adulthood. Thus, a second type of motor imagery task 
suggests a refinement of internal models during adolescence.
EXPERIMENT 4C:
5.3.7. Method for visually-guided pointing task (VGPT)
5.3.7.1. Experimental procedure
5.3.7.1.1. Executed condition
The VGPT was adapted from that used by Sirigu et al. (1995, 1996). Participants were 
required to use their right hand for every trial. For each trial, participants were presented 
with a plain sheet of paper. On the left hand side of the paper, an 80 mm vertical line 
was printed and to the right side of it, a black target box with its closest edge 30 mm 
away from the line (see Figure 5.7). Five different sheets were used and on each sheet 
the widths of the target box were 3.0, 5.3, 10.6, 18.9 and 28 mm. The order of 
administration of the different sized targets was counterbalanced between participants. 
For each trial of a single target width, participants made five hand movements, where 
one movement was defined as each participant’s hand motion (in both the executed and 
imagined condition) from the far side of the vertical line to touch the target and back to 
the far side of the vertical line. Participants were told that they could touch the pencil 
down anywhere inside the borders of the target square. A stopwatch was used to record 
the duration of participants' hand movements. For the executed condition, participants 
completed two trials of each of five target widths giving a total of 10 trials per 
participant. The action was timed from the moment the experimenter said “Go” until the
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participant made the fifth movement back to the far side of the line and said “Stop” out 
loud.
5.3.7.1.2. Imagined condition
See Method section 5.3.2.2.2 from Experiment 4A.
5.3.7.1.3. Instructions
See Method section 5.3.2.2.3 from Experiment 4A.
5.3.7.1.4. Praxis Imagery Questionnaire (PIQ)
See Method section 5.3.2.2.4 from Experiment 4A.
5.3.7.2. Data analysis
5.3.7.2.1. E-I correlations 
See Method section 5.3.2.3.1
5.3.7.2.2. Relationship between action time and age 
See Method section 5.3.2.3.2.
5.3.7.2.3. Fitts' Law analysis
To investigate whether the same constraints were operating on action representations of 
both adolescents and adults, performance on the VGPT was analysed using an 
established method specifically for this type of pointing task. This method determines 
how well movements performed by both groups conformed to Fitts’ Law. The mean 
movement duration for each group was plotted against target width for each condition. 
Each target width was also converted to an Index of Difficulty (ID) using the Fitts’ Law 
equation as below:
Index of Difficulty (ID) = Logio[2 x AAV], 
where A is the amplitude of the movement (a constant value of 30mm) and W is the 
width of the target square. A logarithmic and linear curve was fitted to the data points 
and a least squares calculation was used to determined the goodness of fit for each curve 
(Maruff et al., 1999, Sirigu et al., 1995; Wilson et al., 2001).
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[
Figure 5.7. Visually guided pointing task.
Participants were required to move, and to imaging 
moving, a pencil from  the starting point at the top o f 
the line to anywhere within the target square and back 
again as quickly and as accurately as possible.
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53.7.2.4. Group reaction time fo r  Item Diff iculty
To investigate the effect of Item Difficulty (ID) (5 levels), a reflection of size of target, 
on movement duration, a repeated measures 5 (ID) x 2 (age group) x 2 (gender) 
ANOVA was used to test the hypothesis that participants in both groups would get 
progressively slower as the target object size decreased, in line with Fitts’ Law 
(Cerritelli et al., 2000; Maruff et al., 1999; Wilson et al., 2001).
5.3.7.2.5. Individual correlations fo r  each participant
A correlation between the timings for each of the 25 single E movements and 25 I 
movements was calculated for every subject. Individual R values were then compared 
across age groups.
5.3.8. Results
There were two outliers (one adult and one adolescent) for the VGPT.
5.3.8.1. Group data fo r  Item Diff iculty (ID)
A between subjects repeated measures 2 (age group) x 5 (ID) x gender (2) ANOVA 
showed that there was a main effect of ID (F(4,64)=29.7; p<0.0001), indicating that on 
average across both the I and E trials, participants in both age groups performed the 
actions increasingly efficiently as the target size increased (mean RT + SE for ID 1.3 
(3.0mm)=4.95±0.14s,; RT for ID 1.05 (5.3mm)=4.73±0.14s; RT for ID 0.75 
(10.6mm)=4.45±0.13s, RT for ID 0.5 (18.9mm)=4.22±0.13s; RT for ID 0.33 
(28mm)=4.04±0.13s). See Figure 5.8. There were no effects of age (F(l,67)=2.72, 
p=0.104) or gender (F(l,67)=0.01, p=0.979).
5.3.8.2. F itts’ Law analysis o f group means
The established logarithmic relationship between the speed and accuracy of executed 
movements (Fitts’ Law) extended to all age groups and also to the imagined condition 
for all age groups. The linear relationships between Index of Difficulty (ID) and 
movement duration that arose from the Fitts’ Law equation are shown in Figure 5.9. 
Table 5-2 indicates that for both adults and adolescents, the logarithmic regression 
provided the best fit of the data for the actual and imagined conditions when plotted 
against target width. For both groups, the data conformed highly significantly to Fitts’ 
Law.
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Figure 5.8. Mean movement duration ± S.E. as a function o f  
Index o f  Difficulty (ID). As ID decreaseD (or target size 
increased), movement duration decreased in line with F itts’ Law, 
among all participants.
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Figure 5.9. Fitts ’ Law analysis fo r  each age group. The graph shows 
the linear relationships between Index o f Diff iculty (ID) and movement 
duration that arose from  the Fitts ’ Law calculations. Movements o f all 
age groups conform strongly to Fitts ’ Law.
Group / condition Logarithmic R2 Linear R2
Adolescents
Executed
Imagined
y  = -0.488Ln(*l + 5.89 
y = -0 .2 9 2 L n (*; + 5.22
0.975**
0.997***
y =  -0 .040* + 5.30 
y =  -0 .0 2 5 *+  4.88
0.817*
0.916*
Adults
Executed
Imagined
y = -0 .4 6 7 L n (*; + 5.24 
y = -0 .3 8 3 L n (*; + 5.21
0.985***
0.964**
y = -0 .0 4 1 *+ 4 .7 1  
y = -0 .0 3 4 *+ 4 .7 8
0.973**
0.983***
Table 5-2: Fitts 9 Law analyses. The table shows the equations fo r  both logarithmic 
and linear regressions o f mean movement duration against ID. R2 values fo r  both ages 
show that E and I movements o f  both groups conform highly to F itts’ Law.
[***p < 0.001; ** p < 0.005; * p  < 0.05]
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Figure 5.10. E -I correlations fo r  each group. Correlations are 
significant fo r  adolescent and adult group (adults: R2=0.914; p<0.01; 
adolescents: R2=0.698; p<0.01);. E-I correlation fo r  adults is 
significantly higher than that o f adolescents (Z=2.93; p<0.01).
9 -
7 -
crt
■ o
cO)
to
E
3 -
‘S:—
167
Chapter 5 Action representation in adolescence
5.3.8.3. E-I correlations
5.3.8.3.1. Within-group correlations between E and I
The correlation between the timing of E and I was significant for both adults (R =0.914; 
p<0.01) and adolescents (R2=0.698; p<0.01; see Figure 5.10).
5.3.8.3.2. Between-group comparison o f E  vs. age and I vs. age
A regression of movement time, in both E and I modalities, over age as a continuum, 
showed that neither Execution time nor Imagery time per se changed as a function of 
age (E vs. age: R2 = 1.0 x 10’5, n.s.; I vs. age: R2 = 0.01, n.s.).
5.3.8.3.3. Between-group comparison o f E-I correlations
However, the correlation between E and I of the adult group was significantly higher 
than that of the adolescent group (Z’=2.93; p<0.01) as shown in Figure 5.10.
5.3.8.3.4. Individual correlation data between E and I
In addition, individual participants’ correlation data demonstrated that adults tended to 
have a higher correlation between E and I than adolescents on an individual-by- 
individual basis (%2(1,71)=8.6, p<0.005). In the adult group, a higher proportion (75%) 
of individuals had R2 (E/I) >0.5 than in the adolescent group (44%).
5.3.9. Mini discussion
This experiment replicated a task -  the VGPT task -  from a previous experiment used 
with adults (Sirigu et al., 1995; 1996) and children with developmental coordination 
disorder (DCD) (Maruff et al., 1999) to assess the development of motor imagery 
during adolescence, using a third task. This task involves a visually-guided pointing 
action. The results demonstrate that within both age groups, the correlation between 
timing of Executed (E) and Imagined (I) actions was significant and positive, suggesting 
the ability to represent accurately actions is in place in adolescents and adults. 
Similarly, as reflected by the effect of Index of Difficulty (ID) on movement duration as 
well as least squares regressions, actions in both E and I conditions conformed highly 
significantly to Fitts’ Law in both age groups However, as in Experiments 4A and 4B, 
again there was a significant increase in the degree of correspondence between E and I 
between adolescence and adulthood. These data from the third motor imagery task used
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in this thesis indicate that both adolescents and adults are able to form motor images, 
but this ability improves between adolescence and adulthood. The data from all of the 
three experiments are discussed in greater detail below. It is concluded that the 
replicated findings suggest that this is due to refinement of internal models during 
adolescence.
5.3.10. General discussion
5.3.10.1. Both adolescents and adults are able to generate motor images
The FPIQ data showed no differences in performance between imagery subscales, 
indicating both groups were equally able to generate both visual and kinaesthetic 
representations. To ensure that imagined actions were “felt actions”, or first person 
simulated actions, participants were instructed to imagine themselves as the agent of the 
action in the Imagery conditions. Moreover, when retrospectively asked about their 
strategy, participants reported using a motor strategy as instructed. Furthermore, the 
high correlations between E and I in both groups corroborate results from previous 
psychophysical experiments, supporting the notion that there are parallels between the 
parameters affecting executed and imagined movements for both adults and adolescents 
(Decety & Jeannerod, 1995; Decety & Michel, 1989; Sirigu et al., 1995; 1996).
5.3.10.2. E-I correlation in each age group
Furthermore, the high correlations between E and 1 in both age groups for all three tasks 
corroborate results from previous psychophysical experiments (Decety et al., 1989; 
Decety & Michel, 1989; Jeannerod, 1994; Sirigu et al., 1995), supporting the notion that 
there are parallels between the parameters affecting executed and imagined movements. 
This indicates that the Imagery conditions for both tasks were tapping action 
representations in both adults and adolescents. This correspondence between E and I is 
explained by Fitts’ Law, a model of human psychomotor behaviour, which expresses 
the relationship between movement time and task difficulty (Fitts, 1954), a phenomenon 
that has been found to extend to imagined actions as well (Decety & Jeannerod, 1995; 
Sirigu et al., 1995; 1996). It reflects the finding that subjects make the same speed- 
accuracy trade-offs for both executed and imagined actions, for example, by slowing 
down in order to reach accurately to increasingly small targets, or by taking longer to 
walk to increasingly distant targets (Decety & Jeannerod, 1995; Maruff et al., 1999; 
Sirigu et al., 1995; 1996; Stevens, 2005). Unlike the study by Maruff et al., (1999),
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results of the Fingers task indicate that performance is not influenced by laterality for 
either of the age groups.
5.3.10.3. Conformity to Fitts’ Law in both age groups
As illustrated by the goodness-of-fit regressions in the results of Experiment 4C (Table 
5-2 and Figure 5.9), movements in both the E and I conditions of the VGPT tightly 
conform to Fitts’ Law. This suggests that the action representation system is well 
established in both participant groups. In line with this, the ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of ID (see Figure 5.8), but no effect of age group, on movement duration. The 
amplitude of the movement was constant, given that all participants started the 
movement from the same starting point and aimed for the closest point within the box 
since they were told to move as quickly as possible. Speed therefore increased with 
decreasing size. As ID increased (as target width decreased), both adolescent and adult 
participants were able to represent speed-accuracy constraints such that they slowed 
down as target size decreased in order to perform actions with accuracy. Furthermore, 
the correlation between E and I was highly significant for both groups in all three tasks.
This correspondence between E and I is explained by Fitts’ Law, a model of human 
psychomotor behaviour, which expresses the relationship between movement time and 
task difficulty for both executed actions and imagined actions (Fitts, 1954). It reflects 
the finding that subjects make the same speed-accuracy trade-offs for both executed and 
imagined actions (Decety et al., 1989; Maruff et al., 1999; Sirigu et al., 1996; Stevens, 
2005).
In addition, we did not find an isochronous effect for handwriting size in the Triple 8 
task. A handful of previous studies have shown that participants have a tendency to 
keep execution time constant independent of movement size (Decety & Michel, 1989; 
Viviani & McCollum, 1983). The tangential velocity correlates with the trajectory such 
that movement time tends to remain constant irrespective of size. However, the Triple 8 
task was designed to constrain the movement by the lines within which the Figure 8s 
were restricted. In contrast, in studies where the Isochrony Principle held true, writing 
movements were “free”, e.g. a signature (Decety & Michel, 1989; Viviani & 
McCollum, 1983). Free movements such as a signature enable the use of one’s own 
unique style of movement and therefore the tagential velocities particular to individual
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handwriting. In the current study, however, the participant’s velocity is more controlled 
with respect to the target lines. Our figure of 8 task thus involves accuracy and is 
therefore perhaps still subject to the Fitts' law effect of timing and movement trajectory.
5.3.10.4. Refinement o f internal models during adolescence
The comparison of strength of correspondence between E and I between the two age 
groups for all three tasks suggests that refinement of this system occurs during 
adolescence. The statistical comparison indicated that the strength of the E-I correlation 
is significantly higher among adults than it is in adolescents. Given that there was no 
difference between groups in the FPIQ scores, the increase in correspondence between 
E and I indicates that the refinement is specific to the ability to represent the speed and 
accuracy constraints involved in actions, and not a general development in imagery.
Similarly, the developmental change was specific to motor imagery and was not a 
consequence of general cognitive-motor improvement. The second set of regression 
analyses revealed no significant correlation between movement execution time (E) and 
age for any of the three tasks. This indicates that both age groups performed the motor 
execution tasks equally efficiently. Similarly, there was no significant correlation 
between age and imagery time (1) for any of the tasks. This suggests that the 
developmental effect (an increase in the correlation between E and I with age) is 
specific to the ability to form accurate motor images based on internal models of action, 
rather than the ability to perform or imagine movement per se. These control regression 
analyses show that there was no difference between age groups in terms of carrying out 
a motor execution task, and other general factors such as understanding task 
instructions, making a hand action, and reaction time.
5.3.10.5. Internal models in the brain
It has long been suggested that the mental processes that contribute to the covert 
simulation of an action are also involved in the actual performance of that action (Binet, 
1885; Strieker, 1885). William James, for example, argued in his ideomotor theory of 
action that “every mental representation of a movement awakens to some degree the 
actual movement which is its object” (James, 1890). Motor imagery studies using 
walking, writing, drawing and simple hand action tasks in normal adults (Decety & 
Jeannerod, 1995; Decety & Michel, 1989; Sirigu et al., 1995; 1996)) indicate that the
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same motor representation governs an action whether it is executed or imagined, and 
time constraints operate in the same way in both modalities of action.
It is thought that motor imagery might be analogous to efference copy (Decety et al., 
1989; Jeannerod, 1997). Efference copy is generated by the brain in parallel with every 
motor command, and is believed to be crucial to action planning (Wolpert et al., 1995). 
Internal models make predictions of the consequences of actions on the basis of 
efference copy (Wolpert et al., 1995). Lesion studies (Sirigu et al., 1996; Wolpert et al.,
1998), neuroimaging studies (Stephan et al., 1995) and electrophysiology studies 
(Kalaska & Crammond, 1995) suggest that the PC is involved in storing and updating 
internal models of actions, including monitoring efference copy received from motor 
outputs. Data from motor imagery studies of parietal lesion patients indicate that 
imagined actions do not follow Fitts’ Law, and as such, they are unable to form accurate 
internal representations of actions (Sirigu et al., 1996; Wolpert et al., 1998). Similarly, 
children with developmental coordination disorder (DCD) have been shown to 
demonstrate weaknesses in their action representation system (Maruff et al., 1999). It 
has been proposed that a weak correlation between executed and imagined actions is 
due to an “impaired ability to process efferent copy signals” and that the problem may 
have its origin in the neural circuitry underlying internal models (cf. Maruff et al., 1999, 
pp. 1323).
5.3.10.6. Development o f the brain and internal models during adolescence 
In light of several neurophysiological and lesion studies of motor imagery (Gerardin et 
al., 2000; Lacourse et al., 2005; Sirigu et al., 1995; 1996; Stephan et al., 1995), a 
speculative interpretation of the current results is that the development in motor imagery 
found in this study may be linked to the maturational processes in the PC. During the 
last decade, neuroimaging studies have shown that cortical development is much more 
protracted than previously believed. Structural MRI studies have demonstrated grey and 
white matter development in the PC throughout adolescence, which may reflect 
synaptic pruning and myelination during this period (Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 
2003; Toga et al., 2006). Given that myelin speeds up neural signalling and synaptic 
pruning is essential for the fine-tuning of functional networks of brain tissue, the 
occurrence of these processes in the brain during adolescence should lead to increased 
neural efficiency (Huttenlocher, 1979; Sowell et al., 1999). Within this context, there
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are two possible explanations for the increasing ability to form motor images with age, 
observed in the current study. Firstly, the maturational processes in parietal circuitry 
may give rise to an increased ability to process efference copy signals with age, during 
adolescence. Thus, increased myelination and synaptic pruning in PC could account for 
the improvement in motor imagery. A second explanation could be that during 
adolescent growth, internal models are refined such that motor predictions take account 
of new hand size and dynamics. This may be a consequence of developmental change in 
the neural networks supporting internal models.
In addition to the PC, histological and MRI data have provided evidence for 
considerable development in PFC during adolescence (Gogtay et al., 2004; 
Huttenlocher, 1979; Sowell et al., 2003; Toga et al., 2006). It is possible that the 
increase in correspondence between imagined and executed timings of actions results 
from an improvement in working memory that is linked to the maturation of the PFC. 
Indeed the refinement of internal models reflected by the current data may result from 
the development and plasticity of frontal and parietal circuitry and reciprocal 
connections with the cerebellum, a brain region additionally linked to internal models 
(Blakemore & Sirigu, 2003). Future studies are necessary to determine the differential 
involvement of cortical circuits in motor imagery for adolescents compared with adults.
Studies of the development of grip force modulation suggest that internal models are 
established between the ages of four and six (Blank et al., 1999; 2000; Pare & Dugas,
1999). However, none has investigated the development of internal models during the 
transition from childhood into adulthood. The results above fit with a previous study 
that compared children (aged between seven and 11 years) and adults on a force 
adaptation paradigm. This showed that internal representations of arm dynamics were 
less precise in children and less stable in time than those of adults (Konczak et al., 
2003).
5.3.11. Conclusion
These data suggest that development of action representation continues beyond 
childhood, possibly in response to physical changes in the body during the transition 
into adulthood, and facilitated by cortical development in the brain. Given that body 
shape is subject to considerable development during puberty and adolescence, neural
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representations of limb dynamics and therefore predictions for actions might be less 
accurate in adolescents than in adults. If limb kinematics change, due to changed body 
size, the representation and prediction of actions made by internal models need to be 
updated on the basis of experience with the new body shape. Refinement of internal 
models may be supported by the maturation of PC during adolescence. The notion that 
the action representation system is still developing during adolescence has 
consequences for the understanding of the typical development of control of thought 
and action, and may have implications for understanding motor impairment in 
developmental disorders such as DCD and autism.
The next experiment compares action representation in typically developing adolescents 
and adolescents with autism spectrum disorders.
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C h a p t e r  6
6 . A c t io n  r e p r e s e n t a t io n  in  a d o l e s c e n t s  w it h  a u t is m  s p e c t r u m  d is o r d e r
6.1. The autistic phenotype
Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder, which is characterised by difficulties in 
social communication and social interactions as well as unusual patterns of repetitive 
behaviour (Wing & Gould, 1979). This ‘triad of impairments’ forms the basis of the 
criteria for classification of autism according to DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) and ICD-10 
(WHO, 1992). Although not part of the diagnostic criteria, problems with motor control 
are often characteristic of autism as well (e.g. Berkeley et al., 2001; Provost et al., in 
press). Autism is viewed as a spectrum of disorders with childhood autism, Asperger’s 
syndrome (AS) and Pervasive Developmental Delay -  Not Otherwise Specified (PDD- 
NOS) on the same continuum (Gillberg & Gillberg, 1989). Within this continuum are 
also individuals with below average IQ (<70) ( ‘low-functioning autism’) and average or 
above-average IQ (>70) ( ‘high-functioning autism’). Individuals with AS do not suffer 
from intellectual disability or language delay but do manifest problems in social 
reciprocity, social communication and repetitive behaviour patterns. The prevalence of 
autism spectrum disorders (ASD) in a population cohort of 56,946 children aged nine to 
10 years in South London has recently been estimated at 116.1 per 10,000 (over 1%). 
This study indicated that the prevalence of ASD is 3.3 times higher in boys than in girls 
(Baird et al., 2006).
Behaviourally, the triad of impairments associated with ASD is manifest in varying 
degrees. Social communication problems can be verbal and non-verbal and can be 
characterised by difficulties in pragmatic aspects of communication, such as 
inappropriate facial expressions or use of eye contact, or problems with gestures (cf. 
Baron-Cohen, 1999). Social interaction difficulties are seen in peer interactions, in the 
inability to detect social cues like eye gaze and poor socio-emotional reciprocity, 
including the hallmark feature of a lack of empathy (Frith, 1989; Frith, 2001). 
Repetitive and stereotyped behaviours are linked to a lack of imaginative capabilities. 
However, repetitive behaviours are evident in high-functioning people with autism who 
are not ‘mind-blind’ and seem to serve a calming function. Autistic children are less 
inclined to engage in symbolic play and instead demonstrate a preoccupation with
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routine and structure (Turner, 1999). While the current diagnostic criteria reflect 
consensus on clinical features of autism, there is still no consensus on an explanatory 
framework that integrates aetiology, neural structures, cognitive processes and 
behaviour (Happe et al., 2006; Volkmar et al., 2004). However, autism is currently 
described as a neurodevelopmental disorder with a strong genetic aetiology (Rutter et 
al., 1997). Since the original accounts of autism by Leo Kanner (1943) and Hans 
Asperger (1944), several theories of the origin of autism have been proposed. In the 
following two sections, four (not mutually exclusive) psychological theories proposed 
to explain the main features of autism will be outlined: the mindblindness theory, the 
executive function theory, the weak central coherence theory and the recent mirror 
neuron system (MNS) theory. This last theory, which relates representations of action to 
TOM impairments in ASD, will be the focus of the experiment in this chapter.
6.2. Psychological theories o f autism
6.2.1. The mindblindness theory
The central tenet of the mindblindness theory is that impairment in TOM, or in the 
ability to ‘mind-read’, causes an inability to infer the mental states of others or to 
predict their behaviour, which in turn leads to the hallmark social interaction problems 
seen in autism (Baron-Cohen, 1995). The False Belief test (cf. Dennett, 1987) designed 
by Wimmer and Pemer (1983) (discussed in Chapter 1), has been central to the 
development of the mindblindness theory of autism. As described earlier, this test 
distinguishes between one’s own knowledge of reality and the understanding of another 
person’s belief about reality. The first study involved administering the False Belief 
Test to autistic children, children with Down’s Syndrome and typically-developing 
(TD) children (all matched on verbal and non-verbal ability IQ). The results 
demonstrated that the children with autism were specifically impaired in TOM (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1985). The children with Down’s Syndrome passed the false belief task 
like the typical children, whereas the autistic children did not pass the test. This finding 
has since been corroborated by several other studies showing that autistic children do 
not show the same awareness of social elements of other agents’ mental lives as do TD 
children (see Frith, 2001; Hill & Frith, 2003, for reviews).
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Children with autism are often impaired on several tasks of first-order TOM that 
involve inferring someone else’s beliefs (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; Pemer et al., 1989; 
Swettenham, 1996). Ordinarily, children aged four can pass these tests. In addition, 
unlike TD children aged five to six years, children with autism are often unable to pass 
second-order TOM tasks that involve inferring what one character thinks about another 
character’s belief (Baron-Cohen, 1989). In addition, unlike TD children of the same 
age, they are less likely to spontaneously generate mental state words such as ‘imagine’ 
or ‘wish’ in their speech (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986) and have trouble understanding 
other people’s mental states and intentions in speech, shown for example, in their 
inability to follow sarcasm, irony or metaphors (Happe, 1994). While TD children aged 
two can distinguish between real acts and pretend acts (Leslie, 1987), children with 
autism have problems with pretence. They are less likely to engage in pretend play 
(Baron-Cohen, 1987), which indicates an inability to understand the notion of pretence, 
most likely because appreciating pretence requires an understanding of the intentions of 
the actor and the ability to distinguish between reality and belief. Furthermore, while 
autistic children can comprehend the physical causes of emotions, such as pain causing 
sadness, they are less able to comprehend mentalistic causes of emotions, such as a 
particular belief causing sadness (see Baron-Cohen et al., 1993). Like TD children, 
children with autism are able to understand physical representations, but there appears 
to be something particular to mental state representations that is impaired in autism 
(Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1995). Children with autism also have problems decoding 
social information from faces: while TD children can infer mental states from eye gaze, 
children with autism are impaired at this (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995).
Together, these studies suggest a specific delay in the development of mindreading in 
children with autism (Baron-Cohen, 1991b), which might also be apparent from joint 
attention problems at the early stage of around 20 months of age (Charman et al., 1997). 
As described in Chapter 1, joint attention indicates an awareness of other people’s 
subjective worlds, and has been proposed to be a precursor to mindreading (Baron- 
Cohen, 1991). It is thought that a parallel impairment in the normal trajectory of 
development of brain areas related to TOM and joint attention, such as MPFC, STS and 
temporal poles, might be causally linked to these mindreading problems in autism (cf. 
Frith & Happe, 2005; Hill & Frith, 2003). However, the mindreading theory does not 
explain the tendency of autistic people to show repetitive and perseverative behaviours.
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Furthermore, it has been emphasised that a number of individuals with ASD do pass 
TOM tasks (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) and that other clinical groups (such as those 
with schizophrenia (e.g. Corcoran, 2000)) also show TOM deficits (Tager-Flusberg, 
2001). In addition, limitations in semantic and syntactic knowledge have been shown to 
be associated with TOM performance (Tager-Flusberg, 1996). A mindreading theory as 
a unitary explanation has been called into question on account of the difficulties in 
applying TOM impairments either universally, or specifically, to autism (Tager- 
Flusberg, 2001; Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2003).
6.2.2. The executive function theory
It has been suggested that executive deficits may have a causal role in the social 
communication impairments in autism (Dawson et al., 1998). Executive function refers 
to the mental operations that enable us to disengage from the immediate context and to 
coordinate our behaviour in a manner that is flexible, strategic and goal-directed 
(Shallice, 1988). A frontal lobe based “central executive”, or Supervisory Attentional 
System, is conceptualised to govern these mental operations, which include working 
memory, planning, selective attention, generativity and inhibition of pre-potent 
responses (Baddeley, 1991; Shallice, 1988). Patients with PFC damage perform poorly 
on tasks designed to tap executive function (Shallice, 1988). Similarly, autistic 
individuals perform significantly worse than controls on these tasks (Hughes et al., 
1994; Ozonoff et al., 1991; Russell, 1997). Drawing on these findings, it has been 
suggested that executive function deficits might explain the impairments in the ability to 
engage in social interactions. The relatively poor performance in these tasks is thought 
to reflect an inability to integrate online information and selectively attend to different 
aspects of the environment that might have social importance (Rumsey & Hamberger, 
1988). These findings have also suggested that the brain based origins of the cognitive 
features of autism may be the frontal lobes (Ozonoff et al., 1992). However, people with 
autism can pass certain executive function tasks (cf. Baron-Cohen, 1999). Furthermore, 
executive dysfunction is common to other behavioural disorders such as attention deficit 
with hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Grodzinsky & Diamond, 1992) and schizophrenia 
(Stirling et al., 2006). The executive function theory, therefore, may not be sufficiently 
specific to explain the autistic phenotype.
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6.2.3. The weak central coherence theory
The weak central coherence tWCC) theory poses that certain characteristics of 
individuals with autism arise from a failure in the normal propensity to form coherence 
over several stimuli and to integrate them into a context or “Gestalt” (called “weak 
central coherence” theory; Frith, 1989). This theory describes the processing style that 
leads autistic people to perceive complex stimuli in a piecemeal manner, as disparate 
parts rather than a collective whole. This theory was originally put forward to explain 
the restricted and repetitive behaviours seen in autism, such as highly circumscribed 
interests (e.g. underground maps), extreme sensitivity to slight changes in the 
environment and interests in particular details of toys rather than their whole function 
(Frith & Happe, 1994). This theory has also been put forward to explain why some 
people with autism demonstrate remarkable abilities in certain areas, while still 
demonstrating features of autism such as profound social and language impairments 
(Happe, 1999).
There are several lines of evidence for WCC theory. It has been argued that superior 
performance on the Block Design test, a part of the Wechsler intelligence test 
(Wechsler, 1991), which requires the participant to break down a geometric design into 
its component parts, is due to the tendency of individuals with autism to see the discrete 
elements rather than the whole context (Shah & Frith, 1993). This same phenomenon 
has been shown through other tasks in different domains, including reading and 
perception of shapes (Happe, 1996; Shah & Frith, 1983). Children with autism fail to 
take into account information about meaning when pronouncing words which may be 
alternatively pronounced (e.g. ‘tear in her eye’ versus ‘tear in her dress’ (Happe, 1997). 
In this example, the correct pronunciation of ‘tear’ depends on understanding the word 
in the context of the whole phrase, not just on enunciating the letters of the single word. 
Similarly, on the Embedded Figures Test, which requires participants to identify simple 
shapes hidden in familiar pictures, participants with autism perform significantly better 
than those with mental retardation and typical controls, due to their insensitivity to the 
broader context when processing information (Frith & Happe, 1994). In contrast, in 
these tasks, control groups without autism tend to show a global style of processing, 
using information holistically to derive meaning. This theory also explains why 
individuals with autism can have ‘islets of ability’ with certain types of task. It is 
possible that weak central coherence and mindreading impairment theories together are
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required to explain social deficits in autism, since some individuals with autism can 
pass TOM tests but show weak central coherence (Frith & Happe, 1994).
6.3. A mirror neuron system dysfunction theory fo r  autism?
6.3.1. Mirror neuron system malfunction in autism
It has been argued, however, that none of the theories outlined above is sufficient to 
account for the triad of impairments in autism. For example, while the notion that there 
is an impairment in the capacity to ‘mind-read’ explains many of the socio- 
communicative features in autism, it cannot account for motor problems. Further, it has 
also been proposed that the problem is one of emotional engagement with others and 
that a focus on TOM is too narrow (Hobson, 1993). Recently, some researchers have 
suggested that the neurobiological findings from non-human and human primate studies 
of a “mirror neuron system” (MNS) might provide a cognitive model that is also 
neurophysiologically based (e.g. Williams et al., 2001). As described in detail in 
Chapter 1, mirror neurons are a class of neurons found in monkey ventral premotor 
cortex, that are activated both by the execution of an action as well as the observation of 
another agent performing that action (cf. Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). In the human 
brain the MNS comprises inferior frontal gyrus, inferior PFC and STS.
It has been suggested that a failure of proper development of the MN system plays a 
causal role in the development of autism, since MNs are thought to be a substrate for 
representations of actions that bridge the self to others. Impairment in the understanding 
of other people’s actions is proposed to lead to a deficit in TOM, which in turn would 
be manifest from an early stage in a poor quality of self-other interactions such as 
imitation, joint attention and emotion-sharing (Williams et al., 2001). The implication is 
that problems with certain types of action may be at the root of the developmental 
cascade that ultimately leads to social communication problems in autism (Gallese, 
2006). It is possible that imitation, an action that involves engaging with others, also 
thought to be a precursor to TOM and potentially related to non-social motor and 
executive functions, is central to an explanatory account of autism (Williams et al., 
2001). Imitation, in turn, is thought to rely on a functioning MNS in the brain, which 
links representations of what is seen to what is done (Iacoboni et al., 1999).
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6.3.2. Imitative deficits arise from  mirror neuron system dys function 
The starting point of the MNS dysfunction model of autism (Ramachandran, 2000; 
Williams et al., 2001) is that, in normal development, imitation is intimately connected 
to TOM because it involves “translating from the perspective of another individual to 
oneself’. This is similar to the theory proposed by M eltzoff and Decety (2003), who 
connect mirror phenomena in humans with TOM, using evidence from developmental 
psychology and functional neuroimaging to argue that the “neural mirror system begets 
TOM,” via imitation (Meltzoff & Decety, 2003, pp. 491). They review infant studies 
showing motor imitation of facial gestures in healthy newborn babies (Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1977), to argue that the coding of perception and generation of actions is innate 
in humans. Meltzoff and Decety (2003) suggest that action representations of the 
observed acts unify the self and other. In other words, humans are able to store internal 
models of motor acts to match their observed action and establish a correspondence 
between the self and other. The fact that babies can imitate actions has led to the 
interpretation that the ability to translate behaviour seen in others to behaviour of the 
self is set in place very early on in human development (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993). The 
second line of argument appeals to simulation theory which proposes that we come to 
understand other people’s mental states by internally imitating, or simulating, other 
people’s actions in our own minds (Gallese, & Goldman, 1998) (see Chapter 1). This 
ability may be a precursor to the understanding of other people’s mental states. Thus, as 
Williams and colleagues (2001) suggest, a failure to represent another person’s actions 
in one’s own brain may have consequences for the development of social and emotional 
engagement with others.
That an imitative deficit might explain the social deficits in autism was first proposed 
by Rogers and Pennington (1991). They suggested that a lack of imitative propensity 
during early childhood may be underpinned by a brain based impairment that could 
account for the constellation of symptoms in autism. This proposal is corroborated by 
several consistent findings showing differences in the propensity and style of imitation 
between groups of participants with and without autism (e.g. Hobson & Lee, 1999; 
Rogers et al., 1996) and indeed, indicates a problem in mapping action representations 
of others onto the self in individuals with autism. Impairment in the MNS might also 
account for the non-social features of autism, such as repetitive and stereotyped 
behaviour (Williams et al., 2001). Williams and colleagues (2001) propose that as well
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as intrinsically social phenomena, malfunctioning of the perception-action linkage 
system might also underpin imitation-related phenomena that are aberrant in autism, 
including echolalia, the mimicry of words without the normal links to goals or meaning. 
It is suggested that the inhibitory component of the MNS, required to prevent the actual 
execution of actions during internal simulation, is somehow impaired in autism. This 
leads to inappropriate mimicry, without reference to the meaning of the action and 
therefore without the normal social significance of imitation. Part of the problem, in 
other words, might be that meaningful actions are learned by imitation, which is 
impaired in ASD.
6.3.3. Imitation and the mirror system in the normal brain
Equivalent brain areas are activated in the human brain by execution, observation and 
imitation of actions and it has been argued that this reflects that a function of this 
proposed human MNS may indeed be to imitate other people’s actions (Arbib, 2002; 
Iacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti et al., 2002). Using fMRI, Iacoboni and colleagues 
(1999) have shown that in normal adult participants, the activity in anterior PFC and 
Broca’s area during execution and observation of a finger movement also occurred and 
was augmented during the imitation condition (Iacoboni et al., 1999). This showed that 
the MNS is active in the human brain during imitation. However, the human brain is not 
wired to simply resonate with other people in action. The way the human brain responds 
to the observation of actions is influenced by the goals of the actions. When asked to 
hold in mind an action to later imitate, brain activity increases are seen in prefrontal and 
inferior PFC (Decety et al., 1997; Grezes et al., 1999). Prefrontal activity is thought to 
reflect the top-down effect of intention processing (Meltzoff & Decety, 2003) and 
inferior parietal activity might be involved in maintaining the distinction between agents 
during actions (Ruby & Decety, 2001). As described in Chapter 2, the experiment by 
Ruby and Decety investigated brain activation differences and overlaps during 
imagination of one’s own versus another’s actions, and showed that inferior parietal 
activity is associated with action imagery and that activity is lateralised according to 
who the agent of the action is (Ruby & Decety, 2001). Furthermore, brain activity 
during imitation is influenced by the visual perspective from which the action is 
observed (Jackson et al., 2005). Imitating an action from the first person perspective 
(1PP) is associated faster latencies and fewer errors, compared to the third person 
perspective (3PP), as well as relatively higher activation in the sensorimotor cortex,
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indicating a cognitive advantage for the 1 PP. This is thought to be due to the relative 
ease of mapping ‘Like m e’ actions compared to others’ actions, and the imitation in the 
two perspectives relies on distinct neural mechanisms (Jackson et al., 2005). These 
findings reflect the notion that intentions, perspectives and agency are also coded in the 
brain during overt and covert imitation of other people’s actions, suggesting a link 
between imitation and social cognition.
6.3.4. Evidence fo r  dysfunction o f the mirror system in the autistic brain 
The prediction that follows, therefore, according to the theory that MNS dysfunction 
gives rise to social impairments in autism, is that the neural substrate of imitation will 
not show the same pattern or intensity of activity as healthy controls in people with 
ASD. Indeed, neurophysiological evidence from MEG, EEG, TMS and fMRI has 
emerged in recent years in support of anomalous perception-action coding in individuals 
with ASD. For example, the mapping of action observation and execution was shown to 
be weaker in adults with ASD compared with healthy controls in a study that involved 
applying TMS over the primary motor cortex during the observation of meaningless 
finger actions (Theoret et al., 2005). In control participants, action observation 
selectively enhanced motor output to the muscles involved in the movement. However, 
in the ASD group, this selective excitation was significantly weaker. In addition, the 
task involved modulating the perspective of the action in relation to the observing 
participant, such that it was either towards (allocentric view) or away from (egocentric 
view) the viewer. In the egocentric condition, muscle facilitation was absent during 
observation of the action, which was interpreted to reflect a deficit in self- 
consciousness. Furthermore, an EEG study of high functioning individuals with ASD, 
spanning a large age range including children and adults, provided results that support 
the notion of MNS dysfunction in autism (Oberman et al., 2005). Here, mu wave 
suppression was used as an indicator of MN activity during observation of actions. 
There was a lack of mu wave suppression in the ASD group during action observation, 
while there was suppression in the control group during the same condition. It is 
possible, however, that the interpretations from these data were obscured by the large 
age range (6-47 years) included in the small sample size (N(ASD)=11; N(control)=13).
Recently, data from an fMRI study, based on the paradigm involving observation and 
imitation of finger movements, previously used by Iacoboni and colleagues (1999), has
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shown differential patterns of brain activity during action observation and imitation in 
the right parietal lobe and right TPJ, between adolescents with ASD and TD 
adolescents, aged approximately 15.5 years (Williams et al., 2006). Both groups showed 
augmentation of somatosensory cortex activation during imitation conditions, relative to 
other execution conditions, similar to the finding by Iacoboni and colleagues (1999) in 
normal participants. However, activity in this area was less extensive in the ASD group 
during imitation. In the ASD group, this reduced activity in somatosensory cortex was 
paralleled by diminished activity during non-imitative execution conditions, suggesting 
the possibility of poorer proprioceptive feedback in ASD. Furthermore, the ASD group 
demonstrated greater activity in DLPFC during imitation, suggesting that this group was 
relying on visuomotor learning strategies rather than mirror phenomena. Another 
interesting finding was the activity at the right TPJ, normally associated with TOM (cf. 
Saxe et al., 2004), was found during imitation but not observation in the control group, 
but in the observation and not imitation condition for the ASD group. It was speculated 
that, normally, TPJ activity during imitation influences perception (thus linking action 
understanding to social understanding), but that this is absent during imitation in 
individuals with ASD (Williams et al. 2006).
In line with the notion that MNS dysfunction might be linked with social cognitive 
deficits in autism, an event-related fMRI study demonstrated that children with ASD 
showed no MNS activity while imitating and observing emotional expressions of anger, 
fear, happiness, neutrality and sadness, compared to age and IQ-matched TD children 
who did show reliable MNS activity during this task (Dapretto et al., 2006). 
Specifically, during imitation of emotional expressions, the TD children showed activity 
in areas previously associated with MNS activity in adults including premotor regions, 
amygdala, cerebellum as well as strong activity bilaterally in the pars opercularis in 
IFG. In contrast, children in the ASD group showed significantly less activity in anterior 
regions of the MNS, and most notably, an absence of activity in pars opercularis of IFG. 
TD children also showed greater limbic activity than ASD children. Intensity of activity 
in the pars opercularis was also shown to correlate negatively with symptom severity in 
the ASD group. The authors speculated that these results reflect an impairment in the 
ASD group in the system enabling emotion understanding via action representation 
(Dapretto et al., 2006). However, it is unclear whether these differences in brain activity
184
Chapter 6 Action representation in adolescents with ASD
arise from behavioural differences in performance inside the scanner. In addition, the 
number of participants was low in this study (N=10).
In summary, certain lines of evidence from developmental psychology and neuroscience 
studies have led to the theory that action understanding is impaired in ASD. The 
functional neuroimaging findings described above support the proposal that 
malfunctioning of action coding neurons in the autistic brain lead to impairments in the 
self-other representations necessary to transform visual perceptions into actions. At the 
cognitive level, the ability to represent actions, thought to be crucial for encoding 
actions and subsequently intentions and emotions of others, is as a result thought to be 
impaired in autistic syndromes.
6.4. Experiment 5: Action representation in adolescents with ASD
6.4.1. Introduction
Clinical and experimental data demonstrate that autism is associated with motor 
stereotypies, problems of fine motor control, as well as higher social cognitive deficits 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1991a; Milne et al., 2006; Smith & Bryson, 1994; Turner et al., 
1999). The core characteristics of autism, including difficulties in social interaction and 
repetitive behaviours, are shared by other diagnoses within the broader category of 
Pervasive Developmental Delay (PDD) (APA, 2000), all of which are encompassed by 
the term autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) (National Institute of Mental Health, 2004). 
While motor development is not considered a criterion for diagnosis, there is much 
clinical and experimental evidence to suggest differences in gross and fine motor skills 
as well as overall motor development between TD school-aged children and those with 
ASD (Berkeley et al., 2001; Manjiviona & Prior, 1995; Mari et al., 2003; Mayes 
&Calhoun, 2003; Provost et al., 2006).
The MNS dysfunction theory of autism would predict that atypical attributes of action 
representation might account for both motor and social cognitive problems in ASD 
(Williams et al., 2001). Given this hypothesis, action representations might be expected 
to be different in individuals with ASD compared with normal controls. As described in 
the previous chapter, an action representation (or internal model) is a neural system that 
simulates the dynamic behaviour of the body in relation to the environment (Wolpert et
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al., 1995). An internal model can be thought of as a schema, which is composed of 
information from one’s own cognitive mechanisms as well as from the external world 
(Neisser, 1976). It has been proposed that these internal models make predictions about 
actions, limb kinematics and parameters of the external world and enable successful 
planning and execution of movement (Wolpert, 1997). As well as being important for 
motor control, as detailed in Chapter 1, it is proposed that these predictions are 
necessary for making distinctions between the self and other, and therefore, are 
implicated in social cognition.
As described above, neuroimaging studies point to a difference between autistic and 
control groups in the functioning of the brain regions thought to be linked to the MNS. 
However, behavioural paradigms designed to tap action representations are also 
instructive in this regard. Given that the discovery of the MNS is fairly recent, and the 
hypothesis for their involvement in autism even more so, very few behavioural studies 
have specifically investigated action representation in autism and existing results are 
equivocal. For example, Zalla and colleagues (2006) investigated how the 
understanding of others’ actions relates to the inference of goals and intentions in 
autism using a picture-sequencing task. The task required three groups of participants - 
adolescents with autism, adolescents with mental retardation and TD adolescents -  to 
arrange picture sequences depicting different types of goal-oriented activities in the 
correct order of execution. While all groups were able to recognise the actions, 
participants with autism took a significantly longer time and made more errors than both 
control groups when sequencing the object-related actions. Given that the task was 
hypothesised to require the representation of goals in relation to each action, the authors 
concluded that the findings reflect a pervasive deficit in representing and performing 
purposive actions in ASD, which cannot be ascribed to general intellectual deficits 
(Zalla et al., 2006).
It has been suggested that proposed deficits in action understanding in ASD might have 
a basis in impaired action representation at the level of forward modelling (Gallese, 
2006). A postural anticipation task, in which EMG was used to record latencies of 
kinematic and muscular events showed that the latencies were significantly longer for 
voluntary unloading using the forearm in ASD (aged 5.9 to 10.6 years) compared to TD 
children (aged 4 to 8 years). It was therefore suggested that ASD children are impaired
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in generating the internal action representations necessary for the anticipation of 
postures for a bimanual loading task (Schmitz et al., 2003). On the other hand, a recent 
study showed that children with ASD performed more poorly than verbal age matched- 
children TD children on TOM tasks and on a meaningless posture representation task, 
but that performance was no worse in ASD than TD children on goal-oriented action 
representation tasks, assessing goal-directed imitation, mirror imitation and graph 
planning (Hamilton et al., submitted).
Similarly, another recent study of internal models of action showed no difference 
between ASD and control subjects (Blakemore et al., 2006). A tactile stimulus was 
applied to the palm of the hand using a mechanical device that was controlled either by 
the subject (self-produced condition) or by the experimenter (externally produced 
condition). Like control participants, ASD participants rated the self-produced touch as 
significantly less tickly and intense than the externally generated touch. This attenuation 
of self-produced sensory stimulation suggests that their internal models are intact. 
While the participant numbers are small in this study, the conclusion drawn was that 
there is no difference in forward models of action between AS and control adults. In 
contrast, the AS participants gave higher ratings than the control participants for both 
self-produced and externally generated stimuli. This supports the notion that autism is 
associated with hypersensitivity to sensory stimulation.
It has been hypothesised that PC and cerebellum are two putative brain substrates for 
internal models of actions (cf. Blakemore & Sirigu, 2003). Volumetric calculations 
from MR images and anthropometric measurements of head circumference have 
suggested that macrocephaly, or enlarged brain volume, co-occurs with autism in a 
proportion of approximately 20% of cases (Courchesne et al., 2001; Fombonne et al., 
1999; Lainhart, 2003). Specifically, reduced or normal brain size at birth is followed by 
rapid brain growth which then ceases between age two and four years, before the typical 
age of diagnosis (Redcay & Courchesne, 2005). Redcay and Courchesne (2005) indicate 
that this early wave of brain growth results in a brain size that is equivalent to the size 
of the adolescent brain. In MR images, the brain enlargement is reflected by increased 
cerebral grey and white matter. It is speculated that a lack of synaptic pruning underlies 
the early brain growth (DiCicco-Bloom et al., 2006; Frith, 2003), and brain areas that 
have been particularly implicated with abnormal morphological development include
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the cerebellum and PFC (e.g. Courchesne et al., 1993; Courchesne, 1991). It is possible 
therefore that abnormal synaptic pruning in these brain areas may impact upon internal 
model prediction involved in action control and representation in individuals with ASD.
In the current experiment, internal models were investigated using one of the motor 
imagery tasks used in the study of action representation in normal adolescence, 
described in the previous chapter. This task, called the Fingers task, requires 
participants to perform a simple hand action and to imagine the equivalent action, as 
fast and as accurately as possible. Reaction time is recorded for both, and the 
correspondence between Execution (E) and Imagery (I) times is used an index of how 
well the action is internally represented. This phenomenon is based on previous studies 
of motor imagery that demonstrate a robust effect of equivalence in timing of actions 
whether they are performed overtly or covertly (Decety & Jeannerod, 1995; Sirigu et 
al., 1995; 1996). The motor image is proposed to be a conscious equivalent to an action 
representation, endowed with identical properties (Jeannerod, 1997). As described in the 
previous chapter, this correspondence in timing occurs because the same speed and 
accuracy constraints required to perform an action in reality (Fitts, 1954) are 
represented in the brain in order to imagine that action (Jeannerod, 1997). Therefore, in 
order to point to increasingly small targets, actions would slow down in order to 
maintain accuracy. This relationship between timing and accuracy has been 
mathematically expressed by Fitts’ Law (Fitts, 1954). The same relationship holds true 
when simply imagining an action, which is manifest in the equal timing for motor 
execution and imagery, in various types of task performed by healthy adults, from 
writing to walking (Decety & Jeannerod, 1995; Decety & Michel, 1989). This 
relationship in timing breaks down in parietal lesion patients (Sirigu et al., 1996). This 
is in line with functional imaging evidence that this brain region is associated with 
motor imagery (Lacourse et al., 2005; Stephan et al., 1995).
The experiments in the previous chapter of this thesis showed that TD adolescents are 
able to represent actions, as indexed by a significant positive correlation between E and 
1 in the results from three different imagery tasks. However, their E-I correlations were 
significantly lower than those of adults, suggesting that the ability to form accurate 
motor images is still developing during adolescence. Here, the correlation between E 
and I in the Fingers task was compared in adolescents with ASD and age and IQ-
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matched TD adolescents. To assess the relationship with fine motor skill, performance 
on the Grooved Pegboard task was additionally compared between groups. This is the 
first time that motor imagery ability has been investigated in individuals with ASD, and 
the prediction was that the E-I correlation would be significantly lower than that of the 
TD controls, perhaps as a result of abnormality in neural networks in PFC and 
cerebellum, brain regions associated with internal models.
6.4.2. Method
6.4.2.1. Participants
36 male participants were recruited in total. The first group comprised 22 adolescents 
with ASD (mean age 15.3±0.21 years) and the second group comprised 14 age- and IQ- 
matched TD adolescents (mean age 15.0±0.67 years). Of all the participants included in 
the study, three in the ASD group and two in the TD group were left-handed. The 
dominant hand of the remainder of participants was the right. TD adolescent 
participants were from state comprehensive primary and secondary schools in the 
London area and ASD adolescents were drawn from the Special Needs and Autism 
Project (SNAP), a screened population cohort of children born between July 1, 1990 
and December 31, 1991, situated in a circumscribed area of South Thames, UK (Baird 
et al., 2006). The study was approved by the South East Multicentre Research Ethics 
Committee, and informed parental consent was obtained for all children recruited for 
this study. In the TD group, none had a history of psychiatric, neurological, 
developmental or learning disorder. All children in the ASD group had a consensus 
clinical diagnosis of ASD from three clinical investigators on the basis of in-depth 
assessments including the autism diagnostic interview-revised (ADI-R) and the autism 
diagnostic observation schedule-generic (ADOS-G) (See Baird et al., 2006 for details of 
recruitment and diagnosis procedures for SNAP cohort). The Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence (WASI) was administered to each participant individually to assess 
IQ. Participant demographics are shown in Table 6-1, demonstrating no significant 
differences between groups with respect to IQ and age.
6.4.2.2. Experimental procedure
6.4.2.2.I. Pegboard task
The Grooved Pegboard Test consisted of a square board with 25 grooved holes. 
Participants were required to place grooved pegs into the matching holes. The grooves
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required participants to rotate the pegs in order to insert them into the appropriate holes. 
Participants were instructed to perform the task as quickly as they could. The total time 
taken to complete the task, that is, to fill all the holes with each hand, was recorded for 
each participant. The speed is an indicator of simple visuo-motor control and dexterity. 
Participants were tested once on each hand, starting with the dominant hand.
6.4.2.22. Fingers task
During the piloting stage, the order of blocks was counterbalanced between participants, 
so that some started with the Imagined condition and others with the Executed 
condition. It was found that starting with the Imagined condition was challenging for 
subjects, who reported not knowing what to imagine. Therefore, it was decided that, 
during the actual study, participants would perform the tasks in blocks of Executed 
actions followed by Imagined actions.
The fingers task was identical to that described by Sirigu et al. (1996), and replicated 
from the previous adolescent study of action representation, described in Chapter 5 (see 
Method, Chapter 5 for full details of Executed and Imagined conditions, as well as 
Instructions). Two blocks of Executed actions were followed by two blocks of Imagined 
actions, with each block consisting of a sequence of three consecutive, continuous 
finger actions. The piloting stage with the ASD group indicated that three actions for 
each block would be more appropriate, compared with five actions as in the previous 
typical adolescence study.
6.4.2.3. Statistical analysis
6.4.2.3.1. Pegboard task
For each group, the mean time taken to complete the task was recorded for each hand, 
and overall time, irrespective of the hand used, was calculated. Independent samples t- 
tests were used to compare mean reaction times between groups.
6.4.2.3.2. Fingers task: individual reaction time data fo r  Imagined and Executed 
actions
For each participant, the mean movement duration for all the trials (six for each 
condition) under the Executed and Imagined conditions was calculated. To investigate 
how well these data correlated across participants, each participant’s mean Executed RT
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(E) was plotted against his mean Imagined RT (I), for each task. Individual correlations 
provide information about motor imagery ability, which would be masked by 
comparing group means. A Pearson’s product moment correlation was calculated 
between the mean E RT and mean I RT.
6.4.2.33. Comparison o f E-1 correlations between groups
Fisher's Z analysis was used to test whether the size of the correlations between 
executed and imagined movement duration significantly differed between the ASD and 
TD groups on each task. According to this test, if the Z value was above 1.96, the 
correlations were significantly different at the p<0.05 level, and if the Z value was 2.58 
or over, the correlations were significantly different at the p<0.01 level.
6.4.2.3.4. The effect o f laterality
The effect of laterality for this task was analysed by comparing E-I correlation for the 
left and right hand within each of the ASD and TD groups.
6.4.3. Results
Data from four ASD participants were excluded as they were unable either to complete 
or to follow instructions for the Fingers task. IQ and Pegboard task data were not 
available from four of the TD participants. For the Pegboard task, there were three 
outliers in the ASD group, whose mean RT fell over 3 SD away from the mean.
Variable Mean ±SD (ASD; N=18)
Mean ±SD 
(TD; N=14) f-value p-value
Age 15 .3± 0.21 15 .0± 0.67 1.9 .08
Verbal IQ (VIQ) 84 .95± 11.5 92 .8± 16.2 - 1.5 .14
Performance 
IQ (PIQ) 95 .75± 16.8 103.6± 18.4 - 1.2 .25
Full scale IQ 
(FSIQ) 89 .3± 12.8 97 .4± 17.7 - 1.4 .16
Table 6-1. Participant information. Mean age and IQ scores (including fu ll scale IQ, 
verbal IQ and performance IQ). As shown by the t- and p-values, there were no 
significant differences in age or IQ between groups.
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6.4.3.1. Relationship between IQ and tasks
Linear regressions investigating the relationship between IQ and fine motor control as 
indexed by time taken on the Pegboard task showed that that none of the subscales of 
IQ have any effect on performance in the ASD group (effect of FSIQ: *=1.1; d.f. =3,11; 
p=.29; PIQ: *=-1.1; d /  =3,11; p=.30, VIQ: *=-1.2; d.f. =3,11; p=.24; all N.S.), nor in the 
TD group (FSIQ: *=-2.1; d .f =3,4; p=. 10; PIQ: *=1.6; d .f  =3,4; p=.18, VIQ: *=2.6; d.f. 
=3,4; p=.06; all n.s.).
The same analyses indicated no effect of IQ on performance on the Fingers task in the 
ASD group, as indexed by the RT difference, irrespective of direction, between E and I 
(effect of FSIQ: *=-.62; d .f  =3,14; p=.55; PIQ: *=.64; d .f  =3,14; p=.53, VIQ: *=.73; d .f 
=3, 14; p=.48; all N.S.), nor in the TD group (FSIQ: *=.20; d .f  =3,4; p=.85; PIQ: *=-.27; 
d.f. =3,4; p=.81, VIQ: *=-.26; d.f. =3,4; p=.81; all N.S.). Given that IQ unrelated to any 
of the dependent variables it was decided to include the four TD participants who did 
not have IQ data (although parents and teachers had all indicated that the children did 
not have learning disability).
6.4.3.2. Pegboard task: fine motor control
An independent samples t-test indicated no difference in the time taken to complete the 
Pegboard task between the ASD group (mean RT±S.E.=85.2±3.7secs) and the control 
group (mean RT±S.E.=79.7±3.3secs) (*=.959; p=.35).
6.4.3.3. Fingers task: action representation
The correlation between the timing of actual (E) and imagined (I) actions was positive 
and significant for both age groups (R2 (ASD)=0.60; R2 (TD)=0.80; p<0.01 for both). A 
Fisher’s Z test indicated that there was no significant difference in the E-I correlation 
between groups (Z=l .06; p>.05; n.s.). See Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1. Fingers task E -I correlation. The correlation between the 
timing o f actual (E) and imagined (I) actions was positive and 
significant fo r  both age groups (R2 (ASD)=0.60; R2 (TD)=0.80; p<0.01 
fo r  both). There was no significant difference in the E-I correlation 
between groups (Z=1.06; p>0.05; n.s.)
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6.43.4. Comparison between action times in each group
Independent samples t-tests used to compare the mean E time between groups indicated 
that ASD adolescents were significantly slower (mean RT±S.E. = 4.10±0.24 ms) than 
TD adolescents (3.13±0.14 ms) at executing the finger action (t=3.6, d.f.=25.6; 
p<0.005). Similarly, the mean I time of ASD adolescents (mean RT±S.E. = 4.55±0.33 
ms) was significantly slower than that of the TD adolescents (mean RT±S.E = 
3.53±0.20 ms) (t=2.5, d.f.=29; p<0.05).
6.4.3.5. Laterality effects on action representation
As found from the data in the normative adolescent study in the previous chapters, 
comparisons between E-I correlations for each hand showed no effects of laterality on 
ability to represent actions (Z (ASD)=0.58, p>0.05; n.s.; Z (TD)=.47, p>0.05; n.s.).
6.4.4. Discussion
The results of the Pegboard task indicate that there were no significant differences 
between the ASD and TD group in fine motor control. For the motor imagery task, 
while the timing of Executed (E) actions as well as Imagined (I) actions was 
significantly slower in ASD compared to TD adolescents, there was no significant 
difference in the E-I correlation between groups. In both participant groups, the E-I 
correlation was significant and positive, suggesting the ability to represent accurately 
actions is in place in TD adolescents (confirming previous results from the Chapter 5) 
as well as in adolescents with ASD. This is the first time that a motor imagery task has 
been used to show that the action representations generated and used for this type of 
task are in tact in adolescents with ASD. Thus, the data do not indicate that there is a 
relative impairment among ASD adolescents, in the ability to form motor images. It is 
worth pursuing this study with a higher N to verify this lack of difference.
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Figure 6.2 Action times fo r  Fingers task. Adolescents with ASD  
were significantly slower than TD adolescents at both executing 
and imagining the action.
*=p<0.05; **=p<0.005
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6.4.4.1. Both TD and ASD adolescents are able to generate motor images 
The comparison between the mean E time between groups and the mean I time between 
groups demonstrated that action times in each of the executed and imagery modalities 
were significantly slower among ASD adolescents than TD adolescents. This may have 
been due to differences in carrying out the Fingers task, such as generally slower RT 
among individuals with ASD. However, with respect to the measure of ability to 
represent actions, the high correlations between E and I in both groups corroborate 
results from previous psychophysical experiments, supporting the notion that there are 
parallels between the parameters affecting executed and imagined movements for both 
adults and adolescents (Decety & Jeannerod, 1995; Decety & Michel, 1989; Sirigu et 
al., 1995; 1996). In addition, the significant positive E-I correlation for the TD 
adolescents mirrors the earlier findings from the previous imagery experiments in this 
thesis, which found, using this Fingers task, as well as two other motor imagery tasks, 
that adolescents are able to form motor images, as indexed by their high correlation 
between the timing of E and I actions. The limitation of the current study, however, was 
that the Praxis Imagery Questionnaire (PIQ) used in the previous normative studies was 
not used here, due to the time constraints involved in the battery of tasks performed by 
each ASD adolescent. However, given that there was a tight correspondence between E 
and I for the ASD adolescents as well as the TD group, it is likely that the Imagery 
condition was indeed tapping action representation. In other words, ASD adolescents 
were able to follow the instructions and perform the imagery component of the task 
properly. It is worth noting, however, that the relatively low N (compared, for example, 
to that in the normative adolescence study in Chapter 5) might have statistically 
weakened the E-I correlations in each group. Small sized samples are a general problem 
in ASD research and might account for the conflicting findings about action 
representation.
As described in the previous Discussion, this correspondence in timing between E and I 
reflects the phenomenon that finding from several motor imagery paradigms that 
subjects make the same speed-accuracy trade-offs for both executed and imagined 
actions, for example, by slowing down in order to reach accurately to increasingly small 
targets (Decety & Jeannerod, 1995; Maruff et al., 1999; Sirigu et al., 1995; 1996; 
Stevens, 2005). The notion that we slow down to ensure accuracy for such actions that 
we execute has been expressed mathematically by Fitts’ Law (Fitts, 1954). Motor
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imagery studies with healthy adults have demonstrated that the same relationship holds 
true for actions that we represent, or imagine (Decety & Jeannerod, 1995; Maruff et al., 
1999; Sirigu et al., 1995; 1996; Stevens, 2005). The previous sets of results in this thesis 
showed that this extends to adolescents and the results reported above indicate that it is 
also true for adolescents with ASD. In line with the data from the adolescence study in 
the last chapter, but unlike the study by M aruff et al. (1999), results of the Fingers task 
indicate that performance is not influenced by laterality for either the ASD or TD 
adolescent group.
6.4.4.2. No difference in motor imagery or fine  motor control between ASD and TD 
adolescents
Internal models, or representations, of action are thought to be necessary for motor 
control. As described in the Introduction of Chapter 5, internal forward models are used 
to maintain accurate motor control by gauging the relationship between predicted states 
and desired states and providing the motor instructions required by the muscles to 
accomplish the motor goal, such as the grip force necessary to manipulate a given 
object (Wolpert et al., 1995). This kind of internal model prediction, which occurs even 
in the absence of movement (Voss et al., 2006), requires that the relevant information 
about body kinematics and the relationship to the environment is constantly updated to 
ensure accurate motor control. Even though the E time for the imagery task was slower 
among ASD compared to TD adolescence, there was no difference in the timings for the 
Pegboard task between groups, perhaps because these RTs tap different aspects of 
motor control. It is possible that the same types of action representations tapped by the 
Fingers task in the current study are also necessary for the fine motor control required 
by the Pegboard task. That there were no differences in the performance on the 
Pegboard task or Fingers imagery task between ASD and TD adolescents suggests that 
internal models underlying fine motor control are not impaired in ASD adolescents. The 
implication might be that problems of fine motor control associated with autism are not 
rooted in internal models of action. While further brain imaging studies are required to 
test this hypothesis, perhaps the potential effect of parietal and cerebellar tissue 
abnormalities on the cognitive bases of action, which can occur early in the first few 
years of life in ASD, are not detected by adolescence. Altered developmental 
trajectories of brain development that occur following early childhood may for example
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be corrective. It is not presently known whether, or how, brain development in ASD 
during late childhood and adolescence deviates from the normal trajectory.
6.4.4.3. No global action representation impairment in ASD
The results from the current study are in line with a previous study of internal forward 
models of action in ASD and typical adult controls, which showed no differences in 
self-monitoring during tactile stimulation between groups (Blakemore et al., 2006). 
However, the results are at odds with another study described in the Introduction of this 
chapter, on representation of goal-oriented actions in ASD and typical adults (Zalla et 
al., 2006). It is possible that action representation is normal in ASD, when tapped by 
motor tasks per se, such as the tickling task or the Pegboard task. However, if the task is 
loaded by a social cognitive element, such as an intention or social context, 
representations of actions are affected in ASD. In the picture sequencing task of Zalla 
and colleagues (2006), participants were required to demonstrate action understanding 
that was linked to making inferences of motives, goals and intentions. While 
participants with ASD were no worse than controls at action recognition or object 
identification, their performance was significantly poorer than controls for prediction of 
purposive actions. These pictures depicted a hand-drawn character performing actions 
involving objects, where the understanding of the character’s intention, in relation to the 
object and its function, was crucial to predicting the sequential actions. Results from the 
other conditions in the task also demonstrated an advantage for prediction of physical 
events compared with person-to-person events, suggesting that the impairment in action 
representation was restricted to the goal-directed domain.
Even though the task that Zalla and colleagues used did not require the attribution of 
mental states, there is clearly a higher, social component to the action representations 
that is required to perform well, unlike those that are tapped in the current motor 
imagery study, which require the internal modelling of only physical parameters 
involved in the action and do not involve imaging another person. An earlier study by 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1986) demonstrated that children with autism performed poorly, 
compared to control children, on a TOM task but not on tasks involving arrangement of 
behavioural sequences that represented everyday routine or person-to-person 
interactions. An interesting line of investigation to follow from the current study would 
be to determine at what point of ‘social loading’, action representations become
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impaired in ASD, since MN studies suggest their dysfunction. The results of the current 
study suggest that basic motor representations relevant to simple motor tasks are intact 
in ASD. These motor simulations are not intrinsically social. The study by Zalla and 
colleagues (2006) suggest that as the actions become more purposive and involve 
another agent, action prediction becomes impaired in ASD. Could it be only at the point 
of representing an action involving another agent, from a third-person perspective that 
the system breaks down? This would explain why ASD participants fail at TOM tasks 
and are impaired in joint attention skills but why their forward models of actions seem 
intact. Data collection is currently in progress to compare performance on a simple 
mentalising task and on the current motor imagery task in the same ASD and TD 
adolescent participant groups, to examine the possible links between action 
representation and TOM in ASD.
The hypothesis that action representation becomes impaired in ASD when loaded with 
social stimuli fits with the recently proposed theory that autism is a disorder of 
“intentional attunement” (Gallese, 2006). On the basis of MN studies in the normal 
population and the few that have been conducted with autistic individuals, Gallese 
predicts that a disruption to the ability to represent a “we-centric space”, by simulating 
actions and intentions of others, prevents the development of intentional attunement to 
other agents, which is reflected in the social communication problems in autism 
(Gallese, 2006). This also fits with the notion that autism is explained by problems in 
emotional engagement with other people (Hobson, 2002). Gallese suggests that 
interpersonal engagement problems in ASD may have their origin in action 
representations such as those used for anticipatory motor control (Schmitz et al., 2003).
Schmitz and colleagues made EMG recordings during a bimanual loading task which 
required ASD (N=8; age 5.9 to 10.6 years) and TD children (N=16; age 4 to 8 years) to 
lift a load using the arm. The longer latencies among ASD participants during voluntary 
unloading were taken to reflect an impairment in the generation and use of action 
representations required to model the constraints, related to the body and the object, for 
the action, and this was speculated to be due to cellular abnormalities in the cerebellum. 
One possible problem that may account for their different finding was the age range. 
Their assumption was that internal representation for postural control is developed by 
age 8 (cf. Schmitz et al., 2003, pp. 19). However, the results of the study presented in
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Chapter 5 of this thesis suggest otherwise; that action representation continues to be 
refined during adolescence. Thus, the range of ages used by Schmitz and colleagues 
may have been a confounding factor. On the other hand, as outlined earlier, a recent 
finding that ASD children, relative to TD children, were impaired in posture 
representation as well as TOM tasks, while they were not impaired relative to controls 
in goal directed imitation, mirror imitation and grasp planning (Hamilton et al., 
submitted). The authors suggested that ASD individuals might have a problem in 
representing actions to do with meaningless body postures as well as TOM. The 
dissociation between TOM and imitation in the study by Hamilton and colleagues 
suggests that TOM deficits in ASD cannot be accounted for by a single factor 
explanation of an action representation or MN deficit theory. The implication of the 
current findings, in the context of previous data, is that action understanding is not a 
unitary cognitive component, and that different types of action representation may 
either be impaired or preserved in ASD.It has been emphasised that it is unlikely that 
any one currently available account can explain all of the behavioural features of ASD. 
Indeed, it is suggested that ASD is best considered as a multi-system disorder, for which 
there may not be one unitary explanatory account (cf. Charman, 2006; Happe et al., 
2006). Equivocal findings from recent studies, therefore, suggest that it is unlikely that a 
theory of impairment in action representation, can alone account for the autistic 
phenotype.
6.4.5. Conclusion
The results in this chapter do not suggest a significant difference between adolescents 
with ASD and TD adolescents in the ability to represent actions. In line with the 
findings from Chapter 5, the significant and positive E-I correlation in TD group 
indicates that the TD adolescents were able to accurately represent actions. The 
significant and positive E-I correlation in the ASD group was also indicative of this 
ability and was not statistically different from that of the TD group. This does not 
suggest an impairment in the action representation system in ASD adolescents, although 
the sample is smaller than that of the study from Chapter 5. While Gallese (2006) 
suggests that the problems in motor equivalence between self and other in ASD might 
be manifest in simple motor control strategies, the data presented here indicate 
otherwise: low level action representation in ASD is not adversely affected in the type 
of representation generated and accessed for motor imagery tasks.
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1. D is c u s s io n
7.1. Studying the development o f  social cognition from  a neuroscience perspective
In the last ten years, the study of the neural bases of social functioning has become a 
burgeoning enterprise, tying together questions from the social sciences with methods 
from the cognitive sciences. Most of this work, however, has related to adult or clinical 
populations. The finding that the human brain develops beyond childhood is relatively 
recent, while the centrality of social interaction to typical adolescence has long been 
described. This thesis began by reviewing recent histological and MRI data, which 
indicate that the normal brain continues to develop during adolescence and into early 
adulthood. This structural change involves considerable development in the areas of the 
brain associated with social cognition, including MPFC, STS and PC. Behavioural and 
fMRI studies have demonstrated parallel development in cognitive processes. Most 
have focused on executive function and have shown development of inhibition, 
selective attention, planning and working memory, all thought to correlate with 
maturation of the PFC (see Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006a,b; Toga et al., 2006 for 
reviews).
Social cognitive development during adolescence, however, is relatively understudied. 
Adolescence is considered to be a transitional phase involving changes that extend 
beyond purely physical development. The Western concept of adolescence is 
characterised by an emphasis on social behavioural development (Coleman & Hendry, 
1990). The purpose of this thesis was to explore empirically the role of developing 
neurocognitive processes that may contribute to such social behavioural changes. Until 
now, these questions have been pursued within the realms of social psychology and the 
social sciences using self-report and interview methods. However, our own notion of 
‘se lf is thought to be constructed through social processes (Mead, 1934), that is through 
others, and thus the method of studying social cognition that relies on self-reports can 
obscure processes linking self and other. In addition, in light of the recent data on brain 
development across the lifespan, neural maturation is increasingly recognised as playing 
an important role in cognitive development. In the last decade, the emergence of social 
cognitive neuroscience has provided both conceptual and technical tools to investigate 
social cognitive development. These tools rely on objective recordings such as reaction
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time measures in behavioural tasks and BOLD signals in fMRI paradigms and therefore 
do not depend solely on subjective reports (Lieberman, 2005).
The experiments in this thesis were designed to explore questions that relate the brain 
and cognition, and given the developmental context, to be amenable to children and 
adolescents. These experiments have employed both behavioural and neuroimaging 
methods suited to children, adolescents and adults. The first task, designed to tap 
perspective taking, was a novel laptop-based behavioural paradigm that presented 
verbal vignettes depicting everyday scenarios familiar to all age groups. This was a 
reaction time task that was designed to be amenable to testing children aged eight and 
upwards, in schools, as well as clinical patients in a psychiatric unit. Reaction times 
were taken as an index of cognitive efficiency to carry out the perspective taking task. 
Previous perspective taking tasks have activated MPFC, IPL and STS in adults (Ruby & 
Decety, 2001; 2003; 2004).
The second task, which was similarly a novel computer-based verbal question-and- 
answer task tapping intention understanding, was administered inside the fMRI scanner. 
fMRI provides an unobtrusive and non-invasive measurement of social cognitive 
processing. In this study, fMRI proved to be well-suited to testing young adolescents 
(aged 11 and upwards). This method provided direct evidence of brain function during 
the intention understanding task and therefore allowed tighter interpretations of brain- 
cognition correlations.
The third group of tasks (two replicated, one novel) that investigated action 
representation were behavioural action tasks that relied on a robust cognitive 
phenomenon based on reaction times for actual and imagined actions. These were 
simple enough to perform for all age groups tested including a group of adolescents 
with ASD. The correspondence between executed and imagined reaction times, known 
to be revealing about the action representation system (Jeannerod, 1997), was the 
measure of interest.
In summary, all paradigms used for these experiments with children, adolescents and 
adults, and participants with psychiatric and developmental disorders, were intended to 
tap social cognitive processes and were designed to do so based on well-replicated
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phenomena. A summary of the findings from this thesis is outlined below. These 
culminate in a possible theoretical model of social cognitive development during 
adolescence that could be used as a springboard for future research in this field. 
Limitations of any assumptions involved are also described. Finally, possible 
applications of these empirical findings to educational and social policy are briefly 
discussed.
7.2. Developing a shared representation o f  the world with others
What can be learned from the findings of these experiments about the development of 
perspective taking, intention understanding and action representation during 
adolescence? Furthermore, how do the findings relate to the study of social cognition in 
psychopathology? The combination of behavioural and neuroimaging experiments in 
this thesis have attempted to track the development of the cognitive mechanisms that 
underlie the ability to build and share representations of the world with other people. 
The starting premise is that we must be able to successfully generate our own 
representations of the world. These then have to be aligned to those of other people in 
order to understand their perspective on the world and to identify with their subjectivity. 
One idea that has previously been proposed is that prediction of actions, through 
internal forward models, might be part of this alignment process. Understanding how 
these social and motor cognitive processes develop in the typical population allows us 
to study their possible linkages and also to delineate those mechanisms which go awry 
in individuals with psychopathological development.
7.3. Developing an understanding o f other people’s perspective during adolescence
The phenomenon central to these studies is awareness o f others. The results of Chapter 
2, which investigated development of perspective taking in typically developing (TD) 
adolescents, indicate a development in the efficiency and strategy of perspective taking. 
Here, the difference in RT between taking the 3PP and 1PP (A RT) was used as a 
measure of proficiency of perspective taking. This difference was pronounced in the 
pre-adolescents, lower among adolescents and diminished by adulthood. The 
diminishment of A RT with age suggests that there is a refinement in the cognitive 
mechanism for perspective taking during adolescence. Speculations can also be made
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about the link to brain development. Given that previous fMRI studies have shown that 
simulating how other people act, think or feel activates superior FC and right IPC (Ruby 
& Decety, 2001; 2003; 2004), the current data were interpreted to reflect a refinement 
during adolescence in the frontal and parietal based neural networks that support 
perspective taking. In light of earlier histological data (Huttenlocher, 1979; Yakovlev & 
Lecours, 1967), these refinements may be considered in terms of development in 
interconnectivity between networks, through, for example, synaptic pruning and/or 
axonal myelination.
What remains to be clarified, however, is the nature of this development of perspective 
taking during adolescence, in terms of its content. The findings from Chapter 2 suggest 
that efficiency in this ability improves. In addition, the scatterplot (Figure 2.4) of RT 
versus age indicating directionality (3PP>1PP or 1PP>3PP) suggests a strategic shift 
with age, such that pre-adolescents demonstrate a less systematic style of processing 
with RTs distributed approximately equally on either side of the zero line (where 
3PP=1PP). In other words, half of the pre-adolescents in this experiment took longer to 
take the 3PP than the 1PP and the other half took longer to take the 1PP than the 3PP. 
As age increased, the distribution of A RTs clustered closer together until adulthood, 
during which age the distribution was largely along the zero line. The results of this 
study show that both the magnitude of the difference between 1PP and 3PP (A RT) and 
perhaps also the strategy develop with age during adolescence. A negligible difference 
in RT between 1PP and 3PP is proposed to be the normative healthy adult response, 
signifying fast, intuitive perspective taking that depends on mature, fine-tuned and 
efficient neural networks. Whether a longer RT for one perspective condition, compared 
to another (e.g. 3PP>1PP), signifies relative difficulty in stepping into another person’s 
‘mental shoes’ cannot be answered here. If first-person perspective taking takes longer 
than third-person perspective taking (1PP>3PP), this might suggest an impairment in 
self-consciousness. Alternatively, taking longer for 3PP versus 1PP may suggest that the 
participant is engaging in third-person perspective taking and able to see the world from 
someone else’s view (but that this process is more effortful and therefore takes longer), 
while a low RT for 1PP might suggest inability to access one’s own point of view (see 
Limitations and Future Studies).
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7.4. Understanding one’s own and other people’s perspectives in delusional 
schizophrenia
The results of the perspective taking experiment in healthy adults and adult patients 
with affective disorders and schizophrenia indicated that affective patients have a 
significantly higher A RT than normal controls, particularly in the Closed condition 
(Chapter 2). This was contrary to the prediction that schizophrenic patients (those with 
the highest levels of persecutory delusions) would show the highest A RT. On further 
examination of the data, there was a suggestion that the pattern of directionality of RT- 
C (3PP>1PP / 1PP>3PP) differed between groups. In the normal controls, there was no 
difference between 3PP and 1PP (3PP=1PP). In the affective group, most patients 
showed a difference in the direction of 1 PP>3PP and in the schizophrenic group, almost 
all showed a difference in the direction of 1PP>3PP. However, the relatively low N in 
both groups must be considered here. This pattern was not shown to be significantly 
different between groups, most likely because of the small number of patients in the 
schizophrenic group (N=6). If longer RTs signify relative difficulty, then one 
interpretation is that affective patients have difficulty in taking someone else’s 
perspective while schizophrenic patients have a problem in self-consciousness. The 
opposite would be true if longer RTs reflect engagement in the task and shorter RTs a 
failure to engage in one particular perspective condition.
7.5. Imaginary audiences: present in the population on a continuum?
Does the experience of having an exaggerated awareness of others have a particular 
profile of A RT for the perspective taking task? The data presented in Chapters 2 and 3 
provide a starting point for further research into the content of the processing styles in 
psychiatric patients and TD adolescents. The TD pre-adolescents and adolescents and 
the affective patients demonstrated A RTs in a similar millisecond range. This might 
suggest something similar in the efficiency of the cognitive systems for perspective 
taking for these groups (see Figure 7.1). In terms of directionality, the style of pre­
adolescents and adolescents is comparable to that of patients with affective disorder and 
schizophrenia, who showed A RTs in both the 3PP>1PP and 1PP>3PP directions. An 
interesting question is whether there could be something qualitatively similar about the 
underdevelopment of social cognitive mechanisms in adolescents, and the abnormality
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Psychiatric patients with varying 
levels of positive symptoms
3PP>1PP
Impaired other- 
consciousness ?
Impaired self- 
consciousness?
Pre-adolescents Adolescents Healthy adults
1PP>3PP
F igure 7.1. Imaginary audiences. The lack o f  system atic ity  in processing  em otional 
perspectives in TD adolescen ts (C h apter 2) m ay h ear a sim ilarity  to that o f  the 
psych ia tric  pa tien ts (C hapter 3). This leads to the question o f  whether there are any 
qualita tive sim ilarities in cogn itive  processin g  fo r  a ltered  aw areness o f  the se lf  or  
others am ong both healthy and clin ica l populations.
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of these mechanisms in depressive or delusional states, that is linked to having less 
alignment between one’s own representations of the world and those of others. This 
may be in the form of exaggerated awareness of other people or impaired self- 
consciousness. The data presented in this thesis cannot answer this question but may 
suggest an avenue to pursue.
The notion of the ‘imaginary audience’ was discussed in the Introduction. This is a 
construct introduced by post-Piagetian psychologist, David Elkind, to describe the 
exaggerated awareness of other people’s thoughts during typical adolescence (Elkind, 
1967). This preoccupation with others tends to be directed towards the self. People with 
delusions of persecution also have an exaggerated awareness of other people (Bell et al., 
2006). These often involve the ascription of malevolent intentions to other people, 
directed to the self (Frith, 1992). Delusions of persecution exist in the normal 
population, and are also characteristic, in an extreme form, of some clinical patients 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Bell et al., 2006).
Some researchers have suggested that delusions are not categorical phenomena that are 
linked to psychopathology and absent from the normal population, but rather that they 
exist on a continuum on which they are absent on one end but extreme on the other. 
This idea is drawn from questionnaire data that show that 10% of the normal 
undiagnosed population score higher than the mean of psychotic inpatients on 
delusional ideation measures (Peters et al., 1999; 2004). These data indicate that the 
form of delusions is not qualitatively distinct from normal beliefs, but that they may 
represent an extreme version of the anomalous mental phenomena that are relatively 
common in the typical population.
In a similar vein, some researchers have suggested that the presence of auditory 
hallucinations may not necessarily signify pathology. Given that the form of these 
hallucinations is not starkly different in undiagnosed people in the general population 
who hear alien voices from those that are diagnosed as schizophrenic (Leudar et al., 
1997), it has been suggested that auditory hallucinations, too, exist on a continuum of 
thought patterns (cf. Jones & Femyhough, in press). The finding that subvocalizations 
could be picked up by a throat microphone from hallucinating patients (Gould, 1949), 
and that hallucinations could be stopped if hallucinating patients opened their mouths
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wide enough to stop the vocalizations (Bick & Kinsbourne, 1987) led to the proposal 
that inner speech is causally linked to auditory hallucinations. On the basis that inner 
speech is the ‘substance’ of auditory hallucinations, Jones and Fernyhough (in press) 
have proposed an explanatory model, which is a variant of Frith and colleagues’ model 
of self-monitoring (Blakemore et al., 2003b; Frith et al., 2000). The authors hypothesise 
that a failure to predict the consequence of an action, due to the absence of efference 
copy, leads to a lack of awareness of self-generated inner speech. The subsequent 
mismatch between the predicted and actual state leads to the experience of external 
authorship of inner speech (Jones & Fernyhough, in press). The authors claim that, 
according to their framework, “inner speech constitutes a form of verbal self-regulation 
that is derived from semiotically mediated exchanges with interlocutors in the social 
world’’. Thought is therefore essentially social; inner speech retains the dialogic 
qualities of conversation and thus “thinking is naturally permeated by other voices’’ 
(Jones & Fernyhough, in press , pp. 6). This theory indicates that verbal speech and 
inner speech are related, which in turn suggests that inner speech involves similar 
corrections and adjustments to spoken words.
In keeping with the notion that inner thought is derived from social dialogues, positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia such as delusions of persecution or auditory hallucinations 
might be conceptualised, phenomenologically, as an extreme form of the adolescent 
imaginary audience. Indeed, the mental construct of the imaginary audience is not 
restricted to adolescents, but has been shown to exist for adults (Vartanian, 2000). 
However, the degree to which adults and adolescents act on, respond to, or 
acknowledge the voices or actions of their imaginary audiences clearly differs. Whether 
or not there is a process of cognitive maturation that enables the inhibition of this 
manner of thinking, or that social expectations and norms contribute to this 
development, remains to be investigated. However, the data presented provide a 
springboard to investigate, in a developmental context, the notion that delusional 
thinking, or ‘imaginary audiences’, exist on a continuum. Different developmental 
trajectories between TD and clinical groups must be taken into account, but it could be 
worth exploring the possibility that the imaginary audience may be qualitatively similar 
in adolescents, adults in the typical population who experience magical thinking, 
persecutory thoughts or who hear alien voices and people with a diagnosis of affective 
disorders or schizophrenia and who have positive symptoms (see Figure 7.1). Perhaps
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these altered states of self/other processing at the higher social level are linked to the 
ability to read intentions.
7.6. Understanding intentions: a shift in social cognitive strategies with age
Figure 7.2. Strategic shifts in social cognitive processing during adolescence: It is
possib le that the shifting neural strategy from  relatively higher STS activity’ to higher 
M PFC activity fo r  intention understanding (Chapter 4) with increasing age reflects a 
change in the type o f  representation generated to achieve the same social goal. To make 
sense o f  and predict one's own or others ’ behaviour, adolescents may represent past 
actions while adults may be more likely to represent future-oriented mental states.
The results of the fMRI study described in Chapter 4 demonstrate that there is a change 
in the pattern of brain activity during adolescence for understanding the consequences 
of one’s own intentions. Specifically, the data indicate a shift with age in recruitment 
within the mentalising network in the brain, from relatively higher posterior (STS) 
activation to relatively higher frontal (MPFC) activation from early adolescence to 
adulthood. Thus, it seems that during adolescence, the neural strategy for thinking about 
intentional causality changes with age. The posterior-anterior shift might in turn reflect 
a changing cognitive strategy. The nature of a cognitive strategy shift is suggested by 
the change in relative roles of brain areas from predominantly STS (associated with 
actions) in young adolescence to predominantly MPFC (associated with TOM) in 
adulthood. In order to predict the consequences of an intention, it is proposed that 
adolescents generate an action based representation that relies on existing motor schema
STRATEGIC s h i f t -
Adults
Future-oriente< 
mental states 
"Hot"
Adolescents 
Past-based actions 
"Cold"
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from past actions (“What would I do?”, based on a prediction of an action), whereas 
adults generate anticipated mental state representations (“What would I do, given how I 
would feel?” based on one’s own imagined mental states). Adults might also base their 
predictions of intentional actions on representations of other people's  mental states 
(“What would I do, given how they would feel?” based on the imagined mental states of 
others). Thus, increasing MPFC activity with age might suggest the increased 
incorporation of other people’s mental states into self-related computations (Figure 7.2).
Based on the notion that action representation is an early precursor to full blown 
mentalising, these data indicate a strategic maturation: during adolescence, there is a 
shift towards a more sophisticated form of intention understanding. Aichhorn and 
colleagues’ suggest that posterior STS/TPJ region is involved in realising that minds 
represent the world differently and storing “cold” facts about the mind while on the 
other hand MPFC is thought to represent “hot” information such as predicting the 
emotional consequences of behaviour (Aichhorn et al., 2006). In this context, the 
current data reflect a shift in processing style from “cold” to “hot”, during adolescence 
(see Figure 7.2). Again, it might be speculated that this is facilitated by the development 
of these brain areas and the reorganisation of their interconnections. It is possible that 
the development of intention understanding has a basis in the way the brain generates 
representations of action.
7.7. What does the development o f  action representation tell us about social cognitive 
development during adolescence?
The experiments described in Chapter 5 using three different motor imagery tasks 
demonstrated that the ability to imagine accurately an action develops during 
adolescence. This type of imagery is analogous to unconscious action representation, 
which is proposed to be necessary for controlling our own actions (Jeannerod, 1997). 
Action representations are also necessary to predict the actions of others and it is 
thought that we use this to detect errors in order to refine our representations of mental 
states of other people with whom we interact. Since the discovery of mirror neurons 
(MNs) in the last decade, motor theories for self-other interaction have flourished. The 
central tenet is that we are implicitly bridged to other people through action. More 
specifically, it is proposed that we are able to read other people’s intentions and desires
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from their actions because we can map their actions to our own action schema, or 
representations, and thus make mental state inferences. This idea arose from several 
variations of the experiments by Rizzolatti and colleagues, which demonstrated that the 
visual perception of another’s goal-directed action elicits a representation of that action 
in the observer’s own brain in both non-human and human primates (cf. Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004).
While the first perspective taking study showed that the ability to imagine how oneself 
or someone else feels develops in adolescence, the series of action representation 
studies showed that the ability to imagine making an action is also refined during 
adolescence. As mentioned earlier, internal models of actions are thought to be 
necessary in the understanding of another’s intentions (Blakemore & Decety, 2001). A 
motor image is thought to be a conscious equivalent of efference copy, an integral 
aspect of the forward model. Hfference copy is an exact copy of the motor command. A 
representation of action, accessed by imagining an action, is therefore analogous to an 
action prediction. This action prediction is necessary to monitor errors and to make 
corrections in order to accurately control our actions. The forward model can thus be 
applied to imagined actions as well as executed actions, since imagined actions are 
endowed with the same properties as real action plans and are governed by the same 
parameters (Decety & Jeannerod, 1995).
Could the refinement in action representation and perspective taking during adolescence 
reflect an association between these two cognitive capacities? It might be speculated 
that there is in fact a causal link such that the development in the ability to represent 
actions reflects its necessity for the ability to represent mental states. There are at least 
two conceptual assumptions made here: firstly, that representing one’s own actions is 
necessarily linked to representing other people’s actions, and secondly, that representing 
another’s actions is linked to representing another’s mental state. The data described in 
the Introduction suggest these linkages. Whether or not these two cognitive capacities 
directly overlap cannot be ascertained from the experiments described in this thesis, 
since the populations of participants were separate for the two types (perspective taking 
and motor imagery) of task. The direction of causality, that is, whether action 
representation is necessary for higher social cognitive processes or vice versa, cannot be 
determined either. One previously suggested possibility is that action representation is
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an ontogenic precursor to mental state representation (Gallese, 2006). On the other 
hand, perhaps understanding other people’s minds guides our subsequent actions and 
behaviour, such that we act in a way that is aligned with what we predict to be other 
people’s expectations. Rither way, that these two abilities continue to develop, if subtly, 
during adolescence is suggestive of some development during this period of the 
awareness and incorporation of other people’s actions and mental states into one’s own 
cognitive schema.
7.8. Testing the hypothesis that action understanding is impaired in autism
A lack o f  social awareness of others is central to the behavioural phenotype of autism 
spectrum disorders (ASD). In the final experimental chapter (Chapter 6), the results 
showed no difference in the ability to represent actions between adolescents with ASD 
and TD adolescents. It might have been predicted, based on the assumption that action 
representation is necessary for mental state representation, that the ability to imagine 
actions would be impaired in ASD. In addition, the role of PCC for action 
representation, as demonstrated by adult lesion patients, coupled with atypical parietal 
morphology in the ASD brain might lead to the hypothesis that motor imagery is 
impaired in ASD. The data presented in Chapter 6, however did not demonstrate this. 
The correlation between timing of executed and imagined actions, the index of 
proficiency at representing actions, was lower among ASD adolescents than TD 
adolescents, but this was not significant. This difference may have become significantly 
pronounced with a greater N, and data is still being collected to ascertain this. However, 
the conclusion drawn from the current findings is that the ability to generate action 
representations is comparable in ASD and TD adolescents.
It has previously been suggested that ASD can be explained in terms of a failure in 
intentional attunement, that is, the lack of embodied engagement with other people 
(Gallese, 2006). According to Gallese, this entails simulating the actions, intentions and 
mental states of other people. Gallese suggests that a deficit in mentalising in ASD is 
due to an inability to simulate other people’s intentions and mental states, which in turn 
has a root in an impairment in the ability to represent actions. In line with a previous 
finding from a self-tickling paradigm demonstrating that forward models are not 
atypical in autism (Blakemore et al., 2006), the current data show no impairment in the
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action representations tapped by the motor imagery paradigm. These results suggest that 
action representations generated for motor tasks per se, are not affected in autism. In 
other words, individuals with ASD are able to represent the physical parameters 
required to form accurate action representations. It is possible that the impairment in 
action representation in ASD suggested by Gallese and others is only noticeable when 
the action task is imbued with a social context, such as a character or an overt social 
goal (Zalla et al., 2006). However, Gallese’s theory about impairments in action 
simulation in ASD makes reference to one study (Schmitz et al., 2003) that suggests 
that even anticipatory models of action, that involve posture correction, and thus have 
no obvious social context, are adversely affected in ASD. Similarly, it has been 
proposed that there is an imitative deficit in ASD, reflecting impairment in action 
representation (Dapretto et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2001). This is at odds with the 
finding in Chapter 6. However, in line with the current results, it has recently been 
found in that, while children with ASD performed more poorly than TD children on 
TOM tasks and on a meaningless posture representation task, performance on goal- 
oriented action representation tasks was no worse in the ASD group (Hamilton et al., 
submitted). Taken together, it may be argued that there is no global deficit in action 
representation in ASD, but rather that action understanding is best understood in terms 
of multiple action systems, some of which are preserved in ASD. Further experiments 
that replicate action representation tasks, that have larger numbers of participants and 
have equivalent inclusion and grouping criteria are necessary to investigate the level at 
which action understanding might be problematic in ASD.
Furthermore, the relationship between action representation and cognitive features of 
ASD, such as problems with mentalising and repetitive behaviours, require systematic 
testing. It is unlikely that one account, such as a theory of impairment of the MNS or of 
action understanding alone, can account for the triad of impairments seen in ASD 
(Charman, 2006; Happe et al., 2006). Rather, ASD is better viewed as a multi-system 
disorder, in which action representation might have a connection to one or more of the 
behavioural features of ASD.
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7.9. Dialectics o f  development: a shift in social cognitive strategies during 
adolescence
The results of the empirical studies presented here are best interpreted in a framework 
that views adolescent cognitive development as a process of both strategic shifts and an 
improvement in ability. Put differently, all of the experimental studies presented here 
showed that both adults and adolescents were able to perform the tasks. Thus, it is not 
as if adolescents are impaired in social cognition. Indeed, it is well established that four 
year-old children have a TOM (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). What is apparent, however, is 
a subtle refinement in the way in which the tasks are performed. The notion of this kind 
of dialectical development in relation to adolescent cognitive development is apparent 
in the writings of Piaget on stages of cognitive growth. The suggestion is that there is a 
transformation, or a development in the form . A distinction is therefore made between 
the level (degree of ability) of processing and the form (strategy) of processing (see 
Figure 7.2).
As described in the Introduction, the development of egocentrism from childhood 
through adolescence has previously been described in dialectical terms (Bikind, 1967), 
that is, the transformation of one form into another. Specifically, this development is in 
terms of a lack of awareness of others turning into an over-awareness of others, at 
adolescence. It is possible that that the bidirectional A RT pattern in the adolescence 
perspective taking results reflects this transformation -  a period of change in the way 
social information about the self and others is processed, as well as an increase in 
efficiency. The results of the fMRI study on intention understanding further illustrate 
this view of adolescent cognitive development, but at the level of the brain. 
Additionally, action representation shows a refinement in the degree of ability, with age 
during adolescence. Taken together, the studies suggest that the refinement in 
representations of mental states, intentions and actions reported here is due to changing 
cognitive strategies and efficiency, paralleled by developments in neural strategies and 
in turn possibly underpinned by brain maturation in the relevant areas during 
adolescence.
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7.10. M odelling social cognitive development during adolescence
The above sections have described how emotional perspective taking, intention 
understanding and action representation develop during adolescence, in terms of 
possible cognitive and neural strategies. This may be interpreted in terms of the Social 
Information Processing Network (SIPN) model (Nelson et al., 2005; see Introduction, 
Chapter 1). Like executive function abilities, social cognitive abilities are associated 
with components of the three nodes of the SIPN, including PFC, amygdala and STS. 
These social cognitive processes show development, while the neural substrates 
themselves show plasticity in terms of actual structure or changes in activity with age in 
the social cognitive tasks described in Chapter 1.
However, the SIPN is perhaps also limiting as it neglects the role of the PC. PC 
undergoes a developmental trajectory similar to that of PFC and is associated 
(particularly IPL) with processes related to social cognition, such as perspective taking 
in the motor, conceptual and emotional domains (Ruby & Decety, 2001; 2003; 2004), 
representation of one’s own actions (Sirigu et al., 1995; 1996) and imitation of other 
people’s actions (Decety et al., 2002; Jackson et al., 2006). Parietal development has 
already been linked to the improvement in abstract reasoning skills during adolescence 
(Luna et al., 2004b; Qin et al., 2004). Further investigations are required to determine 
how parietal development influences social cognitive development, and which regions 
are particularly involved.
New studies might continue to consider what mechanisms are directing social cognitive 
development. The SIPN proposes a “multi-step” route, in which neurally-based nodes 
process social stimuli in a sequential manner. Somewhere in this route, however, 
between detecting that a stimulus is animate and imbuing it with emotional significance, 
the brain must assign it to the correct agent. In other words, in the framework of the 
SIPN, an additional “agency node” linked to IPL might be involved in distinguishing 
whether the action is related to the self or to another before the limbic node would 
process approach or avoidance decisions and before the cognitive-regulatory node 
would perform higher level social processing. Indeed, as mentioned above, IPL seems 
to be involved in distinguishing between self and other, in terms of imagining how 
someone would think or feel (Ruby & Decety, 2003; 2004), making an action (Farrer &
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Frith, 2002) or imagining making an action (Ruby & Decety, 2001). The current 
findings suggest that action understanding may be one mechanism that facilitates social 
understanding during adolescence.
A further speculation based on the results of the studies discussed is that puberty and 
adolescence represents a period of synaptic reorganisation and, as a consequence, the 
brain might be more sensitive to experiential input at this period of time in the realm of 
both executive function and social cognition. This sensitive period might be akin to 
sensitive periods of brain development evident in the early sensory system. Much like 
sound categorisation during language acquisition, experience with certain social 
cognitive skills might be much more difficult to incorporate into brain networks once 
they are established after adolescence. This notion is purely speculative and further 
research, preferably with input by multiple disciplines including educational 
researchers, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists, may shed light on this. The 
consequence might be that adolescence provides an extended period of learning, with a 
possible emphasis on the potential for social learning and development.
7.11. Implications fo r  teenagers
Research into the cognitive implications of continued brain maturation beyond 
childhood may therefore be relevant to the social development and educational 
attainment of adolescents (although see Limitations and Future Directions). Further 
studies are necessary to reach a consensus about how axonal myelination and synaptic 
proliferation and pruning impact on social, emotional, linguistic, mathematical and 
creative development. In other words, which skills undergo perturbation, which undergo 
sensitive periods for enhancement and how does the quality of the environment interact 
with brain changes in the development of cognition? Longitudinal studies of the effect 
of early deprivation on the cognitive development of Romanian adoptees in the UK 
have begun to investigate this question (O’Connor & Rutter, 2000). Whether greater 
emphasis on social and emotional cognitive development would be beneficial during 
adolescence is unknown but research will provide insights into potential intervention 
schemes in secondary schools, for example, for remediation programs or anti-social 
behaviour.
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Research in psychology and cognitive neuroscience can also contribute to the debate 
about juvenile crime, for instance on the current use of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders 
(ASBOs) in the UK. ASBOs are civil orders which can be imposed against anyone aged 
10 or over who is deemed to have acted in a manner which 'causes harassment alarm or 
distress' to anyone, and which if breached become criminal offences. A dialogue 
between psychologists and parliamentarians would be useful to shape future legislative 
procedures concerning adolescent social behaviour. Current theoretical and 
philosophical underpinnings of criminal law are grounded in the principle of autonomy: 
individuals are regarded as rational autonomous human beings who can 'choose' their 
actions and are therefore held responsible by criminal law. This framework of the law is 
borrowed from philosophy rather than psychology. Drawing on recent experimental 
evidence from cellular, behavioural and brain imaging studies, neuroscientists and 
psychologists can evaluate the efficacy of ASBOs. Firstly, they can investigate the role 
of brain development in causing problem behaviour among adolescents. Secondly, 
given that the brain is still developing, psychologists can explore the long-term 
psychological effects o f receiving an ASBO on the adolescent. Finally, neuroscience 
may offer insights into alternatives to current punitive methods. It may, for example, be 
worth allocating more resources to educational and rehabilitation programmes designed 
to take into account the natural developmental changes in adolescent psychology.
7.12. Limitations and fu ture directions
Here, it is suggested that modifications to the tasks are made to enhance our 
understanding of the content of the development of form and efficiency of social 
cognitive processes. Both theoretical and empirical directions are suggested to further 
the investigations in this thesis and provide new perspectives on social cognitive 
development in adolescence and social cognition in autism and schizophrenia.
7.12.1. Paradigms fo r  adolescent social cognition
Is it possible to know whether the task was in fact tapping participants’ cognitive 
capacity for perspective taking? Can we know whether participants are likely to have 
used, for example, a simulation of their own actions to surmise the mental states of 
other agents in the 3PP? Rather, it is possible that when asked how a man would feel on 
finding a £5 note on the street, the mental state of hypothetical characters such as these
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can be judged in an abstract, strategic manner, that does not involve reference to the self 
or application of self-knowledge to others, but instead the use of general semantic 
knowledge of ‘what people feel when they find money unexpectedly’, for example. An 
interesting modification to the task would be to use characters that have real meaning to 
all participants, following the Ruby & Decety (2003; 2004) fMRI studies of conceptual 
and emotional perspective taking. In the first of these tasks, 3PP and 1PP were 
contrasted by asking medical students what another medical student (3PP) versus a 
layperson (1PP) would think about medical questions. In the second task, how one’s 
mother (3PP) would feel in certain situations was contrasted with how the participant 
(1PP) would feel. By bearing a certain familiar character in mind, these stimuli are 
perhaps more likely to tap this cognitive capacity and generate a starker contrast 
between the two perspective stances.
A more definitive idea of the content of the strategies that lead to these cognitive styles 
might be found from changes to the paradigm design. For example, modulating the 
difficulty of the questions beyond Open and Closed choice types, but in terms of 
familiarity of characters in the scenarios might enable us to elucidate more about how 
participants surmise 1PP and 3PP. The protagonists of the scenarios might in future be 
systematically varied by age, gender, familiar person, famous celebrity, and so on, to 
vary the ‘psychological distance’ between the participant and the character in the 3PP 
condition. If A RT became increasingly high with a direction of 3PP>1PP, as the 
protagonist became increasingly unfamiliar, this might suggest that a high 3PP RT 
reflects difficulty in identifying with the other character.
Once the meaning of longer (more difficult to process?) and shorter (easier to process?) 
RTs is ascertained, it would be interesting to investigate the role of selective inhibition 
in perspective taking. It has been proposed that we have a natural egocentric bias (e.g. 
Vorauer & Ross, 1999) such that we have a natural propensity to impose our own belief 
on our expectation of others’ beliefs. One possibility is that in order to successfully 
surmise other people’s beliefs and mental states, we are required to inhibit our own 
response. Inhibitory processes are thought to rely on PFC function and have been 
shown, through fMRI studies, to develop in parallel with PFC development during 
adolescence (e.g. Casey et al., 1997). A future investigation might interleave the current 
perspective taking task with a simple inhibition task to test the possible association
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between executive function and social cognition, in particular. It is possible that 
development of inhibition of the 1PP might enable development of the ability to take 
the 3PP during the period of adolescence.
Individual differences in IQ have recently been shown to have a link to trajectories of 
brain development (Shaw et al., 2006). To supplement the fMRI data on the 
development of understanding intentional causality, it would be useful to determine 
how individual differences between subjects play a role in the activity in STS/MPFC. 
For example, questionnaires could be designed to provide a quantitative measure of 
self-consciousness, so that scores could be correlated with brain activity in different 
areas. It might be predicted that higher self-consciousness scores demonstrate greater 
activity in MPFC. The interpretation would be that greater MPFC activity would 
demonstrate higher incorporation of the mental states of others in the decision of what 
action follows one’s own intention. It would be worth taking both self-report and 
parent-report questionnaire data to acquire a more accurate picture of self- 
consciousness.
A fuller account of adolescent social cognitive development requires a closer 
understanding of how higher cognitive processes interact with sex hormones and their 
influence the organisation of the brain’s connectivity. It would be useful to investigate 
whether pubertal stage is linked to performance on the tasks described in this thesis. 
Further investigation of the influence of puberty on brain development and cognition 
would, however, benefit from objective and appropriate measures of pubertal 
development. Currently, if studies measure puberty at all, they tend to rely on self- 
ratings, parent reports or the judgements of teachers in schools. Investigators 
consistently report the difficulties met in ascertaining the level of pubertal development 
in adolescent, even using these methods. Not only do parents and teachers often 
consider them to be inappropriate to administer in schools, where much cognitive 
testing for such studies takes place, but they are also crude indices of pubertal status. It 
may be worth working with endocrinologists to investigate alternative reliable methods, 
such as using saliva swabs to test hormone levels. One study (McGivem et al., 2002) 
demonstrated using a match-to-sample task that cognitive efficiency is particularly slow 
around the age of puberty. The authors attributed this to exuberance of synapses in the 
required brain areas at puberty, although no measures of puberty were actually taken. It
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would be worth validating this finding with further studies that are qualified with 
puberty measures.
7.12.2. Paradigms fo r  clinical populations
A neurocontructivist approach to studying developmental disorders would emphasise 
caution on brain-based predictions about performance by typically and atypically 
developing adolescents that rest on the static neuropsychological model provided by 
adult lesion patients. This theoretical approach may be relevant to the interpretations 
made at the level of the brain for both the typical developmental studies and clinical 
studies presented here. fMRI studies, especially longitudinal designs for the 
developmental studies, would be more appropriate for making interpretations about 
development of brain mechanisms.
The caveats of neuropsychological lesion models and cross-sectional approaches can be 
illustrated for example in the case of the action representation study. Even if PC 
function is a constraint in development of action representation, development itself is 
likely to play a significant role in shaping the outcome by adolescence. In other words, 
development is a dynamic process, in which the progressive changes in processing as a 
function of time influence the final formation of cognitive functions (Bishop, 1997; 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). This makes it difficult to use adult studies to speculate on 
which brain areas might be driving a particular brain function at a given point in 
development. It has been suggested that cognitive modules are not innately specified, 
but rather, that developmental processes begin with domain-relevant modules, which 
are initially usable, but less efficient, for more than one function and become refined 
over time until they are particularly efficient for a specific function (Karmiloff-Smith, 
1998). Imaging the developing brain using fMRI during motor imagery tasks would 
provide a better picture of neural networks that are activated to a lesser or greater extent 
during adolescence. Depending on the synchrony of brain development, different 
regions might be more or less involved at different time points of development. For 
example, PFC is known to be involved in working memory or holding in mind actions 
(Gilbert et al., 2005) and might be more involved in motor imagery in late adolescence, 
whereas the PC might be implicated more in early adolescence. This hypothesis is based 
on the relative rates of maturation of these brain areas and the fact that PFC function 
may also be relevant to this task. This may also be tied to the possibilities that lower
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level developmental events in the brain such as dendritic arborisation, synaptogenesis 
and synaptic pruning, play different roles with greater of lesser influence on cognition at 
different times.
It could be particularly problematic to predict that functions such as action 
representation will be disrupted in ASD in the same way as in adult parietal lesion 
patients simply because of atypical development of parietal morphology in ASD. It 
would be a fallacy to conclude that no difference in the E-I correlation between ASD 
and TD adolescents suggests no developmental differences in the action representation 
system in ASD or to assume this reflects that parietal areas involved in action 
representation are ‘intact’ in ASD. This would be relying on a static picture provided by 
adult imaging and lesion studies which does not incorporate the dynamic nature of 
development. This dissociation logic is unlikely to be applicable to development. One 
interpretation for the lack of difference in motor imagery performance between groups 
could be that ASD adolescents use a different cognitive process to arrive at 
approximately the same level of performance as TD adolescents. This may be because 
of the reorganisation of the brain that takes place in an atypical manner in ASD, but it is 
important to note that this atypical development is also dynamic. In other words, 
reorganisation which might occur in response to abnormal parietal and cerebellar 
morphology in early infancy in ASD would have knock-on effects on the organisation 
and functional roles and specificity of other brain areas.
The study of perspective taking in affective and schizophrenic patients was limited by 
two fundamental constraints. Firstly, there was often a lack of consensus between 
clinicians as to the diagnosis of patients. For this reason, delusions were considered on a 
continuum for part of the analysis and all patients placed in one group. However, the 
measurement o f particular symptoms was also problematic. The PANSS involves 
determining the level of delusional and hallucinatory behaviour, which in turn requires 
consensus on a qualitative definition of delusions and hallucinations. While DSM IV 
provides diagnostic definitions, these also proved to be subject to different 
interpretations that were not always confirmed by different clinicians. Almost every 
clinical patient involved in the study had a context of emotional distress surrounding 
their case. Although each case was individually discussed to contextualise the content 
what was potentially considered a delusion or hallucination, there was often
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disagreement as to whether the description in each case conformed to diagnostic criteria 
(ef. Bell et al., 2006 for a brief discussion of assumptions of criteria for the diagnosis of 
delusional behaviour). Secondly, the results of the study may have been confounded by 
the different types of medication taken by each patient. Each patient had a separate 
constellation of symptoms, for which they were prescribed particular types and varieties 
of medication. It was not possible to test the patients free of medication, or to match the 
medication types between patient groups, and thus, results were contaminated by 
possible side effects such as varying degrees of slowing of reaction speed or adverse 
effects on memory.
7.12.3. Viewing the brain as necessary but not sufficient in an explanatory account o f  
adolescent social cognitive development
This thesis has investigated and interpreted development of social cognitive skills 
within a cognitive neuroscience framework that assumes behaviour is underpinned by 
neurally based cognitive mechanisms. The assumption has therefore been that the 
development of the organisation of the brain gives rise to the functional refinements in 
cognitive mechanisms. The importance of individual differences has already been 
discussed above, where the necessity of studying how differences in levels of self- 
consciousness and introversion/extroversion might influence social cognitive processing 
was emphasised. While it was suggested above that knowledge of the developing brain 
must be taken into account for social and educational policy, a cautionary note about 
this is also important. Adolescence is inextricably bound up with major socio-cultural 
influences, including the change of familial and societal expectations, the changing 
school environments involving qualitatively different peer and adult interactions as well 
as influences from media about the role of adolescents, which itself is subject to 
constant flux. There is therefore a complex reciprocal relationship and interaction 
between biological development and the social environment, both of which must be 
considered as dynamic in nature. O f course, biology places several constraints, at the 
level of genetics and the brain, on cognitive development. These are also most likely 
pre-specified through evolution. However, the findings presented here are best viewed 
within a theoretical framework that considers protracted neocortical development, itself, 
as evolutionarily specified, thus placing more emphasis on the adaptation of the human 
brain for extended learning and flexibility during the socially and culturally demanding 
period of adolescence. It is also noteworthy that the hypotheses and interpretations
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discussed here about adolescence are based on the Western notion of ‘adolescence’ and 
its associated social repertoires. Different cultural practices and socio-economic 
contexts place different sets of constraints on behavioural development during 
adolescence. For example, ‘adolescence’ is a Western construct that is not necessarily 
relevant in many non-Western cultures in which the transition from childhood to 
adulthood is immediate due to different family duties and physical labour needs and 
contrasting values placed on the development of the individual versus the collective (see 
Timimi & Maitra, 2005 for a critique of mainstream medical models of adolescent 
psychology and psychiatry). As such, there is often less emphasis on prolonged social 
development in non-Western cultures. It was suggested above that the adolescent brain 
has evolved to undergo an extended period of plasticity, perhaps in order to enhance 
socio-cultural learning at a period of changing roles. While brain development may be 
universal, the cognitive consequences may be entirely different given the two-way 
interaction between the brain and the socio-cultural environment.
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7.13. Overall conclusions
This thesis has provided novel findings showing development o f social cognitive skills, 
in terms o f cognitive and neural mechanisms, during adolescence. Why should social 
understanding develop at all during adolescence? Adolescents must be equipped with 
the means to negotiate contact in complex social institutions, including the fam ily and 
the school environment. The development o f  social understanding perhaps endows 
adolescents with the skills and motivation to engage collatoratively and collectively in 
new social contexts at adolescence. The development o f  the adolescent brain and social 
cognitive mechanisms may facilitate this period o f refinement o f cultural cognition 
(Tomasello et a i, 2005).
In this thesis, a developmental cognitive neuroscience fram ework has been used, but a 
richer account o f  changes in adolescent learning, strategic and social behaviour 
requires a multidisciplinary approach that recognises the complex interactions between 
genetics, brain structure, physiology and chemistry and the socio-cultural environment. 
Studying the development o f  adolescent cognition using complimentary in vivo methods 
that exploit the advantages o f  a variety o f behavioural and neuroimaging techniques, 
within a theoretical fram ework that regards motor, affective, social and perceptual 
functions as intertwined, promises to further inform our understanding o f typical and 
atypical adolescent behaviour.
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A p p e n d i x  2
P e r s p e c t i v e  t a k i n g  p a r a d i g m
E very  q u estion  screen  (w ith  a w ritten  scen a rio ) w as fo l lo w e d  b y  an a n sw er  screen  (a  
ch oice  o f  tw o  em o tio n a l fa c e s), a s  fo llo w s .
There w ere  tw o  ch o ice  types: O pen  a n d  C lo sed
The O pen con dition  p re se n te d  tw o  equ a lly  a p p ro p r ia te  an sw ers,, w h ile  the C lo sed  
con d ition  p re se n te d  on e co rre c t a n d  one in co rrec t a n sw er  to  the p rec ed in g  question.
E xam ple o f  qu estion  stim ulus:
1PP 3PP
You get told off for A student gets told off
talking during a for talking during a
lesson. lesson.
How do you feel? How does she feel?
E ach a n sw e r  screen  p re se n te d  tw o  o f  the fo llo w in g  em otion  fa c e s :
Happy Very happy Neutral Sad Afraid Angry
R T  to  ch o o se  a  fa c e  though t to  b e s t a n sw er the qu estion  w a s rec o rd ed
256
Appendix 2
E x a m p l e s  o f  q u e s t i o n s  f r o m  p e r s p e c t i v e  t a k i n g  t a s k  f o r  p r e -a d o l e s c e n t s ,
ADOLESCENTS AND ADULTS
(Written emotion choices were depicted as cartoon emotion faces as illustrated on 
previous page)
First-person perspective (1PP)
1. You have had a big argument with your best friend. How do you feel?
Neutral or Sad [Open]
2. You get told off for talking during a lesson at school. How do you feel?
Very happy or Afraid [Closed]
3. You are told that your maths test has been cancelled. How do you feel?
Very happy or neutral [Open]
4. You get autographs from the stars at the opening of a film. How do you feel?
Very happy or Angry [Closed]
5. You find a five-pound note while walking along. How do you feel?
Neutral or Happy [Open]
Third-person perspective (3PP)
1. A girl has had a big argument with your best friend. How does she feel?
Neutral or Sad [Open]
2. A boy gets told off for talking during a lesson at school. How does he feel?
Very happy or Afraid [Closed]
3. A boy is told that his maths test has been cancelled. How does he feel?
Very happy or neutral [Open]
4. A man gets autographs from the stars at the opening of a film. How does he feel? 
Very happy or Angry [Closed]
5. A woman finds a five-pound note while walking along. How does she feel?
Neutral or Happy [Open]
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A p p e n d i x  3 a
E x a m p l e s  o f  q u e s t io n s  f ro m  p e r s p e c t iv e  t a k in g  t a s k  f o r  p s y c h ia t r ic  a d u l t  
p a t ie n t s  in V e r s a il l e s , F r a n c e
First-person perspective (1PP)
1. Un admirateur secret vous envoie un bouquet de fleurs. Comment vous sentez- vous? 
(A secret admirer sends you a bouquet of flowers. How do you feel?)
Happy or Very happy [Open]
2. Votre ami vous offre une caisse de vin pour vous remercier de votre aide. Comment 
vous sentez-vous?
(Your friend gives you a case of wine to thank you for some help. How do you feel?) 
Happy or A f  raid [Closed]
3. Vous realisez que vous avez perdu votre nouvelle montre a une soiree. Comment 
vous sentez-vous?
(You realise you have lost your new watch at a party. How do you feel?)
Neutral or Sad [Open]
4. Vous avez eu une grosse dispute avec votre collegue. Comment vous sentez-vous? 
(You realise you have lost your new watch at a party. How do you feel?)
Angry or Happy [Closed]
5. Le parti politique pour lequel vous avez vote perd les elections finales. Comment vous 
sentez-vous?
(The political party you vote for loses in the general election. How do you feel?)
A ngry or Sad [Open]
Third-person perspective (1PP)
1. Un admirateur secret envoie un bouquet de fleurs a une femme. Comment se sent- 
elle?
(A secret admirer sends a woman a bouquet of flowers. How does she feel?)
Happy or Very happy [Open]
2. Un homme offre une caisse de vin a son amie pour la remercier de son aide. Comment 
se sent-elle ?
(A man gives his friend a case of wine to thank her for some help. How does she 
feel?)
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Happy or Afraid [Closed]
3. Un homme realise qu’il a perdu sa nouvelle montre a une soiree. Comment se sent-il ? 
(A man realises he has lost his new watch at a party. How does he feel?)
Neutral or Sad [Open]
4. Une femme a eu une grosse dispute avec son collegue. Comment se sent-elle ?
(A woman has had a big argument with her colleague. How does she feel?)
Angry or Happy [Closed]
5. Le parti politique pour lequel l ’homme a vote perd les elections finales. Comment se 
sent-il ?
(A man finds out that the political party he voted for loses in the general election. 
How does he feel?)
Angry or Sad [Open]
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A p p e n d i x  3 B
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SYNDROMES SCALE
PANSS
NOM PRENOM
SEXE AGE DATE
EXAMINATEUR
CONSIGNES
Entourer la cotation appropriee a chaque dimension, a la Suite de l’entretien clinique 
specifique. Se reporter au Manuel de Cotation pour la definition des items, la 
description des differents degres et la procedure de cotation.
1 = Absence; 2 = Minime; 3= Legere; 4= Moyenne; 5 = Mod. Severe; 6 = Severe; 7=Extreme 
ECHELLE POSITIVE_______________________________________________________
PI Idees delirantes
P2 Disorganisation conceptuelle
P3 Activite hallucinatoire
P4 Excitation
P5 Idees de grandeur
P6 Mefiance/Persecution
P7 Hostilite
ECHELLE NEGATIVE
N 1 Amusement de fexpression des emotions
N2 Retrait affectif
N3 Mauvais contact
N4 Repli social passif/apathique
N5 Difficultes d ’abstraction
N6 Absence de spontaneite et de fluidite dans la conversation
N7 Pensee stereotype
ECHELLE PSYCHOPATHOLOGIQUE GENERALE
G1 Preoccupations somatiques
G2 Anxiete
G3 Sentiments de culpabilite
G4 Tension
G5 Manierisme et troubles de la posture
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G6 Depression
G7 Ralentissement psychomoteur
G8 Manque de cooperation
G9 Contenu inhabituel de la pensee
G10 Desorientation
G il Manque d ’attention
G12 Manque de jugement et de prise de conscience de la maladie
G13 Trouble de la volition
G14 Mauvais controle pulsionnel
G15 Preoccupation excessive de soi (tendances autistiques)
G16 Evitement social actif
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T r a n s l a t io n  o f  t h e  PANSS s c a l e  from  F r e n c h . E a c h  item  w a s  s c a l e d  from  
1-7 (1 = ABSENCE; 7 = HIGHEST LEVEL)
POSITIVE SCALE
PI Delusional ideation
P2 Conceptual disorganisation
P3 Hallucinations
P4 Agitation
P5 Delusions of grandeur
P6. Delusions of persecution
P7. Hostility
NEGATIVE SCALE
N 1 Emotional bluntness
N2 Affective withdrawal
N3 Poor contact
N4 Social withdrawal
N5 Difficulties in contextualising
N6 Absence of spontaneity and fluidity of conversation
N7 Stereotyped thoughts
GENERAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL SCALE
G1 Somatic anxiety
G2 Anxiety
G3 Feelings of guilt
G4 Nervous tension
G5 Problems with mannerism and posture
G6 Depression
G7 Psychomotor slowing
G8 Lack of co-operation
G9 Unusual thought content
G10 Disorientation
G il Lack of focus
G12 Lack of judgement and consciousness of illness
G13 Disorders of volition
G14 Poor impulse control
G15 Excessive preoccupation with the self (autistic tendencies)
G16 Social avoidance behaviours
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A p pe n d ix  4
E x a m p le s  o f  q u e s t i o n s  f r o m  i n t e n t i o n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  F m ri t a s k  
Intentional Causality (IC)
1. You want to sunbathe but don’t want to get sunburnt.
Do you put on sun screen ?
2. You want to find out what is on at the cinema.
Do you look in the newspaper?
3. You want to be healthy and are choosing lunch.
Do you share the lunch ?
4. Your friend phones and invites you to go to the park.
Do you buy a new book?
5. You can’t find your homework and are late for school.
Do you feed  the pigeons?
Physical Causality (PC)
1. It is summer and the rays of sunshine are very strong.
Does it cause the ground to warm up?
2. It is stormy weather and the sea is very rough.
Does it cause large waves to form?
3. It is very windy and there is a gale outside.
Does it cause the birds to sing ?
4. The flowers in the garden have not been watered.
Does it cause the door to swing open ?
5. The kettle of water is hot and about to boil.
Does it cause the sun to shine brightly ?
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A p p e n d i x  5
P r a x i s  I m a g e r y  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e
(adapted from  Ochipa et al., 1997 and Wilson et a i, 2001)
A l. Kinaesthetic subscale
1. Imagine that you are writing your name with a pencil. Which joint moves more, 
your wrist or your finger joints?
2. Imagine you are cleaning your teeth. Which moves more, your wrist or finger 
joints?
3. Imagine you are eating with a spoon. Which joint moves more, your finger or 
your wrist?
4. Imagine you are flicking on a light switch. Which moves more, your finger joint 
or your elbow joint?
5. Imagine you are zipping up a jacket. Which moves more, your elbow or 
shoulder joints?
6. Imagine you are drinking out of a glass. Which moves more, your wrist or your 
shoulder joints?
7. Imagine you are using a pencil sharpener. Which joint moves more, your wrist 
or elbow joints?
A2. Position subscale
1. Imagine you are writing your name with a pencil. Which is closer to the paper, 
your index finger or your pinky?
2. Imagine you are cleaning your teeth. Is your arm bent or straight?
3. Imagine you are eating with a spoon. Is your hand open or closed?
4. Imagine you are flicking on a light switch. Is your palm facing towards your 
body or away from you?
5. Imagine you are zipping up a jacket. Is your palm facing towards your body or 
away from you?
6. Imagine you are drinking out of a glass. Which is closer to your body, your 
fingers or your thumb?
7. Imagine you are sharpening a pencil. Are your fingers bent or straight?
A J. Action subscale
1. Imagine you are writing your name with your right hand. Does your hand move 
towards or away from your body?
2. Imagine you are cleaning your teeth. Do you move your toothbrush around you 
mouth, or your mouth around your toothbrush?
3. Imagine you are eating soup with a spoon. Do you move the spoon straight 
towards your body or in a circle?
4. Imagine you are flicking on a light switch. Does your finger move up and down, 
or to the side?
5. Imagine you are zipping up a jacket. Does your hand move towards your neck or 
shoulder?
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6. Imagine you are drinking out of a glass. Does the bottom of the glass move 
towards the floor or the roof?
7. Imagine you are sharpening a pencil. Does your hand move in a circle, or up and 
down?
A4. Object subscale
1. Which is wider, the eraser at the end of a pencil or the point?
2. Is the end of the toothbrush you put in your mouth usually rectangular or round?
3. Is a spoon bigger where you hold it, or where you put it in your mouth?
4. Which is bigger, a light switch or a door handle?
5. Does a clothes zip have teeth on both sides before being done up? Yes/No
6. Is a drinking glass usually wider at the top of the glass or at the base?
7. When you put a pencil in a pencil sharpener, is the hole square or round?
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